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In this Article, the authorargues that mandatory, non-binding
federal court-annexed arbitrationprogramswill not succeed in increasingaccess to justice, and may in fact decrease access to justice
for poorer litigants,precisely the people the programs were designed
to help. After exploring the effects of such programs on parties'
litigation decisions and demonstrating that the programs are
unlikely to create private or social benefits, the Article explores the
attributesof privateADR tribunals that partiesfind desirable and
the many ways, apartfrom reducing cost and delay, that private
ADR agreements create value. The Article concludes that, while
the promise of the court-connected ADR movement for solving the
problems facing the federal courts is limited, procedural reform
that explicitly permits parties to combine private ADR and
traditionaladjudication might be desirable.
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In recent years the availability of private dispute resolution
providers, ranging from expert mediators to rent-a-judge programs
complete with black robes and model courtrooms,1 has increased
dramatically. 2 The alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") movement has received extensive press attention and has been hailed as
a solution to crowded dockets and an inexpensive panacea for the
ills of an overly litigious society. Pointing to the rapid growth of
private ADR providers and studies purporting to show a high level
of lawyer and client satisfaction with these alternative processes,
states, joined recently by the federal government, began passing
laws3 requiring parties to participate in an ADR process as a
precondition to judicial resolution of their dispute.
In 1978, Congress authorized the creation of the first three
federal district court-annexed arbitration programs. 4 The programs
1 A private rent-ajudge program is operated by Judicate, a publicly owned
company. See infra note 71 (describingJudicate's services). In addition, California
operates a quasi-public rent-ajudge program. Parties pay a retired judge to hear their
case and issue an opinion which can then be appealed as if a regular trial had been
held. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 638-645 (West 1993). The California program has
been criticized on the grounds that it creates a two-tiered system ofjustice, enabling
the rich to get in line for an appellate decision four or five years before the poor even
have a trial date. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRIVATE JUDGES 19-20
(1992).
2 See EllenJ. Pollock, Business of MediatingBrings in Big Money, WALL ST. J., Mar.
22, 1993, at B1, B9 (describing the burgeoning caseloads of for-profit ADR providers
such asJudicial Arbitration & Mediation Services, Inc., Endispute, Inc., andJudicate,
Inc.).
3 Throughout the seventies and eighties state legislatures passed ADR legislation
at an increasingly rapid rate. In 1980, state legislatures passed fewer than five ADR
bills. In 1989, they passed 34 of 140 proposed ADR-related bills. See AMERICAN BAR
Assoc., LEGISLATION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 75 (1990). As of 1988, the latest date

for which complete data are available, twenty-two states and the District of Columbia
operated some type of court-annexed arbitration program for civil claims. See Susan
Keilitz et al., State Adoption of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Where is it Today?, STATE
CT. J., Spring 1988, at 4, 6.
4 The three districts were the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Northern
District of California, and the District of Connecticut. The District of Connecticut
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required parties to participate in a mandatory non-binding courtannexed arbitration ("CAA") hearing as a precondition to obtaining
a trial. The programs received strong support from then Attorney
General Griffin Bell, who believed that compulsory court-annexed
arbitration programs would "broaden access for the American
people to their justice system and... provide mechanisms that will
5
permit the expeditious resolution of disputes at a reasonable cost." 6
In 1985, Congress funded eight additional CAA pilot programs.
In 1988, it authorized continued experimentation with mandatory
CAA 7 and provided funding for ten voluntary CAA pilot programs. 8
The trend towards publicly sponsored or mandated ADR shows
no signs of abating. 9 One of the six "cornerstone principles" of the
discontinued its program in 1982, citing disproportionate administrative costs.
However, it continues to experiment with other forms of ADR such as "using special
masters to facilitate settlement, binding and non-binding mediation and mini-trials,
judicially supervised settlement conferences, and summaryjury trials." BARBARA S.
MEIERHOEFER, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN
DISTRICT COURTS 14 n.4 (1990) [hereinafter MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN TEN DIST. CTS.].
5 The Court-AnnexedArbitrationAct of 1978: Hearingson S. 2253 Before the Subcomm.
on Improvements inJudicialMachiney of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong.,
2d. Sess 21 (1978) (statement of Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General).
6 See MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN TEN DIST. CTS., supra note 4, at 15.
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 651(a) (1988).
8 See id. § 658.
9 See James F. Henry, No Longer a Rarity, Judicial ADR is Preparingfor Great
Growth-But Much Care is Needed, 9 ALTERNATIVES 95, 95 (1991) (reporting that "40
percent of federal district courts and nearly half the circuits have enacted formal ADR
rules"); see alsoJohn L. Barkai & Gene Kassebaum, Using Court-Annexed Arbitrationto
Reduce Litigant Costs and to Increase the Pace of Litigation, 16 PEPP. L. REV. S43, S44
(1989) (arguing that the success of Hawaii's state tort claim CAA program, which has
ajurisdictional limit of$150,000, demonstrates that an arbitration program need not
be limited to low-value civil cases); RaymondJ. Broderick, Court-Annexed Compulsory
Arbitration: It Works, 72JUDICATURE 217, 217 (1989) (arguing that the success of the
state and federal court-annexed ADR programs suggests that "now is the time to
consider making court-annexed compulsory arbitration an integral part of our federal
judicial system so that it will become available to all our U.S. [D]istrict [C]ourts").
Recently, the Advisory Committee to the Federal District Court for the District of
NewJersey, recommended that the district's CAA program be greatly expanded. See
JudicialADR Reducing Expenses and Delays, 9 ALTERNATIVES 179, 179 (1991).
The trend toward government-sponsored ADR is not confined to the courts. The
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104
Stat.) 2736 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 581-593 (West Supp. 1993)), directs
each government agency to appoint an ADR coordinator to study the feasibility of
using ADR in place of agency adjudication. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 581 note (West Supp.
1993) (Promotion of Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution). Similarly, a number
of recently introduced health care reform bills contain provisions that require certain
types of medical malpractice claims to be submitted to publicly administered ADR
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Civil justice Reform Act of 199010 was "expanding and enhancing
the use of alternative dispute resolution."1 1 The Act directed each
federal district court to complete a cost and delay reduction plan
and to specifically consider the possibility of instituting courtconnected ADR programs. 12 As of February 1992, thirty-two of
the thirty-four federal courts that had completed these plans either
endorsed or adopted some type of court-connected ADR.13 In
addition, the Federal Courts Study Committee, which was created
to "develop a long-range plan for . . . the Federal judiciary,
including assessments involving ... alternative methods of dispute
resolution,"14 recommended that Congress "broaden statutory
authorization for local rules for alternative and supplementary
procedures in civil litigation, including rules for cost and fee
incentives."15
Despite its widespread acceptance by lawmakers and most legal
scholars, 16 the effects of court-annexed arbitration programs on

programs. See, e.g., H.R. 101, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 212 (1993) (stating that "[nlo
medical malpractice liability action may be brought in any state court... unless the
claim.., has been initially resolved under an alternative dispute resolution system").
10 Pub. L. No. 101-650, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 5089 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. III 1991)).
1 S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6803, 6823.
12 See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (Supp. 11 1990).
13 See Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures Increase, CT. ADMIN. BULL.,
Feb. 1992, at 2, 2, 18-20.
14 Federal Courts Study Act, § 102(b)(2)(A), Pub. L. No. 100-702, 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 4644, 4644 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988)).
15 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY

COMMITTEE 83 (1990). In addition, the recently introduced Access to justice Act of
1992, S. 2180, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), includes several ADR provisions and
reflects the view that ADR processes should become an integral part of the federal
courts. See, e.g., id. § 7. The Act also evidences strong support for using fee and costshifting provisions to induce settlement and discourage unnecessary discovery
motions. See, e.g., id. § 3.
16 See, e.g., MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN TEN DIST. CTS., supra note 4, at 12 (surveying

the FederalJudicial Center's empirical studies of the CAA pilot programs and recommending that "Congress enact an arbitration provision... authorizing arbitration in
all federal district courts, to be mandatory or voluntary in the discretion of the
court"); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Mediationwith a Mugger: The Shortageof Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1808, 1839-40 (1986) (endorsing CAA as an access-increasing reform and a sensible
response to the shortage of adjudicative services); Barkai & Kassebaum, supra note 9,
at S45 (concluding that "Hawaii's [state] Court-Annexed Arbitration Program
increases the pace of litigation and reduces litigation costs while maintaining adequate
levels of satisfaction of the participants"); Wayne D. Brazil, A Close Look at Three CourtSponsored ADR Programs: Why They Exis How They Operate, What They Deliver, and
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parties' litigation decisions have yet to be systematically examined.
Furthermore, in their rush to adopt court-connected ADR programs,
whose benefits were allegedly proven by the widespread use of
private ADR, lawmakers have ignored a fundamental difference
between the programs they laud and the legislation they have
passed-namely that private ADR proceedings are conducted with
the parties' consent, while participation in many public ADR
processes is required by law.
This Article explores the ways that various features and
proposed features of federal CAA programs could be expected to
influence litigant behavior.
It considers whether, given the
availability of private ADR fora at relatively low cost, there are any
compelling justifications-from the perspective of either the parties

Whether They ThreatenImportant Values, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 303, 397 (arguing that
none of the federal CAA programs studied "is seriously vulnerable to criticisms that
have been articulated of court-sponsored ADR programs in general, and that each of
these programs offers significant benefits to litigants without causing serious harm
to competing interests"); RaymondJ. Broderick, Yes to MandatoryCourt-Annexed ADR,
LrrIG., Summer 1992, at 3, 60 (arguing that given the caseload in the federal courts,
court-annexed ADR is a necessary step in "adapt[ing] our federal judicial system to
the ever-changing conditions of national life"); Broderick, supra note 9, at 217
(arguing that "now is the time to consider making court-annexed compulsory
arbitration an integral part of our federal judicial system"); Richard A. Enslen, ADR:
Another Acronym, or a Viable Alternative to the High Cost ofLitigation and Crowded Court
Dockets? The Debate Commences, 18 N.M. L. REV. 1, 30-33 (1988) (arguing that while
current empirical data do not demonstrate their beneficial effects, the policy
arguments in favor of court-annexed ADR programs are so strong that such programs
should nevertheless be continued until further studies are concluded); Leo Kanowitz,
Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration Experience, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 239, 302-03 (1987) (acknowledging some of the arguments against CAA
programs, but concluding that on balance, if properly administered, they are likely
to be beneficial); Paul Nejelski & Andrew S. Zeldin, Court-Annexed Arbitration in the
Federal Courts: The Philadelphia Story, 42 MD. L. REV. 787 (1983) (arguing for
expansion of federal CAA programs);Jessica Pearson, An Evaluation of Alternatives to
Court Adjudication, 7JuST. SYS.J. 420, 420 (1982) (reviewing the empirical literature
and concluding that "[c]ompared with their voluntary counterparts, mandatory
mediation and arbitration programs come closer to succeeding (and in some cases do
succeed) in reducing court congestion and achieving public cost savings too"); Robert
F. Peckham, A JudicialResponse to the Cost of Litigation: Case Managemen Two-Stage
Discovery Planningand Alternative DisputeResolution, 37 RUTGERs L. REV. 253, 267-77
(1985) (arguing in favor of CAA as part of an integrated case management program
in the federal courts). But see Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution
in the Federal Courts, 76 IowA L. REV. 889, 915 (1991) (arguing that the perception
that ADR is an effective method of caseload management "lacks solid empirical
justification"); G. Thomas Eisele, From the Bench: No to Mandatory Court-AnnexedADR,
LMG., Fall 1991, at 3, 3 (arguing that mandatory non-binding arbitration programs
undermine "the symbolic status of our singlejudge-generalist Article III federal trial
court").
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or the state-for the federal government to become a provider of
mandatory non-binding CAA services.
Part I describes the basic features of federal CAA pilot programs
and highlights the most important differences in the local rules
governing the programs. Part II focuses on justifications for
government provision of CAA services. After briefly describing the
market for private ADR, it explores the barriers to parties' contracting for private ADR when its use can produce private benefits, and
considers whether mandating participation in non-binding CAA
programs will result in parties' capturing these private benefits when
such barriers exist. The section then focuses on whether the
programs will produce private or social benefits by reducing the
number of nuisance 17 or negative expected value suits 18 filed,
reducing the private or social cost of litigation, decreasing delay, or
increasing access to justice.
Part III is the core of the Article. It uses numerical simulations
of a model of the litigation process in a CAA jurisdiction with a
post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting rule to explore the programs'
effect on parties' litigation decisions. 19 The simulations demonstrate that when both parties are overly optimistic, the most
common cause of failure to settle, CAA programs may actually
reduce the likelihood of pre-trial settlement. The simulations are
also used to explore the programs' effect on the settlement range
at various stages in the litigation process and to highlight the
programs' largely unanticipated distributional effects. The results
suggest that parties are most likely to accept the arbitration award
when it most accurately reflects the cost of invoking the judicial
process and the inequality of bargaining power between them.
Finally, the section discusses the programs' effects on total litigation
costs and the amount of discovery conducted, and concludes that
CAA programs will tend to systematically disadvantage poorer and
more risk-averse litigants, precisely the litigants the programs were
designed to help.
Part IV argues that the limits of the ability of court-connected
ADR programs to create private value and achieve other social goals
can only be understood by exploring the differences between
private and public ADR. The section begins by considering the
See infra text accompanying note 117 (defining a nuisance suit).
18 See infra text accompanying note 134 (defining a negative expected value suit).
17

19 The model used to generate the simulations is presented in the Technical
Appendix, infra.
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features of private ADR tribunals that parties find desirable but that

cannot be fully replicated in public programs. It then distinguishes
between ex ante and ex post ADR agreements and discusses a
variety of ways, apart from reducing cost and delay, that private
ADR provisions create value. The section concludes that while
government-provided ADR may not be a solution to many of the
problems facing the federal courts, it might be desirable to amend
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to explicitly permit parties to
contract to use ADR in conjunction with, or as a substitute for,
certain pre-trial procedures.
This Article concludes that further experimentation with CAA
is undesirable, since contrary to the hopes of the programs'
supporters, CAA programs will not succeed in promoting for "all
citizens-rich or poor, individual or corporation, plaintiff or
defendant-the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of civil
disputes in our Nation's Federal courts." 20 Justice for "the middle
class of this country [for whom] the courthouse door is rapidly
being slammed shut"21 will not be achieved and many litigants will
be even worse off than they would have been in the absence of the
program.
I. THE BASIC FEATURES OF COURT-ANNEXED
ARBITRATION PROGRAMS

The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act2 2 sets out

the basic structure of federal CAA programs, but gives each district
the authority to adopt local rules specifying important program
23
features.
Suits for predominantly money damages that fall below a
particular amount in controversy, which, depending on the district,
ranges from $50,000 to $150,00024 and do not involve federal
20 S. REP. No.
21 Id. at 6809.
22 Pub. L. No.

416, supranote 11, at 1, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6803.

100-702, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 4642 (codified as amended
in scattered
sections
of 28 U.S.C.).
2
3 See id. § 651, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) at 4659 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 651

(1988)).
24 Although 28 U.S.C. § 652(a)(1)(B) sets the jurisdictional limit at $100,000, it
permits districts "whose local rule [already)... provides for a limitation on money
damages... of not more than $150,000, [to] continue to apply the higher limitation."
28 U.S.C. § 652 note (1988) (Exception

to Limitation on Money Damages).

Currently, the $150,000 limit applies in the Northern District of California, the
Middle District of Florida, the Middle District of North Carolina, and the Western
District of Texas. See N.D. CAL. Loc. CT. R. 500(2)(a)(i)(A); M.D. FLA. LOc. CT. R.
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constitutional claims or conspiracies to interfere with civil rights,
must be submitted to non-binding arbitration before a trial can be
requested. 25 In some districts, the parties or the trial judge may
make a motion to exempt the case from arbitration where "the
objectives of arbitration would not be realized (1) because the case
involves complex or novel legal issues, (2) because legal issues
26
predominate over factual issues, or (3) for other good cause."
In most districts the maximum amount in controversy is ajurisdictional limit, not a cap on the damages an arbitrator can award.2 7

8.02(a)(1)(B); M.D.N.C. LOc. CT. R. 602(a)(1); W.D. TEX. LOc. CT. R. CV-87(c)(1)(a).
Although the jurisdictional limits are low, "as CAA has spread so has pressure
to raise the monetary ceiling; some federal courts are now considering limits of
$200,000 or more." A Taxonomy ofJudicialADR, 9 ALTERNATIVES 97, 109 (1991). In
addition, many judges in the pilot districts support raising the jurisdictional limit
and/or broadening the types of cases included in the program. See, e.g., BARBARA
MEIERHOEFER, FEDERALJUDICIAL CTR., COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THE EASTERN

DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 16 (1989) [hereinafter MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN THE E.D.N.Y.]
(indicating that a majority ofjudges there are generally opposed to increasing the
district's $50,000 limit, but support including a broader range of cases in the
program); BARBARA MEIERHOEFER & CARROLL SERON, FEDERALJUDICIAL CTR., COURTANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 17 (1988) [hereinafter

MEIERHOEFER & SERON, CAA IN THE M.D. FLA.] (noting that four out of six judges
support raising the jurisdictional limit, but only three support including a broader
range of cases); BARBARA MEIERHOEFER & CARROLL SERON, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR.,
COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 17 (1988)

[hereinafter MEIERHOEFER & SERON, CAA IN THE N.D. CAL.] ("IF]ive of the seven
judges said they would consider amending their local rule both to add more types of
civil cases to the program and to increase the dollar ceiling."); BARBARA
MEIERHOEFER, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 19 (1988) [hereinafter MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN THE
W.D. OKLA.] (reporting thatjudges there support increasing the jurisdictional limit
but generally oppose including a broader range of cases).
25 See 28 U.S.C. § 652 (1988).
26 Id. § 652(c); see also W.D. OKLA. LOc. CT. R. 43(E). This rule is typical of most
programs. The Middle District of North Carolina also provides for an exemption
when "mandatory arbitration will not likely accomplish the purpose of these rules."
M.D.N.C. LOc. CT. R. 602(b). The most common ground for requesting exemption,
however, is that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional limit. In the
Middle District of North Carolina, for example, of the 83 cases designated for arbitration, exemption motions were filed in 40 cases and granted in 31. See BARBARA
MEIERHOEFER, FEDERALJUDICIAL CTR., COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THE MIDDLE
DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 15 & n.12 (1989) [hereinafter MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN
THE M.D.N.C.]. Of the requests, 39 were based at least partially on the grounds that
the jurisdictional limit was exceeded. See id. at 17. The exemption rate for cases
initially identified as being eligible for arbitration ranges from 4-30%.
See
MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN TEN DIST. CTs., supra note 4, at 47 tbl. 8.

27 See, e.g., D.N.J. LOC. CT. R. 47(C)(4), which provides that the arbitrator can
award more than the $100,000 jurisdictional limit as well as punitive damages.
Similarly, neither the Northern District of California nor the Middle District of
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Hearings are conducted by either a single arbitrator or a panel
28
of three arbitrators chosen from a volunteer pool of lawyers.
Hearings take place 80 to 180 days after the filing of the answer and
decisions are rendered shortly thereafter.29 In some districts,
hearings are open to the public, in others, they are closed. 30 The

Florida impose a limit on the amount the arbitrator can award. See M.D. FLA. LOC.
CT. R. 8.05(a); MEIERHOEFER & SERON, CAA IN THE N.D. CAL., supra note 24, at 55.
In the Eastern District of New York, however, arbitrators do not have the authority
to render an award greater than $100,000. See E.D.N.Y. LOC. ARB. R. 6 (a); see also
W.D. MICH. Loc. CT. R. 43(i)(2) (allowing awards over $100,000 only if both parties
consented to arbitration).
28 In some districts the clerk's office chooses the arbitrators. In others, the parties
participate in their selection. See M.D. FLA. LOC. CT. R. 8.03(a) (giving the parties 20
days to select, by agreement, "not more than three certified arbitrators," and noting
that if they fail to do so the selection is made by the clerk's office); M.D.N.C. LOC.
CT. R. 603(a)(4) (giving the parties 15 days to "select an arbitrator from the list of
arbitrators maintained by the clerk.., or [allowing them to] select any other person,
whether or not an attorney, on the basis of that person's expertise or experience").
29 Although not all districts have a rule specifying the length of time an arbitrator

has to render ajudgment, the emphasis of the programs is on speed. For example,
Congress directs the arbitrators to file their awards "promptly after the arbitration

hearing is concluded." 28 U.S.C. § 6 54(a) (1988). The Western District of Michigan
provides that "[t]he arbitrator shall endeavor to announce the award to the parties
immediately upon conclusion of the hearing, but in any event shall file the award...
not more than ten... days following the close of the hearing." W.D. MICH. Loc. CT.

R. 43(i)(1); see also W.D. OKLA. LoC. CT. R. 43(O)(1) (same).
30 All of the local district court rules dealing with the CAA pilot programs are
silent on the question of whether or not non-parties have a right to attend arbitration
hearings. However, most districts have an informal policy regarding access to
arbitration hearings. In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Middle District of
North Carolina, and the Eastern District of New York, where the CAA program is
viewed as an alternative to a trial rather than as a settlement device, see BARBARA
MEIERHOEFER, FEDERALJUDICIAL CTR., COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 1 (1988) [hereinafter MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN THE E.D.
PA.]; MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN THE E.D.N.Y., supra note 24, at 1-2; MEIERHOEFER, CAA
IN THE M.D.N.C., supra note 26, at 1, the arbitration hearings are conducted in the
courthouse and are open to the public. Although a party may make a motion to close
the hearing, in deciding whether or not to grant the motion, the judge will apply the
same standard that would be used to determine whether or not to grant a motion to
close a trial to the public. Telephone Interview with Mr. Heinerich, Clerk, Eastern
District of New York (Apr. 24, 1993); Telephone Interview with Joseph Benedetto,
Chief Deputy Clerk, Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Apr. 23, 1993); Telephone
Interview with Mr. Creekmore, Arbitration Clerk, Middle District of North Carolina
(Apr. 23, 1993). In contrast, in the District of New Jersey, the Western District of
Oklahoma, the Middle District of Florida, and the Northern District of California,
where the arbitration hearing is viewed as either a settlement device or a case
management technique, see BARBARA MEIERHOEFER, FEDERALJUDICIAL CTR., COURTANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 1-2 (1989) [hereinafter
MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN THE D.N.J.]; MEIERHOEFER & SERON, CAA IN THE M.D. FLA.,
supra note 24, at 1-2; MEIERHOEFER & SERON, CAA IN THE N.D. CAL., supra note 24,
at 1; MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN THE W.D. OKLA., supra note 24, at 1-2, arbitration
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amount of pre-arbitration discovery permitted 31 and the types of
pre-trial motions decided prior to the hearing are governed by local
3 2
rule, subject to certain constraints imposed by Congress.

hearings are frequently held in the arbitrator's office and are generally closed to the
public. This practice, however, has never been challenged. Telephone Interview with
Carol Coleman, Arbitration Clerk, District of NewJersey (Apr. 23, 1993); Telephone
Interview withJane Cummings, Chief Deputy Clerk, Middle District of Florida (Apr.
23, 1993); Telephone Interview with Davis Loupe, ADR Administration, Northern
District of California (Apr. 23, 1993); Telephone Interview with Patricia Presley,
Deputy Court Clerk, Western District of Oklahoma (Apr. 23, 1993). In the Western
District of Missouri, which recently discontinued its CAA program, the hearing was
viewed as a substitute for trial, but was closed to the public. Telephone Interview
with former Arbitration Clerk, Western District of Missouri (Apr. 23, 1993).
31 All CAA programs seek to reduce litigant costs by limiting pre-arbitration
discovery in some way-most commonly by imposing strict discovery deadlines. See,
e.g., E.D. PA. LOG. CT. R. 8(4)(A) (stating that parties have "(90) days ... from the
date the answer was filed to complete discovery unless the judge to whom the case
has been assigned orders a shorter or longer period"); M.D. FLA. LOC. CT. R. 8.03(a),
8.04(a) (noting that parties have 20 days to choose an arbitrator, and if they fail to
agree, the clerk selects one, with the hearing held within 90 days thereafter);
M.D.N.C. LOC. CT. R. 603(a)(3), (d) (establishing "a 90 day deadline for the conduct
of discovery which must be completed in a diligent and expeditious fashion"); N.D.
CAL. LOc. CT. R. 500(5)(a) (providing that the arbitration hearing must be held 20
to 120 days after referral to the program); W.D. MIGH. LOc. CT. R. 4 3 (g) (limiting
discovery to "one hundred and twenty ... days from and after the last responsive
pleading"); W.D. Mo. LOC. CT. R. 30(E)(1) (stating that the parties have 120 days to
complete discovery and cautioning that the standards for granting an extension of this
period are very strict); W.D. OKLA. LOG. CT. R. 43(G)(1), (4) (attempting to limit
discovery more directly by providing that only "[c]ritical discovery necessary for
purposes of meeting the goals of an arbitration hearing shall be completed prior to
the hearing," which is normally held "prior to the discovery cut-off date scheduled for
the trial case"); W.D. TEX. LOc. CT. R. CV-87(f)(1) (providing that the "hearing shall
begin no later than sixty (60) days after the filing of an answer"); MEIERHOEFER, CAA
IN THE D.N.J., supra note 30, at 10 (reporting that the hearing is usually held six
months after the answer is filed).
Two jurisdictions also have rules limiting post-arbitration discovery. M.D.N.C.
LOc. CT. R. 603(d) provides that "[e]xcept in exceptional circumstances, no additional
discovery will be permitted when a trial de novo has been demanded after an
arbitration award." Combined with the district's 90-day deadline for the conduct of
discovery, the CAA program appears to be largely a discovery control tool. See
M.D.N.C. LOc. CT. R. 603(a)(3); see also W.D. MO. LOc. CT. R. 30(K)(1) (stating that
post-arbitration discovery is only permitted on motion accompanied by a very specific
statement of what is sought and a proposed scheduling order).
For a discussion of the ways these discovery limitations might increase the cost
of discovery and reduce the amount of information exchanged, see infranotes 221-28
and accompanying text.
32 See 28 U.S.C. § 653(b) (1988). The statute provides:
[a]n arbitration hearing under this chapter shall begin within a time period
specified by the district court, but in no event later than 180 days after the
filing of an answer, except that the arbitration proceeding shall not, in the
absence of the consent of the parties, commence until 30 days after the
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At the arbitration hearing, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not
apply. 33 Arbitrators may permit the introduction of any credible
non-privileged evidence, including hearsay.a 4 The arbitrators are
not required to issue written or oral findings of fact or conclusions
36
of law,3 5 and at least one district prohibits them from doing so.
A few districts encourage live testimony,3 7 while others discourage
it, providing by local rule that "the presentation of testimony shall
be kept to a minimum, and that cases shall be presented to the
arbitrators primarily through the statements and arguments of
Counsel." 3 8
One district bans live testimony altogether and
requires that "[a]ll evidence shall be presented through counsel who
may incorporate argument on such evidence in his or her presenta40
tion."3 9 Some programs limit the length of the hearing.
disposition by the district court of any motion to dismiss the complaint,
motion forjudgment on the pleadings, motion to join necessary parties, or
motion for summaryjudgment, if the motion was filed duringa time period
specified by the district court. The 180-day and 30-day periods specified in
the preceding sentence may be modified by the court for good cause shown.
Id.
3 See, e.g., M.D.N.C. LOC. ARB. R. 6 0 6 (g) ("The arbitrator shall weigh all evidence
presented upon assessment of its relevance and trustworthiness. The Federal Rules
of Evidence shall not apply, except for rules concerning privilege or protection."); see
also N.D. CAL. Loc. CT. R. 500(5)(c) ("[T]he arbitrator shall be guided by the Federal
Rules of Evidence, but shall not thereby be precluded from receiving evidence which
he considers to be relevant and trustworthy and is not privileged."); W.D. TEX. Loc.
Cr. R. CV-87(f)(4)(a) (same).
34

See supra note 33.

15 See, e.g., W.D. TEX. LOC. CT. R. CV-87(g)(2) (providing that the award need only
"state clearly and concisely the name or names of the prevailing party or parties and
the party or parties against which it is rendered, and the precise amount of money
or other relief, if any, awarded").
36 According to a leading CAA proponent, the Honorable RaymondJ. Broderick,
Senior Judge, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania:
[a]t the conclusion of the testimony, the panel makes an award-for
example, in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $- against one or more
defendants or in favor of the defendant(s). The arbitrators are instructed
not to file findings of fact, conclusions of law, or an opinion of any kind.
They are not to indicate whether the decision was or was not unanimous.
Broderick, supra note 16, at 4.
17 See, e.g., N.D. CAL. LOC. Gr. R. 500(5)(c) (noting that "attendance of witnesses
may be compelled").
38 M.D. FLA. Loc. CT. R. 8.04(d); see also W.D. MICH. Loc. CT. R. 43(h)(5)
(providing that although witnesses may testify, "[i]t is contemplated that presentations
will be made in summary fashion"); W.D. Mo. LOC. CT. R. 30(H)(5) (providing that
"[t]he presentation of testimony should be kept to a minimum").
39 W.D. OKLA. Loc. Gr. R. 43(I)(3).
40 See W.D. MICH. LOC. Gr. R. 43(h)(5) (providing that "[e]ach party shall be
allowed a maximum of 2 /2 hours for the presentation of its case"); W.D. OKLA. Loc.
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Good faith participation in the arbitration hearing is required
of both the parties and their counsel.41 Most districts require
parties to be present at the hearing, 42 and some districts require
the presence of a person with full settlement authority.4 3 Although the authority of the court to order a person with settlement
authority to be present at an arbitration hearing has yet to be
definitively established, an en banc panel of the Seventh Circuit has
upheld a district judge's authority to order a person with full
44
settlement authority to be present at a settlement conference.
In some districts, if either the nonattendance of a party or the
preparation and presentation of counsel is deemed not to constitute
"participation in a meaningful way" in the arbitration process, the
court can impose monetary sanctions and/or strike a party's

CT. R. 43(I)(2) (giving each side one hour to present its case).
41 See W.D. OKLA. LOc. CT. R. 43(I)(5) (providing that "failure to participate in
good faith may constitute default"); D.N.J. LOc. CT. R. 47(E)(3) (giving the judge the
right to impose sanctions for failure to meaningfully participate in the arbitration
hearing); E.D. PA. LOc. CT. R. 8(E) ("In the event, however, that a party fails to
participate in the trial [before the arbitrators] in a meaningful manner, the court may
impose additional sanctions, including but not limited to the striking of any demand
for a trial de novo by that party."); W.D. MO. LOG. CT. R. 30(L) ("If a party fails to
participate in the arbitration process in a meaningful fashion, the Court may impose
appropriate sanctions, including but not limited to an entry ofjudgment by the Court
upon the arbitrators' award.").
42 See, e.g., M.D. FLA. LOG. R. 8.04(d) ("Individual parties or authorized
representatives of corporate parties shall attend the arbitration hearing unless
excused in advance by the arbitrators for good cause shown."); M.D.N.C. LOG. CT. R.
606(f) (requiring parties to be present at the arbitration hearing unless excused in
"exceptional circumstances").
43 See, e.g., W.D MICH. LOc. CT. R. 43(h)(4) ("Each individual who is a party shall
attend the hearing in person. Each party which is a corporation, governmental body,
or other entity, including an unnamed party, shall be represented at the hearing by
an officer or other person with complete settlement authority."); W.D. OKLA. LOc.
CT. R. 43(I)(1)-(2) ("In addition to lead counsel.., a person with actual settlement
authority must ... be present for the hearing. This may not be counsel (except
inhouse [sic] counsel) ....
Other interested parties such as insurers or indemnifiers
shall attend and are subject to the provisions of this Rule.").
44 See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 848 F.2d 1415 (7th Cir.
1988) (en banc); see also Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44, 46, 47 (E.D. Ky. 1987)
(discussing, in an opinion filed after the case had been settled, the court's authority
to strike the defendant's pleadings as a sanction for failing to obey an order that a
person with full settlement authority attend a settlement conference and concluding
that the authority existed, since the "exigencies of modern dockets demand the
adoption of novel and imaginative means [such as] . . . compulsory arbitration,
summaryjury trials, imposing reasonable limits on trial time, or, as here, the relatively
innocuous device ofrequiringa settlement conference [to be] attended by the clients
as well as the attorneys").
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demand for a trial de novo ("trial"). 45 The court's authority to
strike a party's demand for a trial has been upheld by several district
courts, 4 6 but has not yet been considered by any court of appeals.
After the arbitrator has rendered an award, which may,
depending on the local rule, include costs, 47 each party has thirty
days to request a trial.48 When a party requests a trial, the case is
restored to its original place on the docket and treated as if it had
49
never been arbitrated; neither the record of the hearing, if made,
nor the arbitrators' decision are admissible at trial.50 In the pilot
range from forty-six to seventydistricts, trial de novo request rates
51
four percent of arbitrated cases.
Some districts have disincentives to requesting a trial. Most
districts require the party requesting a trial to post a bond with the
court in the amount of the arbitrators' fees and costs which,
45 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
46 See, e.g., New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp. 712 (E.D.

Pa. 1983), where the court struck the defendant's request for a trial after concluding
that (1) the defendant received notice of the arbitration hearing, (2) the defendant

never requested a continuance, (3) neither the defendant nor counsel nor any
witnesses on her behalf appeared at the arbitration hearing, (4) defendant gave no
reason for her failure to appear, and, in contrast, (5) the plaintiff appeared at the
hearing, presented evidence, and was awarded a recovery. In Block v. T.G.& Y Stores
Co., No. 87-0490-CV-W-9, 1989 U.S. Dist. WL 23202, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 22, 1989),
the court struck the defendant's request for a trial on the grounds that he had failed
to meaningfully Participate in the arbitration hearing. The court noted that
"[w]ithout an enforceable requirement that litigants participate meaningfully in the
arbitration process, the goals of the arbitration program are threatened ....
Essentially, arbitration would be a default proceeding, a meaningless proceeding
preparatory to a district court trial." Id. at *3-*4. Similarly, in Gilling v. Eastern
Airlines, 680 F. Supp. 169 (D.N.J. 1988), the court imposed sanctions on a corporate
defendant litigating against an individual plaintiff for failure to participate in a CAA
hearing in good faith. It noted that the
purposes [of the program] are thwarted when a party to the arbitration
enters into it with the intention from the outset of rejecting its outcome and
demanding a trial de novo. Rather than reducing the cost and promoting
efficiency in the system, such an attitude increases the costs and reduces the
efficiency. Furthermore, such conduct can serve to discourage the poorer
litigant and diminish his or her resolve to proceed to final judgment.
Id. at 170.
47 See 28 U.S.C. § 655(d)(1)(a) (1988).
48 See id. § 655(a).
49 No public record of the arbitration is made, but most programs permit a party
to make a record at his own expense if it is done in an unobtrusive manner and a
copy is provided to his opponent free of charge. See, e.g., M.D.N.C. Loc. CT. R.
606(c); N.D. CAL. LOC. CT. R. 500(5)(d); W.D. MICH. LOC. Cr. R. 43(a)(6); W.D.
OKLA. LOC. CT. R. 43(5); W.D. TEX. Loc. CT. R. CV-87(f)(5).
50 See 28 U.S.C. § 655(c).
51 See MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN TEN DIST. CTs., supra note 4, at 49 tbl. 9.
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depending on the district and the number of arbitrators, can range
from $125 to $450 for the typical case. 52 Although complex cases
often cost substantially more to arbitrate, most districts put a cap on
the amount of the bond a party can be required to post in order to
obtain a trial.58 If the party requesting the trial improves his
position at trial, this bond is returned to him; if he fails to do so, it
54
is retained by the court.
In the past, some districts had a rule requiring the party
requesting a trial to pay his opponent's post-arbitration attorneys'
fees and/or costs if he failed to improve his position at trial. 55
The authority of courts to enact such local rules absent congressional authorization was a question of some dispute.
In 1988,
Congress decided that pending further study by the Federal Courts
Study Committee, such provisions should not be part of the pilot
programs. 5 6 However, in its 1990 report, the Committee recommended that Congress authorize the pilot districts to experiment
with fee and cost-shifting provisions, 5 7 common features of many
58
state CAA programs.
52 See id. at 38 tbl. 3G. Some districts have recently increased arbitrator fees.
Other districts "offer non-monetary incentives to arbitrators by exempti[ng] them

from certain Criminal Justice Act appointments." Id. at 37.
53 For example, in the Middle District of North Carolina, $800 is the maximum
bond that can be required. See M.D.N.C. LOC. CT. R. 604(d) (describing the
calculation of the maximum permissible arbitration fees and costs); see also E.D. PA.
LOC. CT. R. 8(7)(E) (setting the maximum bond at $75 per arbitrator).
54 See MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN TEN DIST. CTS., supra note 4, at 40 tbl. 31
(summarizing the disincentives to requesting a trial de novo). In some districts, the
court retains the authority to return the bond if the trial was requested "for good
cause." 28 U.S.C. § 655(2)(B) (1988); see also M.D. FLA. Loc. CT. R. 806(d).
55 The Northern District of California had a post-arbitration cost-shifting rule. See
MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN TEN DIST. CTS., supra note 4, at 134. The Western District of
Michigan had a rule providing that attorney fees could be shifted if the party
requesting a trial did not obtain a trial judgment 10% more favorable than the
arbitration award. See id. The Western District of Oklahoma had a similar rule but
both costs and fees were shifted. See id. at 136.
56 Federal Courts Study Act, § 102(b)(2)(A), Pub. L. No. 100-702, 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 4644, 4644 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988)).
57 See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 15, at 81.
58 For example, in the Arizona state court-annexed arbitration program, when a
party requests a trial:
If the judgment on the trial de novo is not more favorable . .. [than] the
arbitration award, the court shall order the deposit [of the arbitrator's fees
posted at the time the trial was requested] to be used to pay, or that the
appellant pay if the deposit is insufficient, the following costs and fees,
unless the [c]ourt finds on motion that the imposition of costs and fees
would create such a substantial economic hardship as not to be in the
interests ofjustice: (i) To the county, the compensation actually paid to the

1993]

LIMITS OF COURT-CONNECTED ADR

2185

If a trial is not requested within thirty days of the arbitration
decision, the decision is entered as the judgment of the court and
has the same force and effect as a trial judgment.5 9 It cannot,
60
however, be appealed.
The pilot programs also permit litigants in any civil action or in
any adversarial bankruptcy proceeding to voluntarily submit their
case to arbitration. 61 In some districts, when cases are submitted
to the program with the parties' consent and a trial is requested, the
court
may assess costs ... and reasonable attorney fees against the party
demanding trial de novo if... such party fails to obtain a judgment, exclusive of interest and costs ...

which is substantially

more favorable to such party than the arbitration award, and ...
the court determines that
the party's conduct in seeking a trial de
62
novo was in bad faith.
Although all districts permit parties to voluntarily submit
63
disputes to arbitration either for free or at a minimal cost,

arbitrator; [and] (ii) To the appellee, those costs taxable in any civil action
together with reasonable attorneys' fees as determined by the trialjudge for
services necessitated by the appeal.
ARiz. UNIF. R. P. 7(f); see also COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.

13-22-405 (West 1990)

(requiring a party who rejects an arbitration award and fails to improve his position
at trial by 10% to "pay all of the costs, including attorney fees and arbitrator fees, of
the arbitration proceeding not to exceed one thousand five hundred dollars"); FLA.
STAT. ch. 44.303(5) (1989) ("The party having filed for a trial de novo shall be
assessed the arbitration costs, court costs, and other reasonable costs of [his
opponent]... if thejudgment upon the trial de novo is not more favorable than the
arbitration decision."); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1141.21 (West 1993) (describing the
consequences for a party failing to improve on the arbitration award after requesting
trial de novo); HAW. ARB. R. 26 (giving the court the discretion to impose "[r]easonable costs and fees (other than attorney's fees) actually incurred by the party but not
otherwise taxable under the law... [as well as c]osts ofjurors... [and a]ttorneys'
fees not to exceed $5,000," when the party requesting trial fails to improve his
position at trial by 15% of the arbitration award); MICH. CT. R. 2.403(O)(1)-(4)
(describing fee and cost-shifting consequences of demanding a trial after participation
in Michigan's mandatory mediation program).
59 See 28 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1988).
60 See id.
61 See id. § 652(b).
62 Id. § 655(e). Note that the post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting rule considered
in parts II and III of this Article does not contain a "bad faith" requirement.
6S In most districts, parties who accept the arbitration award do not have to pay
an arbitration fee to the court. In the District of NewJersey, however, parties must
agree to pay the arbitrators $150, and in the District of Texas they must agree to pay
the arbitrators a reasonable fee. See MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN THE D.N.J., supra note 24,
at 24; BARBARA MEIERHOEFER, FEDERALJUDICIAL CTR., COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION
INTHE WESTERN DISTRICT OFTEXAS 16 (1989) [hereinafter MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN THE

2186

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 141:2169

litigants rarely choose this option. 64 In Michigan, where CAA has
been available since 1978 and cases submitted to the program by
consent are subject to a post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting
rule, 65 only two cases have been submitted to the program by
consent.66 In the Northern District of California where voluntary
CAA has also been available since 1978, but cases submitted to the
program by consent are not subject to a post-arbitration fee and
cost-shifting rule, voluntary participation in the CAA program is
67
also rare.
II. THE MARKET FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

Although parties do not voluntarily opt to participate in CAA
programs and trial de novo request rates are high, such programs
might nevertheless be desirable if they could produce either private
or social benefits that would not otherwise be created. This section
briefly describes the market for private ADR and explores the
barriers to the parties' contracting for private ADR in situations
where it can produce private benefits. It also considers the ability
of the programs to create private benefits in situations where such
barriers exist as well as their ability to create social benefits such as
reducing the number of nuisance or negative expected value suits
filed, reducing the private or social costs of litigation, reducing
delay, and increasing access to justice.

W.D. TEX.].
64 For example, during the first two years of CAA in the Middle District of
Florida, only two cases were submitted to the program by consent, and voluntary
participation "is expected to remain uncommon." MEIERHOEFER & SERON, CAA IN
THE M.D. FLA., supra note 24, at 55. In the Middle District of North Carolina,
arbitration by stipulation (consent) occurs infrequently, see MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN THE
M.D.N.C., supra note 26, at 19, and during the first year that a CAA program
operated in the Eastern District of New York, only two cases were voluntarily
submitted to the program. See MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN THE E.D.N.Y., supra note 24;
see also MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN TEN DIST. CTs., supra note 4, at 11 (reporting that
.voluntary alternative programs in otherjurisdiction have been notably unsuccessful
in attracting cases").
65 See W.D. MICH. Loc. CT. R. 43(j)(4).
66 Telephone Interview with Arbitration Clerk, Western District of Michigan (Oct.
1991).
67 Telephone Interview with Arbitration Clerk, Northern District of California
(May 1992); see also MEIERHOEFER & SERON, CAA INTHE N.D. CAL., supra note 24, at
53 ("On rare occasions, lawyers request arbitration after an initial status conference
at which the judge suggests arbitration as a useful way of proceeding.").
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A. The Marketfor Private ADR Services
68
The market for private dispute resolution fora is flourishing.
Between 1983 and 1988, the number of private ADR providers has
increased tenfold.6 9 Some private ADR providers offer a variety
of relatively informal dispute resolution services, 70 while others try
to replicate the court system. 7 1 In addition to for-profit 72 and
not-for-profit fee-for-service ADR providers, over 150 grass-roots
ADR organizations currently provide dispute resolution services
73
either free or at a minimal cost.
As the number of ADR providers has increased, so too has
attorney awareness of alternatives to litigation. Over the past
decade there have been numerous national conferences on ADR, 74

68 Lawyers are beginning to view the proliferation of private ADR providers as

creating a "market" for dispute resolution. See, e.g., EllenJ. Pollock, Mediation Firms
Alter the Legal Landscape, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1993, at B1 (quoting Howard V.
Golub, general counsel of Pacific Gas & Electric Co., as saying, "I think that we are
witnessing the emergence of a [free] market in dispute resolution which is challenging
the traditional state-owned monopoly in dispute resolution-which, of course, is the
courts"); Joseph D. Steinfield, Mediation: The Way of the Future, MASS. LAW. WKLY.,
Mar. 8, 1993, at 1 (explaining that "[w]hereas lawyers used to choose between federal
and state court, or between various state courts and counties, now they and their
clients can choose from such additional forums as Endispute, ADR Inc., Judicate,
ADR Solutions, Judges Arbitration and Conciliation Services, Inc., Commonwealth
Mediation and Conciliation, and many others").
69 See Harry N. Mazadoorian, For-Profits Take Firm Hold on Field, BAR LEADER,
Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 22, 22. In addition, from 1988 to 1992,Judicial Arbitration and
Mediation Services experienced revenue growth of 826%and Endispute experienced
130% revenue growth. See Richard Phalon, PrivatizingJustice,FORBES, Dec. 7, 1992,
at 126, 126.
70 For example, the American Arbitration Association and the Center for Public
Resources offer a variety of arbitration, mediation, and conciliation programs.
71 For example, Judicate, a publicly held company with revenues of $4 million in
the first three quarters of 1992, operates private courtrooms all over the country. See
Pollock, supra note 68, at BI. Judicate advertises itself as the National Private Court
System. SeeJUDICATE, IT DOESN'T HAVE TO TAKE YEARS TO GET YOUR DAY IN COURT
(1992). A bailiff is present and retired judges preside over trials. According to the
Judicate Rules of Procedure, unless varied by agreement of the parties, the Federal
Rules of Evidence apply, see JUDICATE R.P. 14(a), discovery is governed by the
procedural rules "which would be applicable if the case was held in the appropriate
court of public jurisdiction," id. at R. 11, and "all rulings on substantive legal issues
shall be based upon the same principles of law which would be applicable if the case
were heard in the appropriate court of public jurisdiction." Id. at R. 2(d).
72 See Pollock, supra note 68, at BI (reporting that estimated revenues for major
arbitration and mediation firms are: American Arbitration Association-$37 million;
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc.-$25 million; Endispute-$4.8 million;
and U.S. Arbitration-$5.5 million).
73 See Enslen, supra note 16, at 26.
4 For references to some of the more prominent ADR conferences, see Lisa G.
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law schools have continued to add ADR courses to their curricula,75 and a prestigious New York law firm recently published a
book on the use of ADR in legal practice. 76 A number of state bar
associations have either amended or are considering amending their
ethical codes to impose a mandatory ethical duty to discuss ADR
with clients, 7 7 and at least one federal district court requires both

lawyers and clients to sign a stipulation prior to the first scheduling
conference affirming that "each party and that party's counsel have
conferred .

.

. to consider the resolution of the litigation through

the use of alternative dispute resolution programs."7 8

Recently,

1460 law firms, 79 including the ten largest in the country,80
signed the Law Firm Policy Statement on Alternatives to Litigation,

Lehrman, The Teaching of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37J. LEGAL EDUC. 37, 37 n.1,
39 (1987); Leonard Riskin, Mediation in the Law Schools, 34J. LEGAL EDUC. 259, 259
n.1 (1984); Albert M. Sacks, Legal Educationand the ChangingRoleofLawyers in Dispute
Resolution, 34J. LEGAL EDUC. 237, 244 (1984).
75 See Riskin, supranote 74, at 260 n.3 (noting that "summaries of forty-seven law
schools' efforts in alternative dispute resolution ... [can be found in the] ABA
Special Committee on Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution, Law School
Directory of Dispute Resolution Services (Washington, D.C. 1983)); see also Frank E.A.
Sander, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Law School Curriculum: Opportunitiesand
Obstacles, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 229, 235 n.33 (1984). In addition, there have been
numerous articles published on methods of teaching ADR. See, e.g., Leonard L.
Riskin & James E. Westbrook, IntegratingDispute Resolution Into Standard First-Year
Courses: The Missouri Plan, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 509, 512-14 (describing ADR
simulations
and exercises used in first-year courses).
76
See DONOVAN LEISURE NEWTON & IRVINE, ADR PRACTICE BOOK (John H.
Wilkinson ed., 1990).
77 Colorado recently added a provision to its Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides that "[iun a matter involving or expected to involve litigation, a lawyer
should advise the client of alternative forms of dispute resolution which might
reasonably be pursued to attempt to resolve the legal dispute or reach the legal
objective sought." Richard E. Lemer, Legislative Activity in the States, N.Y.L.J., Aug.
6, 1992, at 3. Fifteen other states are considering adopting similar provisions. See
Colorado Adopts Ethics Rules, 10 ALTERNATIVES 70, 80 (1992).
78 Steinfield, supra note 68, at 1 (citing D. MASS. LOC. CT. R. 16.1(D)(3)). In
addition, some states routinely provide parties with a list of local ADR practitioners
when a complaint is filed. For example, in Missouri, "litigants are referred by the
court ADR notice to the local bar association, which maintains a listing of available
neutrals." A Taxonomy ofJudicial ADR, 9 ALTERNATIVES 98, 98 (1991). In addition,
"[iun the Northern District of California, the court clerk's office keeps a list of
organizations, firms, and individuals who have told the court that they offer ADR
Services." Id.
79 See CPR LEGAL PROGRAM, CENTER FOR PUB. RESOURCES, CPR LAW FIRM POLICY
STATEMENT: ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION (1991) [hereinafter ALTERNATIVES TO
LITIGATION].

80 Among the firms signing the policy statement are Baker & McKenzie; Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher; and Arnold & Porter. See
Rorie Sherman, Big Law FirmsJoin ADR Sign-athon, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 28, 1991, at 2.
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which reads, in part, "for many disputes there may be more effective
methods of resolution than traditional litigation ... appropriate
lawyers in our firm will be knowledgeable about ADR ... and where
appropriate, the responsible attorney will discuss with the client the
availability of ADR procedures so the client can make an informed
81
choice concerning resolution of the dispute."
On the client side, the information campaign launched by the
non-profit Center for Public Resources has led to widespread
corporate awareness of ADR. This campaign persuaded 600 large
corporations and 1800 subsidiaries, including more than half of the
Fortune 500 companies,8 2 to sign the Corporate Policy Statement
on Alternatives to Litigation, which provides, in part, that "[iun the
event of a business dispute between our corporation and another
corporation which has made or will then make a similar statement,
we are prepared to explore with that other party, resolution of the
dispute through negotiation or ADR techniques, before resorting to
full scale litigation." 83 Recently, General Mills, Inc., a Fortune 500
company, announced that it will refuse to transact with anyone who
is unwilling to include an ADR clause in the agreement. 4 ADR
has become an increasingly common subject in the popular
press, 85 and there is tremendous public awareness of ADR.

B. Barriers to the Voluntary Use of Private ADR
The large variety of dispute resolution providers and the
relatively good information that most attorneys and many clients,
particularly large corporations, have about ADR, suggest that there
is neither a "market failure" 8 6 nor an "information failure" 87 in
81 ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION, supra note 79.
82 See Victoria A. Cundiff, CompaniesAre Seeking LitigationAlternatives,NAT'L L.J.,

May 17, 1993, at S25.

83 CPR LEGAL PROGRAM, CENTER FOR PUB. RESOURCES, CORPORATE POLICY

STATEMENT: ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION (1991).
84 See Deborah Jacobs, ControllingLitigation Costs with a Neutral Third Party, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 1990, at 12.

85 Using the search term "alternative dispute resolution," a search of the Nexis
database MAJPAP (major newspapers) found that from 1980 to 1985 there were 14
ADR-related stories, from 1985 to 1990 there were 88 stories, and from 1991 to April
23, 1993, there were 143 stories. A search of the MAGS (magazines) database found
11 stories from 1980 to 1985, 90 stories from 1985 to 1990, and 102 stories from
1991 to April 23, 1993. Similarly, a search of the LGLNEW (legal news) database
found 74 stories from 1980 to 1985, 373 stories from 1985 to 1990, and 779 stories
from 1991 to April 23, 1993.
86 If the market for private ADR is said to have failed in that the cost of private
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the market for ADR fora. Consequently, in order to justify a regime
of publicly provided ADR on the grounds that it will produce
private benefits, it is necessary to consider whether there are any
barriers to the parties' contracting for private ADR when ADR
processes can produce joint gains,8 8 and whether in those instances where ADR can produce such gains but will nevertheless not be
used, mandatory non-binding CAA programs will enable the parties
to realize such gains. This section considers several possible
barriers to the parties' realizing the joint gains from private ADR,
such as legal restrictions, fear of signaling weakness, transactions
costs, asymmetric ability to bear the costs of delay, lawyer-client
conflicts of interest, and unequal bargaining power in the tort
context. It argues that to the extent that such barriers exist, most
can be eliminated through minor changes in pre-trial practice, and
those that cannot be eliminated through minor procedural changes,
such as the asymmetric ability to bear the costs of delay, lawyerclient conflict of interest, and unequal bargaining power in the tort

ADR is viewed as prohibitively high, this might justify a government subsidy for
submitting disputes to voluntary, binding, private ADR programs, but it does not
provide a justification for government provision of mandatory non-binding CAA
pro ams.
Or If lack of information accounts for parties' failure to opt for private ADR, this
problem can be solved by imposing an ethical obligation on lawyers to discuss ADR
with clients, see supra note 77, by requiring parties and lawyers to sign a stipulation
that they have considered resolving the dispute through private ADR, see supra note
78 and accompanying text, or by encouraging or requiring judges to initiate
discussion of ADR during pre-trial conferences. During a pre-trial conference, a
judge is permitted not only to encourage settlement, but also to suggest that the
parties explore, "the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute." FED. R.
Civ. P. 16(c)(7). According to the Federal Rules Advisory Committee, "this includes
urging the litigants to employ adjudicatory techniques outside the courthouse." FED.
R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) advisory committee note 2.
8 If ADR processes achieve results that parties consider as valid and fair as a
litigated outcome but at a lower cost and with less delay than the court system, in the
absence of strategic behavior, parties will opt for private ADR whenever the cost of
doing so is less than the joint cost of going to trial. Similarly, if parties believe that
a non-binding CAA hearing will be as or more effective than civil discoveryin eliciting
the type of information that is likely to lead to settlement, parties will agree to private
non-binding arbitration whenever the cost of doing so is less than the joint cost of
discovery.
Even if the benefits of private ADR are asymmetric, ADR might nevertheless be
used if the party who benefits more from its use makes a side payment to his
opponent to equalize the gain from using the alternative process. In a contract
setting, an ADR provision might be included in the contract in return for an
adjustment in the contract price. A promisee, for example, might be willing to pay
more for a promise that can be quickly and inexpensively enforced in the event of a
dispute.
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context, will not be eliminated by mandating participation in nonbinding CAA programs.
1. Legal Restrictions
There are few meaningful legal barriers to contracting for
private ADR. 89 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal
Arbitration Act90 as evidencing a "liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements... so that questions of arbitrability must be
addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration," 9 1 and absent procedural irregularities most states
routinely enforce agreements to arbitrate.
2. Signaling
A party may fear that suggesting recourse to private ADR will be
interpreted as signaling a weakness in his case, 92 a desire to avoid
delay, or an inability to lay out litigation expenses. A request for
ADR, however, may also signal a superior ability to bear risk since
the outcome of many ADR processes is more uncertain than a trial
outcome. In addition, it has been suggested that certain types of
ADR procedures tend to favor the stronger party, 93 the more
89 Even agreements between an employer and employee to arbitrate all disputes
have been held to include claims brought under the Age Discrimination in
EmploymentAct and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 despite the pronounced
inequality of bargaining power between the parties to the typical employment
agreement and the important social policies at stake in discrimination suits. See
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991) (holding that the
petitioner's action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") was
arbitrable under a private agreement to submit all disputes to arbitration); see also
Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding on
remand after Gilmer that "Title VII claims, like ADEA claims, are subject to
arbitration under the [Federal Arbitration Act]," and noting that "any broad public
policy arguments against such a conclusion were necessarily rejected by Gilmer").
0 Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14
(1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
91 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24

(1983).

92 See MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN TEN DIST CTS., supra note 4, at 120 (citing attorneys'
fear of "electing a procedure that might be construed as a sign of weakness" as a
reason for the low participation rate in voluntary court-annexed ADR programs);
Brazil, supra note 16, at 333-34 (noting that one of the primary objectives of
California's CAA program was overcoming parties' fear that being the first to raise
the possibility of settlement would be viewed as a sign of weakness). In addition, a
recent study by the Libel Research Project at the University of Iowa found that fear
ofsignaling weakness was one of the main reasons for parties' reluctance to use ADR.
See Libel ADR, 10 ALTERNATIVES 51, 51 (1992).
93 For an overview of legal scholarship on cultural and gender bias in arbitration
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educated party, or the party who can afford the most articulate
4
lawyer.
Although the signaling effect of suggesting ADR is likely to be
weak, it can be eliminated by having the judge suggest the possibili95
Each side could indicate
ty of ADR at the pre-trial conference.
its willingness to use ADR on a secret ballot and the judge would
suggest that it be used only if both parties requested it. This
procedure would remove the negative signal associated with
suggesting ADR since a party who did not opt for ADR would not
96
know whether it was requested by his opponent. Having the trial
judge suggest ADR would also avoid another impediment to private
be interpreted
ADR, the trial lawyer's fear that suggesting ADR will
97
"fighter."
a
not
is
he
that
signal
a
as
client
his
by
On the other hand, when the trial judge suggests private nonto refuse. 98
binding ADR, some lawyers may be overly reluctant
This may lead to the use of ADR in situations where the parties do
and arguments suggesting that many forms of ADR favor the more powerful party to
the dispute, see Jane B. Korn, Changing Our Perspective on Arbitration: A Traditional
and a FeministView, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 67. See also Richard Delgado et al., Fairness
and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985
Wis. L. REV. 1359; Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: ProcessDangersfor Women,
100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991) (arguing that mandatory mediation in divorce cases may
be disadvantageous to women); Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The
Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57
(1984);Janet Rifkin, Mediationfrom a Feminist Perspective: Promiseand Problems, 2 LAW
& INEQ.J. 21 (1984).

94 The effect of litigant wealth on the outcome of the dispute may be pronounced
in some CAA programs, particularly in those that do not permit live witness
testimony and impose strict time limits on the presentation of counsel, since the
rhetorical skills of the lawyer (which may be linked to his hourly rate) may be as or
more important than the evidence and the facts. See Eisele, supra note 16, at 4
(arguing that in a court-annexed ADR proceeding "the debating skills of attorneysnot their real-truth revealing, fact-establishing trial skills-are glorified").
95 There are a number of other ways to eliminate the signaling effect. For
example, a number of corporations have signed the CPR Corporate Policy Statement
on Alternatives to Litigation. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. Since the
statement applies to all disputes, it is unlikely to communicate any information about
the strength of the corporation's position in any particular dispute.
96 Where failure to request ADR sends a negative signal about a party's ability to
bear risk, however, this procedure does not necessarily remove that signal, since a
party who does request ADR will know whether it was requested by his opponent.
97 Interview with ADR expert Eric Green, Professor of Law, Boston University
School of Law, in Boston, Mass. (Spring 1992).
98 See, e.g., As Trial Day Dawns, An All-Night Mediation Yields Resolution in a $1.2
Billion Gas Case, 9 ALTERNATIVES 123, 124 (1991) (quoting one lawyer as saying, "'[w]e
agreed to [ADR] because we knew the chiefjudge thought it was a good idea ... I
was not going to be the one to say no'").
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not anticipate joint gains, making any money spent on ADR a deadweight loss.
3. Transactions Costs
The transactions costs of entering into a private ADR agreement
are low. The American Arbitration Association provides a complementary form book of ADR clauses 99 and such agreements are
summarily enforced by the courts. If it is necessary to obtain
confirmation of a private arbitration award in court, some states
1 00
have an expedited track for rendering such decisions.
4. Asymmetric Ability to Bear the Costs of Delay
One of the primary reasons that parties might not enter into an
ADR agreement even when it can produce private benefits is that
the delay associated with trial is frequently advantageous to one
side, 10 1 and the party who is better able to bear the cost of delay
99
See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOC., DRAFTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES:
A PRACTICAL GUIDE 33 (1993) (providing standard ADR clauses and describing"some
of the ways in which some parties have modified the AAA's time tested standard
clause to deal with specific concerns"). In addition, the Center for Public Resources
publishes a 22-volume set of ADR practice guides, "[c]overing specialized applications
of ADR, including extensive case histories, model procedures and forms," CPR LEGAL
PROGRAM, CENTER FOR PUB. RESOURCES, CPR PUBLICATIONS 1 (1993), as well as 23
volumes of model ADR procedures with "[f]orm agreements or guidelines designed
for easy application or adaptation to particular dispute resolution needs." Id. at 2.
100 See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 7510 (McKinney 1980) ("The court shall
confirm an award upon application of a party made within one year after its delivery
to him, unless the award is vacated or modified ...
").
101 In general, delay favors large, risk-neutral defendants, and hurts small riskaverse plaintiffs, particularly those who have limited access to capital and need money
to either pay medical bills in the case of personal injury tort claimants, or to cover
current operating expenses in the case of small businesses engaged in contract
disputes. In addition, when the expected judgment is large relative to the defendant's
assets, delay often gives the defendant time to hide assets.
Corporate defendants who have access to capital often want to deferjudgment for
as long as possible, particularly when there is a concern that a victory for the plaintiff
will either lead to similar suits being filed, or will have res judicata or collateral
estoppel effects on pending litigation. Similarly, corporate managers, who often
control the pace and conduct of litigation, have an incentive to delay judgment,
especially when they have a weak case. In some instances, delay will give managers

time to find a newjob and/or enter into a long-term employment agreement before
their responsibility for the wrongdoing at issue is established. Delay helps managers
avoid the full ex post settling up (at least in the period immediately following the
wrongdoing) that takes place through the managerial labor market. See Eugene F.
Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88J. POL. ECON. 288, 304-05 (1980).
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10 2
is usually unwilling to relinquish his strategic advantage.
Delay, like other litigation expenses, imposes costs on the

parties; these costs are reflected in the end points of the settlement
range at each stage in the litigation process. As long as the

arbitration award is non-binding, however, CAA programs will not
meaningfully prevent the party better able to bear the cost of delay
from exploiting his advantage. Even in programs with postarbitration fee and cost-shifting disincentives to requesting a trial,
the party who is better able to bear the costs of delay can still

credibly threaten to request a trial; he will simply alter his presentation at the arbitration hearing to minimize the likelihood that he
will suffer a fee and cost-shifting sanction should a trial take
10 3
place.

In addition,
pending litigation need almost never appear as an accrued loss on a balance
sheet intended for public disclosure. At most, its existence must be
disclosed as a note appended to the financial report without any estimate
as to the amount of any likely judgment, and attorneys will often have
plausible reasons for not permitting even this small degree of disclosure
*
In comparison ... [t]he amount paid in settlement will appear as an
accrued loss on the balance sheet ....

William E. Nelson, Contract Litigation and the Elite Bar in New York City, 1960-80, 39
EMORY L.J. 413, 433 (1990).
However, delay can strongly favor the plaintiff in situations where the mere
existence of the claim creates a cloud on title to an asset of the defendant's. See infra
text accompanying notes 128-33. The effect of the cloud is likely to be more severe
with respect to individual defendants and small businesses than large corporations
with publicly traded shares.
In general, the strength of legal sanctions decreases as delay increases-witnesses'
memories fade, evidence disappears, see Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to

Legal ProcedureandJudicialAdministration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD., 399, 420 (1973), and
non-compensable consequential damages may mount, particularly in situations where
the parties' access to capital markets on reasonable terms during the pendency of the
dispute is limited. Conversely, delay often strengthens the effect of non-legal
sanctions such as damage to reputation or a cloud on title. For a general discussion
of nonlegal sanctions and their importance in commercial relationships, see David

Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 466
(1990).
102 The asymmetric benefit of delay is a barrier to both entering into an

agreement to arbitrate once a dispute has arisen, and, in a narrower range of
circumstances, to including an arbitration clause in a contract. For example, when
a large corporation deals with small suppliers, it may refuse to include an arbitration
clause in the contract since it knows that if a dispute arises it will be better able to
bear the costs of delay than the small supplier. It should be noted, however, that
private ADR processes can entail significant delay, particularly if delay-reducing
controls (such as discovery limits and provisions requiring the arbitrator(s) to sit on
consecutive days or for a limited period of time) are not included in the arbitration
agreement. See infra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
103 See infra note 238 and accompanying text.
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5. Lawyer-Client Conflicts of Interest
Another reason that ADR may not be used even in situations
where it can produce private benefits is that the decision whether
or not to use ADR in aid of settlement is "'left in the hands of the
people least likely to settle the case-outside legal counsel who
depend on protracted litigation for their bread and butter and 'the
manager who caused the dispute in the first place. '"' 10 4 Mandatory non-binding CAA programs, however, do not eliminate this
conflict of interest; the same lawyers will advise their clients about
whether to accept the arbitration award or request a trial.
A lawyer paid on an hourly basis has a strong incentive to
encourage his client to request a trial since most legal fees are
earned during discovery and trial.10 5 The hourly-fee lawyer's
incentives are unlikely 1to be affected by a post-arbitration fee and
cost-shifting provision. 06 Consequently, even when participation
in an arbitration hearing is mandatory, as long as the arbitration
10 7
award is non-binding, a potential conflict of interest remains.
In contrast, a contingency-fee lawyer has a strong incentive to
encourage his client to accept an arbitration award. 10 8 The value
of the services that the lawyer must provide prior to arbitration is
small. In a CAAjurisdiction, the lawyer's pre-arbitration investment
will often be low relative to his expected return if his client accepts
the arbitration award. 10 9 Although a contingency-fee lawyer
always has an incentive to encourage his client to settle, 110 the
l°4Jacobs, supra note 84, at F12 (quoting a representative of the American
Arbitration Association). This explanation may account for litigators' reluctance to
enter into an agreement to arbitrate once a dispute has arisen, but it cannot explain
the absence of an ADR clause in a business contract since the lawyer negotiating the
transaction and drafting the contract is being paid to avoid disputes.
105 The federal CAA pilot programs each have different limits on pre-arbitration
discovery. See supra note 31.
106 The hourly-fee lawyer's incentives would only be affected by a post-arbitration
fee and cost-shifting provision if the lawyer thought that the client would be unable
to pag his bill if a post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting sanction was imposed.
Although in a high profile case the lawyer's actions may also be influenced by
reputational considerations, these are unlikely to be significant in the types of cases

subject to CAA programs' jurisdictional limits.
108 The lawyer-client conflict of interest created by contingent-fee arrangements
is explored in Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problemsin Settlement, 16J. LEGAL STUD.

189, 214 (1987).
109 In ajurisdiction with post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting, depending on the
structure of the contingency-fee contract, the contingency-fee lawyer may have to
assume more risk than he would in a trial-onlyjurisdiction. See infra note 171.
110 A contingency-fee lawyer also has a strong interest in encouraging his client
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fact that an award has been rendered by third-party representatives
of the state may make even the most optimistic client more likely to
accept the arbitration award.
A recent study of Hawaii's mandatory non-binding tort claim
state CAA program'1 1 found that the plaintiffs bar, which works
primarily on a contingency fee basis, strongly favors the program,
while the defendant's bar, which is paid by the hour, strongly
opposes it. 112 Given that tort plaintiffs often perceive a jury trial
to be in their best interest, particularly when the defendant has a

deep pocket, these findings suggest that a lawyer-client conflict of
interest may well exist.

113

6. Unequal Bargaining Power in Tort Claims
The argument for some form of publicly mandated ADR is
stronger with respect to tort claims than contract claims. In the tort
context, the parties rarely have the opportunity to bargain before
the dispute arises, and, because delay almost always favors the
defendant, it is unlikely that they will agree to use private ADR after

to opt for binding ADR.
1 The Hawaii program is mandatory for all tort claims under $200,000. A party
requesting a trial must improve his position by 15% at trial or he may have to bear
his opponent's actual costs and reasonable attorney's fees. See HAW. ARB. R. 25, 26.
112 Barkai & Kassebaum, supra note 9, at S65 ("Ninety-one percent of the
plaintiffs' lawyers were satisfied with the program, but only 46% of defense lawyers
were satisfied."). The study also reported that when insurance companies hire outside
counsel to defend suits subject to the program, they pay them a flat fee for
conducting the arbitration and promise to give them a new case to try as soon as they
accept a settlement. See id. at S49 n.38. This appears to be an attempt to curb the
hourly-fee lawyer's incentive to request a trial and conduct discovery, the phase of
litigation during which the most hours are billed.
A number of studies of both state and federal CAA programs survey client
satisfaction with the arbitration process. See, e.g., MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN TEN
DISTRICT COURTS, supra note 4. Client satisfaction surveys, however, may be
misleading, since the typical tort plaintiff is a one-time player who has little or no
ability to value a legal claim. In addition, client satisfaction is generally surveyed soon
after the award is made, which may simply reflect the average personal injury tort
plaintiff's need for cash or exuberance at having "won."
113 To the extent that a lawyer-client principal-agent problem exists with respect
to settlement decisions, if information revealed at the hearing gave the client
information that his lawyer did not provide about the strengths and weaknesses of his
case, requiring parties to participate in an arbitration hearing might be a partial
solution to the problem. However, CAA programs, particularly those where all
evidence is introduced through arguments of counsel, are a relatively poor way to
induce lawyers to reveal such information. Mediation, where the third-party neutral
actively participates in the process by questioning the parties and proposing different
types of settlements, is far more likely to reveal this type of information.
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a dispute has arisen. However, a CAA program designed to
eliminate the effects of the defendant's superior bargaining power
in tort claims would have to be both mandatory and binding.
Otherwise, the defendant will still be able to make strategic use of
his ability to inflict delay. In addition, in jurisdictions with postarbitration fee and cost-shifting provisions, plaintiffs, who tend to
be more risk-averse than defendants, may have to bear more risk in
114
order to obtain information through post-arbitration discovery
than they would to obtain the same information through pre-trial
discovery in a trial-only jurisdiction.
C. Justificationsfor Mandatory Non-Binding CAA Programs
In situations where the parties could jointly benefit from
agreeing to resolve their dispute through ADR but will not agree to
do so, mandatory non-binding CAA programs will not enable the
parties to realize these potential joint benefits. Consequently, in
order to justify government provision of CAA programs it is
necessary to identify other benefits that CAA programs might be
said to provide and to consider whether the programs can, in fact,
achieve these goals.
These benefits include relieving docket
congestion by reducing the number of nuisance and/or negative
expected value suits filed, reducing the private and/or social cost of
disputing, reducing delay, and increasing access to the judicial
system.
1. Reducing the Number of Nuisance and
Negative Expected Value Suits
One possible justification for CAA programs is that they will
reduce the number of nuisance and negative expected value
("NEV") suits filed. In order to determine the effect of CAA
programs on the filing of these suits, it is necessary to consider why
such suits are filed, that is, why plaintiffs who file such suits succeed
in extracting settlements. There is no generally accepted theory of
the nuisance or NEV suit. A number of theories have been
developed, but each depends strongly on its assumptions about the
sequence in which litigation costs are incurred, the structure of the
pre-trial bargaining process, and the amount of information
114 For a discussion of the effect of post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting on riskaverse parties' incentives to request a trial and undertake post-arbitration discovery,

see infra notes 230-37 and accompanying text.
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available to the parties. This section considers two explanations for
such suits that have gained currency in the legal literature-the
asymmetric cost theory1 15 and the asymmetric information
theory"16-and proposes a third explanation: the cloud on title
theory. The section concludes that the overall effect of CAA
programs on the volume of nuisance and NEV litigation is ambiguous and depends on the details of program structure and the
reasons plaintiffs file suit.
a. Asymmetric Cost Theory
The asymmetric cost theory 117 defines a nuisance suit as a
"suit in which the plaintiff is able to obtain a positive settlement
from the defendant even though the defendant knows the plaintiff's
case is sufficiently weak that he would be unwilling or unlikely
actually to pursue his case to trial. " 118 It attributes the plaintiffs
ability to extract a settlement to his ability to invoke the legal
process at a relatively low cost and inflict substantial litigation
response costs on the defendant before being required to bear
significant costs himself. When costs are incurred in this sequence"i 9 and the plaintiff has such superior bargaining power
115 See D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits are Broughtfor Their
Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985).
16 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17J. LEGAL
STUD. 437 (1988) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Suing for Settlement]. For additional
discussions of nuisance and/or NEV suits, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Credibility
and Success of Suits Known to be Made Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer (Nov.
1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous
Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1990); I.P.L. P'ng,
Strategic Behavior in Suit; Settlemen and Trial, 14 BELLJ. ECON. 539 (1983), criticized
in Bebchuk, Suing for Settlement, supra.
117 See Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 115. The authors assume that the parties
are risk-neutral, have full information, and select strategies at the outset of the
litigation "such that [the] parties would never plan later to act in a way that would
lower their expected utility (the interpretation being that they would never make
'threats' which it would not be in their self-interest to carry out)." Id. at 6. They
consider a case in which the defendant must bear significant legal costs in responding
to the plaintiff's claim before the plaintiff has to bear substantial costs. They assume
that the plaintiff has enough bargaining power to make a one-time take-it-or-leave-it
settlement demand to which the defendant must respond by either agreeing to settle
or by incurring the cost of responding to the suit. They demonstrate that given these
assumptions, it is rational for the defendant to settle at the outset for any amount
lower than his litigation response costs and that the plaintiff will find it worthwhile
to file suit as long as the cost to him of doing so is less than the defendant's litigation
response costs. See id. at 4.
118 Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 115, at 3.
119 There are certain types of lawsuits in which the plaintiff may be able to inflict
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that he is able to make a one-time take-it-or-leave-it settlement
demand, 120 he may be able to extract a settlement just under the
defendant's response costs. Given a choice between incurring the
cost of responding to the suit or settling for an amount just under
his response costs, the rational defendant will agree to settle, even
when he knows that the plaintiff's claim is frivolous and will never
result in a trial.
In order to explore the effect of CAA programs on the plaintiff s
incentive to file this type of nuisance suit, it is necessary to consider
the programs' effects in jurisdictions with and without postarbitration fee and cost-shifting provisions and to specify the
sequence in which litigation costs are incurred. It is assumed that
when a suit that would have been an asymmetric cost nuisance suit
in a trial-only jurisdiction is filed in a CAA jurisdiction, costs are
incurred in the following sequence: the plaintiff pays a filing fee,
the defendant incurs pre-arbitration response costs, the plaintiff
incurs pre-arbitration costs, a hearing is held (which is assumed to
be costless), and if one party requests a trial, the defendant incurs
post-arbitration costs. The plaintiff never incurs post-arbitration
costs, since a nuisance suit is, by definition, a claim that he would
be unwilling to pursue to trial.
i.

Programs Without Post-Arbitration Fee and Cost-Shifting
Provisions

A plaintiff will file an asymmetric cost nuisance suit in a CAA
jurisdiction if the cost of doing so 12 1 is less than the settlement he
far higher pre-trial costs on the defendant than he will have to bear himself. For
example, in tort suits based on claims of design defect, and Title VII or Age
Discrimination in Employment Act suits based on statistical inference, plaintiffs may
be able to inflict tremendous asymmetric discovery costs on defendants. In addition,
in federal cases under $50,000, defendants' total litigation expenditures tend to be
far higher than plaintiffs' litigation expenditures. See infra text accompanying notes
210-13. In addition, because a nuisance suit plaintiff has no intention of pursuing the
case to judgment, he does not need to hire a particularly skilled attorney.
120 The Rosenberg-Shavell assumption that the plaintiff has enough bargaining
power to make a one-time take-it-or-leave-it settlement demand corresponds to the
assumption that the plaintiff captures the entire bargaining surplus at the time a
settlement is reached. It is adopted here solely for expositional simplicity. The
sequence of costs can also be viewed as altering the bargaining range faced by the
parties, which will in turn affect their ability to extract a larger share of the
baraining surplus.
21 Although for expositional simplicity the cost of filing suit is assumed to be de
minimis, in practice it may be significant since it will include not only the filing fee,
but also the cost of hiring an attorney to draft a complaint and the cost of serving
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can extract. If a plaintiff with enough bargaining power to make a
convincing one-time take-it-or-leave-it settlement demand files suit
and makes a settlement demand in an amount under the defendant's pre-arbitration response costs, the defendant, given a choice
between defending himself or settling for an amount less than his
pre-arbitration response costs, is better off agreeing to settle. The
plaintiff may, however, be able to extract an even larger settlement
if he has a credible threat to go to arbitration, request a trial, and
then demand a settlement from the defendant in an amount just
under the defendant's post-arbitration costs. In a GAAjurisdiction
without a post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting provision, the
plaintiff will have such a credible threat if his pre-arbitration costs
are less than the defendant's post-arbitration costs.1 22 If this
condition holds and a plaintiff with vastly superior bargaining power
makes a one-time take-it-or-leave-it settlement demand at the outset
of the litigation process in an amount under the sum of the
defendant's pre- and post-arbitration defense costs, the rational
defendant will agree to settle. He knows that even if he incurs prearbitration costs defending himself, the plaintiff will continue the
suit since the cost to the plaintiff of doing so, his pre-arbitration
costs, is less than the settlement he will then be able to extract, an
amount just under the defendant's post-arbitration costs. As a
consequence, at the outset of the litigation process, given a choice
between defending himself or agreeing to settle for an amount less
than his total defense costs, the defendant is better off agreeing to
settle.

process on the defendant.
122 This condition can be derived through backward induction. Consider how the
plaintiff would respond if he filed suit and demanded a settlement but the defendant
refused to settle and instead incurred pre-arbitration costs defending himself. At this
stage, the plaintiff could either drop the suit or incur pre-arbitration costs, request
a trial, and threaten to inflict post-arbitration costs on the defendant. However, the
plaintiff's threat to proceed, given that the defendant initially refused to settle, will
only be credible if the plaintiff's pre-arbitration costs are less than the amount that
he would now be able to extract in settlement were he to proceed, namely an amount
just under the defendant's post-arbitration costs. When the parties know at the outset
that this condition would hold were the defendant to refuse to settle at the outset
(choosing instead to defend himself) and the plaintiff can make a one-time take-it-orleave-it settlement demand at the outset, the plaintiff will demand, and the defendant
will agree to pay, an amount just under the sum of the defendant's pre- and postarbitration costs. The defendant knows that he is better off settling for this amount
at the outset than he is defending himself prior to arbitration and either settling or
defending himself after the arbitration hearing has been held and a trial requested.

1993]

LIMITS OF COURT-CONNECTED ADR

2201

ii. Programs With Post-Arbitration Fee and Cost-Shifting Provisions
In CAA programs with post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting
provisions that require the party requesting a trial to improve his
position at trial by a specified amount or pay his opponent's postarbitration costs and/or legal fees, 123 the programs' effect on the
plaintiffs incentive to file nuisance suits will also depend on
whether the jurisdiction has a "plaintiff-drops" rule-that is, a rule
making a plaintiff who requests a trial but later drops or settles his
claim liable for the defendant's post-arbitration costs.
In the absence of a plaintiff-drops rule, a post-arbitration fee
and cost-shifting provision will not affect the credibility of the
plaintiffs threat to impose post-arbitration costs on the defendant-the plaintiff can still drop his claim without a penalty so his
incentive to sue will be the same as in a CAAjurisdiction without a
post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting provision. In contrast, a CAA
program with both a post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting provision
and a plaintiff-drops rule may discourage asymmetric cost nuisance
suits. Because an asymmetric cost nuisance suit is, by definition, a
claim that the plaintiff will never pursue to trial, a plaintiff who
must bear the defendant's post-arbitration costs if he drops the
claim cannot credibly threaten to impose such costs on the
defendant. As a consequence, the largest settlement the plaintiff
will be able to extract is an amount just under the defendant's prearbitration costs.
iii. Summary
Thus, the settlement value of an asymmetric cost nuisance suit
in a CAA jurisdiction depends on the plaintiffs ability to credibly
threaten to impose post-arbitration costs on the defendant.
Consequently, the programs' effect on a plaintiffs incentive to file
such suits relative to a trial-only jurisdiction is difficult to predict
and will depend on a variety of program features that affect the
sequence and amount of the parties' litigation costs-most importantly, the timing 124 and cost 125 of the hearing, the amount of
123 A typical post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting provision is discussed in Part III,

see infra text accompanying note 159, and modeled in the Technical Appendix, infra.
For examples of the types of fee and cost-shifting provisions that are common in state
CAA programs, see supra note 58.
12 The timing of the arbitration hearing will have a strong impact on the
plaintiff's incentive to sue. Consider a claim that requires each party to incur $10 of
costs in each often periods prior to trial, so that total pre-trial expenditures for each
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party are $100.

Period
0
1
2
3
4

Defendant's postarbitration
costs*
100
90
80
70
60

5

50

=

50

100

6
7
8
9
10

40
30
20
10
0

<
<
<
<
<

60
70
80
90
100

60
70
80
90
100

Sign
>
>
>
>
>

Plaintiff's prearbitration
costs**
0
10
20
30
40

Settlement
amount
100
100
100
100
100

* The defendant's post-arbitration costs when the arbitration
hearing is held in a given period are his total litigation costs less
the number of periods elapsed multiplied by $10.
** The plaintiff's pre-arbitration costs when the arbitration hearing
is held in a given period are the number of periods that have
elapsed multiplied by $10.
As discussed in the text, in ajurisdiction without a post-arbitration fee and costshifting provision, the plaintiff will have a credible threat to impose post-arbitration
costs on the defendant whenever the plaintiff's pre-arbitration costs are less than the
defendant's post-arbitration costs. When this condition holds, the plaintiff can extract
a settlement just under the sum of the defendant's pre- and post-arbitration costs.
When this condition does not hold, the largest settlement the plaintiff can extract is
an amount just under the defendant's pre-arbitration costs. Thus, in the example
presented above, the plaintiff's incentive to sue would be smallest if the hearing were
held in Period 6.
125 If, contrary to the assumption in the text, participation in the hearing did
impose costs on the parties, see infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text, the
magnitude of such costs may affect the credibility of the plaintiff's threat to impose
post-arbitration costs on the defendant. The condition for determining when the
plaintiff will have a credible threat to impose post-arbitration costs on the defendant
when the hearing simultaneously imposes costs on both parties can be derived
through backward induction. Suppose that the hearing has been held. At this stage,
all the plaintiff has to do to impose post-arbitration costs on the defendant is request
a trial. This is a costless act so his threat to do so is automatically credible and he will
be able to extract a settlementjust under the defendant's post-arbitration costs. Now
let us ask, if we were at the stage just before the hearing, when would the plaintiff
have a credible threat to impose hearing and post-arbitration costs on the defendant?
Well, the plaintiff has a credible threat to go forward as long as the cost to him of
doing so-the hearing cost-is less than the benefit to him of actually doing so,
namely, an amountjust under the defendant's post-arbitration costs. Consequently,
assuming that the plaintiff can make a one-time take-it-or-leave-it settlement demand,
he will demand, and the defendant will agree to pay, an amountjust under the sum
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pre-arbitration discovery permitted, 126 and the relevant fee and
cost-shifting provisions and bond-posting requirements. 2 7
b. Cloud on Title Theory
The asymmetric cost theory of the nuisance suit has been
criticized on the grounds that "it can at most explain settlement
1 28
offers up to the amount of [the defendant's] respon[se] costs."
It can, however, explain much larger settlements once it is recognized that the mere existence of a legal claim may impose additional

of the defendant's hearing and post-arbitration costs. However, given the assumption
that the plaintiff can make a one-time take-it-or-leave-it settlement demand, even
before the plaintiff incurs pre-arbitration costs, he will be able to demand, and the
defendant will be willing to pay, this amount. Knowing that the consequences
outlined above would arise if the conditions outlined above were to hold, if the
plaintiff makes a one-time take-it-or-leave-it settlement demand at the outset of the
litigation process just under the sum of the defendant's pre-arbitration, postarbitration, and hearing costs, the defendant will agree to settle. These conditions
suggest that as the cost of the hearing increases, at some point the plaintiff will no
longer have a credible threat to impose post-arbitration costs on the defendant, but
that unless the cost is high enough for the threat credibility condition not to hold, the
existence of the program will increase the settlement demand the defendant will
agree to pay and will therefore increase the plaintiff's incentive to file nuisance suits.
126 The amount of pre-arbitration discovery permitted is particularly important
since discovery is the stage in the litigation process that the plaintiff can most easily
inflict asymmetric costs on the defendant. See supra note 31 (discussing the programs'
limitations on the amount of discovery permitted).
127 Most CAA programs require a party requesting a trial to post a bond in the
amount of the arbitrators' fees. The bond is returned only if the trial outcome is
substantially more favorable to the requesting party than the arbitrated outcome. See
supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. In some cases, a bond-posting requirement
will make the plaintiff's threat to go to arbitration and request a trial incredible at the
outset; it may reduce the maximum settlement the plaintiff can extract and thereby
lessen her incentive to file nuisance suits. If, however, the bond-posting requirement
does not affect the credibility of the plaintiff's threat-as would likely be the case in
a jurisdiction where the arbitration hearing is held after full discovery-it will not
affect the amount she is able to extract in settlement and will therefore have no effect
on her incentive to file such suits. Although the small size of the bond suggests that
it is unlikely to have a significant effect, the effect of a bond-posting requirement can
be far larger than the size of the bond itself. For example, in the numerical
illustration presented supra note 124, if the arbitration hearing were held in period
four, in the absence of a bond-posting requirement, the plaintiff would have a
credible threat to impose post-arbitration costs on the defendant and could therefore
extract just under $100 in settlement. However, if such a program also required a
$21 bond to be posted, the plaintiff would no longer have a credible threat and would
be able to recoverjust under $40. Thus, the effect of the bond-posting requirement
on the plaintiff's recovery may, in certain instances be larger than the amount of the
bond.
128 Bebchuk, Suingfor Settlement, supra note 116, at 439.
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costs on the defendant regardless of whether the plaintiff would
ultimately prevail.1 29 When the filing of a lawsuit creates a "cloud
on title" to an asset held by the defendant, the settlement value of
the claim is determined not only, or even primarily, by the defendant's litigation response costs, but also by the length of time that the
plaintiff can maintain the suit before having a dispositive judgment
entered against him, the cost to the defendant of informing relevant
third parties 3 0° or the market about the strength of the claim, and
the cost to third parties of verifying information released by the
defendant.1 3 1 Consequently, it may be rational for the defendant
129 Clouds on title are common in patent infringement actions, suits alleging that
a former employee breached a covenant not to compete, and certain actions to
accelerate debt. The cloud is easiest to create when the claim can get past summary
judgment, which is most likely when the claim involves a factual dispute. However,
in situations where a good deal of discovery will be permitted prior to a decision on
the defendant's motion for summaryjudgment, even in cases where the defendant is
likely to prevail on summaryjudgment, the time between the filing of the claim and
the granting of summary judgment may be long enough for the cloud's effect to be
strong. It is also important to note that the strength of the cloud may differ from the
strength of the claim, in part because while the plaintiff may have the burden of
proof at trial, the defendant, in effect, has the burden of proof vis-a-vis third parties
during the pendency of the litigation.
130 This cost is especially large in situations where the defendant might not want
to disclose the information needed to reveal the weakness in the plaintiff's claim since
doing so might disclose trade secrets or proprietary information.
1 Although Bebchuk explains how the asymmetry of information between the
plaintiff and the defendant can explain nuisance and NEV suits, see Bebchuk, Suing
for Settlement, supra note 116, when the nuisance value of the claim derives from the
cloud on title, it is the informational asymmetry between the parties on the one hand
and people who might transact with the defendant on the other that enables the
plaintiff to extract a settlement offer. Consider, for example, a patent infringement
suit filed against Mr. A who is in the process of negotiating a licensing agreement
with Ms. B. After hearing of the action, Ms. B will want information about the merits
of the suit. Most likely, she will both request information from Mr. A and undertake
an independent investigation. Even if Ms. B ultimately determines that the claim is
frivolous, she will now be willing to pay only the original license fee less the costs of
determining whether or not the claim had merit. Mr. A loses both the decrease in
the contract price as well as the amount he paid to provide Ms. B with information.
Consequently, ex ante, Mr. A is better off settling with the person who sued him for
any amount less than the cost of responding to the suit plus the cost of Ms. B's
independent investigation and any costs that Mr. A himself would have incurred in
providing information to Ms. B. In a situation where the delay resulting from the suit
might cause the transaction to fall through, Mr. A may even be willing to pay an
additional sum to quickly resolve the dispute. Furthermore, to the extent that Ms.
B has any residual uncertainty about the strength of the claim, this too will decrease
the price she is willing to pay for the license and thus increase the amount that Mr.
A is willing to pay to the plaintiff in exchange for a settlement.
In addition, the value of the suit to the plaintiff may exceed its settlement value
in situations where the parties are competitors and the existence of the cloud gives
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to settle for an amount that far exceeds his litigation response costs.
The time value of a lawsuit may be far higher than the defendant's
litigation response costs. As long as the arbitration award is nonbinding, CAA programs, with or without disincentives to requesting
a trial, will not deter cloud on title nuisance suits13 2 since their
value is determined, in large part, by the length of time the action
can be maintained, something that non-binding CAA programs leave
unchanged. 3
c. Asymmetric Information Theory
The asymmetric information theory defines an NEV suit as a
dispute in which the "plaintiff recognizes that the expected value to
him of going to trial is negative. This might be the case either
because the chances of winning at trial are small (the suit is
'frivolous' [that is, a nuisance suit]) or because the expected

the plaintiff an advantage over the defendant in a product or supply market.
32Although the magnitude of the effect is difficult to predict, CAA programs
may increase the strength of a cloud on title. If the plaintiff prevails at arbitration,
this result may be taken as a signal that the claim has merit. In contrast, if the
defendant prevails, the cloud may not be either removed or significantly weakened
unless the information revealed at the hearing removes the uncertainty that originally
created the cloud. When the hearing is held prior to full discovery, the plaintiff may
be able to maintain the cloud by insisting that, while the arbitrator might have ruled
correctly on the basis of the information presented, his allegations will be borne out
when further discovery is completed.
I" One argument against the cloud on title theory is that the market can
accurately value a lawsuit. This might be true of a large publicly traded company and
routine claims that are small in relation to the corporation's net worth, but it does
not apply to large contingent liabilities where there are numerous murky factual
issues. In these types of cases, the disclosures made by the corporation tend to be of
the form, "the company has meritorious defenses," and nobody knows what types of
incriminating documents will turn up in discovery. In addition, in many types of
complex lawsuits, a lemons problem is likely to exist. A company in the wrong has
no incentive to reveal bad information and a company in the right may be unable to
convince others that it is in the clear, even if it voluntarily releases large amounts of
information. This may lead the market to discount the company's shares and other
transactors to overweigh the existence of the claim in their dealings with the
company. Even in situations where the market can accurately value the claim so that
a well diversified investor is willing to hold the stock in his portfolio, a relatively riskaverse supplier may be reluctant to enter into a long-term contract with the company,
particularly when significant reliance expenditures are involved. Alternatively, the
supplier may be willing to contract but only on terms that compensate him for the
added perceived risk. Consider a tort suit for a design defect filed against a
manufacturer of kidney dialysis machines. If the company were negotiating with a
small firm for a contract to produce filters for the soon-to-be-released home version
of the machine-a transaction that would require the small firm to retool a plant and
make significant reliance expenditures-the small firm might be reluctant to contract.

2206

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 141:2169

judgment is small relative to the expected litigation costs." 13 4 It
attributes the ability of a plaintiff with a NEV claim to extract a
settlement offer to informational asymmetries. At the outset of
litigation, the plaintiff may have better information about the
strength of his claim, the magnitude of his damages, or his expected
litigation costs, so the defendant may be unable to determine
whether the claim is an NEV suit. The defendant's uncertainty
about the plaintiffs expected gain from trial, his inability to
eliminate this uncertainty through modest pre-trial expenditures,
and his fear that if the case goes to trial his litigation expenses will
be high and the judgment large, might lead him to offer some
amount in settlement, even in situations where the plaintiff's claim
actually has a negative expected value, so the plaintiff would not, in
fact, be willing to go to trial if settlement negotiations failed.
The effect of CAA programs on the plaintiff's incentive to file
NEV suits is difficult to predict. It will depend on a number of
factors that affect the cost to the defendant of eliminating the
informational uncertainty, such as the amount of pre-arbitration
discovery permitted and the fee and cost-shifting rule in effect, as
well as the parties' view of the ability of an arbitration hearing to
135
effectively reveal NEV suits.

134 Bebchuk, Suingfor Settlement, supra note 116, at 437. In this model, a plaintiff
who has superior information about either the expected value of his case or his
litigation costs, files a claim and the defendant responds by either (1) offering some
amount in settlement, which the plaintiff must either accept or reject and go to trial;
or (2) by refusing to offer anything in settlement, so the plaintiff must either drop the
case or go to trial. The possibility of eliminating the asymmetry of information
through a pre-trial exchange of information (civil discovery) is not considered; it is
assumed that a plaintiff with a positive expected value claim "cannot eliminate the
informational asymmetry in any way [short of trial] that is not prohibitively costly,"
despite the fact that it is in his interest to do so. Id. at 442 n.8. Because the
asymmetry of information may leave the defendant uncertain as to whether or not the
plaintiff has a credible threat to go to trial, it might enable a plaintiff with an NEV
suit to extract a settlement, see id. at 440, since under the model's assumptions, if the
defendant either does not offer a settlement, or offers too little and the plaintiff in
fact has a positive expected value suit, a trial will take place which will force the
defendant to bear significant costs and expose him to the risk of a substantial
judgment.
35 The ability of a CAA hearing to effectively reveal NEV suits depends, in large
part, on how much information is presented to the tribunal. This, in turn, is
influenced by the amount of pre-arbitration discovery permitted, the type of hearing
authorized by the local rule, and whether or not witnesses are allowed to testify and
be subject to cross-examination.
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Programs Without Post-Arbitration Fee and Cost-Shifting
Provisions

A CAA program without post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting
will only reduce the number of NEV suits filed relative to a trial-only
jurisdiction if the parties think that the arbitration hearing and prearbitration discovery will either reveal NEV suits at less expense
than traditional pre-trial procedures, or do so in situations where
pre-trial procedures would leave the defendant with enough
uncertainty to offer a settlement in a trial-only jurisdiction. If the
arbitration process has either of these informational effects,13 6 a
plaintiff with an NEV suit may no longer find it worthwhile to
sue. 137 The plaintiff will take into account the possibility that the
defendant may refuse to settle until after the hearing is held and
that if the hearing reveals that the suit is NEV, the defendant will
offer little13 8 or nothing in settlement.1 3 9 In contrast, if the
parties think that the arbitration process is unlikely to reveal NEV
suits, CAA programs may slightly increase the plaintiff's incentive
to sue. The cost of the arbitration hearing 140 will increase the
defendant's total cost of acquiring information, and may therefore
136 The informational effects of CAA programs are likely to be weak. See infra
note 172. If a plaintiff has an informational advantage that he could use to extract
a settlement offer in a trial-only jurisdiction, he will be unlikely to either reveal the
undisclosed information in an arbitration hearing or reveal it earlier in pre-arbitration
discovery than he would in pre-trial discovery. Although it might be argued that
because a plaintiff with a positive expected value claim has an incentive to reveal the
strength of his case at arbitration, failure to do so will be interpreted by the
defendant as a signal that the plaintiff's claim is NEV, there is no reason that the
plaintiff's incentive to reveal this information should be any stronger, or his ability
to do so any more convincing, than it would be in a trial-only jurisdiction.
137 Although the possibility of pre-trial discovery is not mentioned in Bebchuk's
article, the ability of the plaintiff to extract a settlement there is due, in large part,
to the cost (assumed to be trial) of eliminating the informational asymmetry. If pretrial discovery gave the defendant an inexpensive way to eliminate the informational
uncertainty, he might prefer to conduct discovery before offering a settlement. If
discovery revealed that the plaintiff's probability of prevailing was low, the defendant
would then be unlikely to offer a settlement.
1 Although the hearing eliminates the asymmetry of information, the asymmetric
cost theory suggests that plaintiff may nevertheless be able to extract a settlement
offer if he can credibly threaten to impose post-arbitration costs on the defendant.
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
IlEven if the arbitrator makes a small award for the plaintiff, the defendant here
can simply request a trial.
140 See infra text accompanying notes 219-20 (discussing the cost of participating
in the arbitration hearing).
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lead him to offer somewhat more in settlement at the outset of the
141
litigation process than he would in a trial-only jurisdiction.
ii. Programs with Post-Arbitration Fee and Cost-Shifting Provisions
The effect of CAA programs in a jurisdiction with post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting may also depend on whether the suit is an
NEV suit because litigation costs are high relative to stakes or
because the plaintiff's probability of prevailing at trial is low (a
nuisance suit).
If the suit is NEV because the plaintiff's costs are high relative
to the stakes, the program may increase the plaintiff's incentive to
sue. If the parties view the arbitration award as an accurate
predictor of the expected trial judgment, the defendant knows that
if an arbitration hearing is held he will be better off paying the
award than requesting a trial. The trial judgment will be the same
as the arbitration award, and he will also have to bear both his own
and the plaintiff's post-arbitration costs. In addition, even if the
plaintiff would have dropped the suit had the defendant initially
refused to settle in a trial-onlyjurisdiction, he may now continue the
suit even if the defendant refuses to settle prior to the arbitration
hearing and requests a trial after the hearing has been held. In such
a situation, the plaintiff knows that the probability he will have to
bear his own costs is very low, so the expected value of going to trial
is likely to be positive. Thus, if the suit is a NEV suit primarily
because costs are high relative to stakes, and the plaintiff's prearbitration costs are less than the expected arbitration award, his
incentive to sue will be greater than in a trial-only jurisdiction. In
a GAA jurisdiction, the plaintiff is certain to obtain a recoverythrough settlement at the outset, acceptance of the arbitration
award, or trial. This increase in the plaintiff's incentive to sue may,
however, be viewed as socially desirable. When the plaintiff's
probability of prevailing is high, he has a legitimate entitlement to
relief. By making it possible for him to obtain a recovery, the
program may serve its intended purpose-increasing access to
justice.
The effect of CAA programs on the plaintiffs incentive to file
suits that are NEV primarily because the plaintiffs probability of
141 See Bebchuk, Suing for Settlement, supra note 116, at 446 (demonstrating
formally that increasing the defendant's costs will "raise the amount that a successful
NEV suit will yield").
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prevailing is low, is more difficult to predict. It will depend, in part,
on the plaintiff's estimate of the likelihood that the defendant will
offer a pre-arbitration settlement. When the parties believe that the
arbitration award is an accurate predictor of the expected trial
judgment, a plaintiff with this type of claim will not actually go to
either trial or arbitration since he will not obtain a recovery. The
likelihood that the defendant will offer a pre-arbitration settlement,
and the amount he will offer if he chooses to do so, will depend on
his estimates of the cost of participating in the arbitration hearing,
the probability that the suit is NEV because the plaintiff's probability of prevailing is low, and the probability that the suit either has a
positive expected value or is NEV primarily because costs are high
relative to stakes. A defendant will not offer a pre-arbitration settlement when he knows that a claim is NEV because the plaintiff's
probability of prevailing is low. However, the defendant's uncertainty about the true character of a claim might lead him to offer a prearbitration settlement. As a consequence, even if the arbitration
hearing does accurately reveal NEV suits, the plaintiff's incentive to
file suits that are NEV primarily because his probability of prevailing
is low will not be eliminated.
If the parties believe that the arbitration hearing is unlikely to
reveal NEV suits, the plaintiff's incentive to file such claims may be
stronger than in a trial-only jurisdiction, particularly if he is not
responsible for the defendant's post-arbitration costs if he requests
a trial and subsequently drops the claim. When a defendant makes
a settlement offer in face of asymmetric information, he is, in effect,
attempting to insure against the risk that, if a trial occurs, litigation
expenses will be high and the judgment large. If the parties think
that the arbitration process is unlikely to reveal NEV suits, a
defendant deciding how much to offer in settlement knows that if
the arbitrator makes a large award for the plaintiff, he will either
have to pay the award or request a trial. 142 He knows that in
142 Although the defendant might take into account the possibility that an
inaccurate arbitrator might rule in his favor which would force the plaintiff to request
a trial, this is unlikely to have a strong effect on either the defendant's willingness to
settle or the amount he would offer if he decided to settle. When the arbitration
hearing reveals little information, the defendant remains unsure about the strength
of the plaintiff's claim. The fact that the plaintiff requested a trial and created the
chance that he would have to pay the defendant's costs does not reveal meaningful
information unless thejurisdiction has a rule making the plaintiff liable if he requests
a trial and subsequently drops the case. Thus, the defendant will be in roughly the
same position that he would have been in a trial-only jurisdiction.
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making this decision, he will have to take into account the possibility that the expected trial judgment will be greater than the
arbitration award so that he will have to pay both the judgment and,
perhaps, the plaintiffs post-arbitration costs. The fee and costshifting provisions increase the expected cost of the defendant's
uncertainty. Consequently, he may offer more in settlement than
he would in a trial-only jurisdiction, particularly when the hearing
is held prior to full discovery. This, in turn, will increase the
plaintiffs incentive to sue.
d. Aggregate Effects on the Volume of Nuisance and NEV Suits
The aggregate effect of CAA programs on the number of
nuisance and NEV suits filed will depend strongly on the plaintiffs
motive for bringing suit and the details of program design. The
effect of programs without post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting
provisions on the plaintiff's incentive to file asymmetric cost
nuisance suits is difficult to predict; it will depend on the cost of the
hearing, the distribution of pre- and post-arbitration costs and how
the sequence in which costs are incurred compares to a trial-only
jurisdiction. These programs, however, will not reduce and may
slightly increase the number of NEV suits based on asymmetric
information. The hearings are unlikely either to give the defendant
information he would not otherwise have obtained through
traditional pre-trial procedures, or to enable him to acquire the
same information he would have acquired in a trial-only jurisdiction
at a lower cost.
Programs with post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting provisions
may decrease the plaintiff's incentive to bring asymmetric cost
nuisance suits, but will only do so if they also have a plaintiff-drops
rule. Otherwise, their effect will be the same as in a CAAjurisdiction without a post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting provision.
However, by increasing the magnitude of the down-side risk from
defendant's uncertainty, programs with post-arbitration fee and costshifting provisions may increase the number of suits motivated by
the plaintiffs possession of asymmetric information.
CAA programs with or without post-arbitration fee and costshifting provisions are likely to leave the number of suits filed for
their cloud on title value essentially unchanged since they do not
effect the length of time a suit can be maintained, the primary
determinant of the suit's settlement value.
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CAA programs will also affect the volume of litigation even in
the absence of asymmetric costs or asymmetric information.
Programs without fee and cost-shifting provisions will increase total
litigation costs in cases that actually go to trial (by adding an
additional layer of costly procedure), making some suits that would
have had a positive expected value in a trial-only jurisdiction into
NEV suits and thereby decreasing access to justice. In contrast,
programs with accurate arbitrators and post-arbitration fee and costshifting provisions may transform some suits that would have had
a NEV in a trial-only jurisdiction (because costs were high relative
to stakes) into positive expected value suits in a CAA jurisdiction,
thereby increasing access to justice.
In sum, CAA programs cannot be justified on the grounds that
they are likely to meaningfully reduce the number of nuisance or
14 3
NEV suits relative to a trial-only jurisdiction.
2. Reducing Cost and Delay
A primary goal of CAA programs is to reduce the private and
social cost of disputing.1 44 However, a review of the empirical
literature on federal CAA programs (which do not have postarbitration fee and cost-shifting disincentives to requesting a
trial 145 ) suggests that there is no conclusive evidence that CAA
programs reduce either the private or social cost of disputing.
143 In addition, the option pricing approach to analyzing litigation decisions
developed by Bradford Cornell suggests that under a wide variety of program
structures and assumptions about the accuracy of arbitration outcomes and awards,
such programs may increase the plaintiff's incentive to sue by increasing the option
value of his claim. See Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option PricingApproach, 19J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 179 (1990).
144 In the empirical literature the private cost of disputing is defined as the cost
to the parties of resolving the dispute; it includes only attorneys' fees and other direct
litigation costs. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND, RAND CORP., ARBITRATING HIGH-STAKES
CASES: AN EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN A UNITED STATES
DIsTRICT COURT 37 (1990) (measuring private costs by the legal fees and costs paid
by each party). Other private costs such as lost productivity when managers spend
time preparing for litigation, are not taken into account in these studies. The social
(or public) cost of disputing is defined as the per-case cost to the court of processing
a legal claim. See, e.g., id. at 40. This excludes many important components of actual
social cost, such as the effect of the program on achieving optimal deterrence of
tortious conduct.
145 The only disincentive to requesting a trial is the requirement that the party
requesting a trial post a bond in the amount of the arbitrators' fees, which is only
returned to him if he significantly improves his position at trial. Seesupra notes 52-54
and accompanying text.
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One measure of social cost is the per-case processing cost. A
recent study of the North Carolina CAA program found that "the
average cost to the court of each closed... [arbitration track] case
was $1209 and the average cost to the court of each closed control
group case was $1240," but cautioned that "[t]he difference in cost
was not statistically significant." 146 One district discontinued its
program "due to disproportionately high administrative costs ...
14% of the district's administrative resources were devoted to
handling arbitration cases, which represented only 7.2% of its civil
14 7

caseload."

Even if CAA programs had no effect on the per-case processing
cost, they might produce aggregate social cost savings if they
reduced the trial rate. There is no conclusive evidence, however,
that the programs have reduced the trial rate, 148 and because so
146 LIND, supra note 144, at 40. The North Carolina program, administered in
part by Duke Law School, is the only pilot program that randomly assigns cases to
arbitration or control groups.
147 See Dayton, supra note 16, at 894-95 n.27 (citing Letter from Sylvester A.
Markowski to RobertJ. Pellicoro (Aug. 11, 1981) (with attached report recommending
to drop the court-annexed arbitration in the District of Connecticut) (on file in the
University of Iowa College of Law Library)).
148 The study most frequently cited to demonstrate that CAA programs reduce the
trial rate is E. ALLAN LIND &JOHN E. SHAPARD, FEDERALJUDICIAL CTR., EVALUATION
OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1983). It
compared trial rates before and after the institution of CAA programs and oncluded
that "it [is] fair to assume that the trial rate for arbitration appropriate cases could

be as high as 6 or 7 percent in the absence of the rules," but cautioned that "it might
not be much higher than the 3 percent we regard as a fair estimate of the rate
achieved with an arbitration program." Id. at 140. Notably, the study did not look at
the trial rate in Connecticut, one of the three programs studied, since the program
was discontinued. There is some evidence that the Connecticut program had no
effect on the trial rate. See Dayton, supra note 16, at 894 n.27 and sources cited
therein. The RAND study of the North Carolina program which randomly assigned
arbitration eligible cases to an arbitration or control group found that there was no
statistically significant difference in the trial rate for the two groups of cases, but
cautioned that the sample size was too small to permit reliable inferences. See LIND,
supra note 144, at 21-22.
In addition, there are a number of reasons to be skeptical of trial rate studies.
Under most program rules, parties can make a motion to exempt their case from
arbitration for a number of reasons, including that "the case involves complex or
novel legal issues ... [or] because legal issues predominate over factual issues." See,
e.g., W.D. OKLA. LOC. CT. R. 43(E). Since these are the types of cases that are most
likely to go to trial, post-arbitration trial rates should be lower than trial rates in a
trial-only jurisdictions even if the programs have no effect on the parties' litigation
decisions. Furthermore, trial rates tend to increase as the amount in controversy
increases. In CAAjurisdictions, the percent of the arbitration caseload comprised of
cases with a particular jurisdictional amount in controversy falls dramatically for
claims over $50,000. See MEIERHOEFER, TEN DIST. CTS., supra note 4, at 45 tbl. 6.
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few of the cases subject to the programs would have gone to trial in
a trial-only jurisdiction, it would take many years of data to reliably
149
detect changes in the trial rate.
There is some evidence that the programs may slightly reduce
the private costs of disputing, but the reductions reported are small,
the studies are inconclusive, and the results may be marred by
serious response bias.1 50 Furthermore, studies that found some
reduction in the private cost of disputing to the plaintiff did not
observe any changes in the contingent fee percentages charged by
plaintiff's lawyers. This suggests that in the tort context CAA
programs may benefit plaintiff's lawyers, but not plaintiffs themselves.

15 1

This suggests that in cases where a trial is desired, parties may claim a larger amount
in controversy at the outset. In addition, many exemption motions are granted on
the grounds that the amount in controversy exceeds thejurisdictional limits. See id.
at 45. It is likely that had these larger cases been subject to the program, the trial
rate in CAA jurisdictions would have been higher. See also DONOVAN LEISURE
NEWTON & IRVINE, supra note 76, § 19 (concluding that "recent quasi-experimental
studies focusing on court administered arbitration [in both state and federal courts]
have found a similar null result," that is, no effect on the trial rate) (citing DEBORAH
R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND CORP.,JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: THE FIRST
YEAR xiii (1981) (concluding that "under various assumptions, [California's state CAA
program].., could save as much as $4 million annually, could break even, or could
result in a $4 million increase in court costs") and ROBERTJ. MACCOUN ET AL., RAND
CORP., ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE NEWJERSEY AUTOMOBILE ARBITRATION PROGRAM (1988)); LIND, supra note 144, at 21-22.
149 This methodological difficulty is pointed out in MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN TEN
DIST. CTS., supra note 4, at 117 n.69 (estimating that "[t]o have an 80% probability
of detecting a two percentage point reduction from a trial rate of 4%, both the
arbitration and control samples must exceed 1,000 cases").
150 The RAND study of the North Carolina program found a statistically
insignificant decrease in costs for plaintiffs and a statistically significant (though small)
decrease in costs for the defendants, but cautioned that "[t]his cost difference might
be due to differences in the cases from which the data were drawn." Id. at 37.
However, as the study itself acknowledged, the reliability of cost data is questionable
since it is collected through attorney opinion surveys. In the RAND study, for
example, 19% of the attorneys surveyed failed to respond to the attorney survey and
of those responding, 29% did not answer the questions relating to litigation costs.
See LIND, supra note 144, at 37.
151 This is not a surprising result since the contingent fee percentage should
reflect the probability of going to trial which should not be affected by a non-binding
program with no meaningful disincentives to requesting a trial.
There is also some evidence that CAA programs may increase certain components of private cost. For example, a study of the North Carolina program which
imposes strict time limits on discovery, found that more motions were filed in cases
assigned to the arbitration program. See LIND, supra note 144, at 36. In addition, as
discussed in Part III, the strict pre-arbitration discovery time limits imposed in some
of the programs may increase actual discovery costs. See infra notes 221-28 and
accompanying text.
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Even if the data demonstrated that CAA programs reduced the
private cost of disputing, the mere fact that actual dispute resolution expenditures are lower does not mean that the high cost of
litigation has ceased to impede access to justice. Since only three
to four percent of the cases subject to the program would go to trial
in a trial-only jurisdiction, it is impossible to assess the programs'
effects on access to justice 152 without information about the
programs' effects on settlement amounts. As long as the arbitration
award is non-binding, the settlement value of a claim and the range
of arbitrated judgments the parties are willing to accept will
continue to reflect the potential costs the parties can threaten to
inflict on one another regardless of whether or not the costs are
actually incurred.
Another goal of CAA programs is to reduce delay. A Federal
Judicial Center study of the time from filing to disposition concluded that "speedier dispositions are not an automatic benefit of
arbitration programs,"153 and a RAND study found no statistically
significant difference in disposition times. 154 Nevertheless, even
if the programs did succeed in reducing average case processing
152 A few of the most commonly cited empirical studies of CAA conclude that they
increase access to justice. See LIND, supra note 144, at 62. However, the definition
of increased access is questionable and the data used to support this conclusion are
subject to conflicting interpretations. For example, the RAND study of the CAA
program in North Carolina hypothesized that the arbitration program might increase
access tojustice by "enabling those who would otherwise have abandoned their cases
to pursue them in the court." Id. at 34-35. It noted a modest increase in the answer
rate in cases subject to the program and a slight increase in the number of case
filings. However, the study is careful to note that while under the local rules, cases
were randomly assigned to either an arbitration or trial track, counsel were not told
whether their case was assigned to arbitration until after the answer was filed,
although it was possible for an attorney who inquired to obtain such information.
Whether these data reflect an increase in access to justice or an increase in nuisance
suits cannot be determined. Consequently, caution should be exercised in concluding
that this evidence supports the inference that the programs increase access tojustice.
153 MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN TEN DIST. CTS., supra note 4, at 97. This study
compared the time from filing to disposition in samples of cases from before and
after institution of the CAA pilot programs. A small reduction in disposition time
was found in three districts, but in seven other districts no statistically significant
effect was observed. A Federal Judicial Center study of the original three pilot
programs found that while disposition times decreased in two of the three districts,
"this is attributable almost exclusively to settlement of cases prior to the arbitration
hearing. In the third pilot court, no such effect was found." LIND & SHAPARD, supra
note 148, at xii-xiii.
154 LIND, supra note 144, at 41-43 (finding that arbitration "cases took an average
of 285 days to reach termination [and] those in the control group took an average of
282 days," but noting that the difference was not statistically significant).
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times, as long as the arbitration award is non-binding, the party with
the superior ability to bear the costs of delay can still threaten to
request a trial. Delay is just another cost of litigation. Although
CAA proponents would view any reduction in disposition time as
evidence of a program's success, regardless of the average disposition time, the parties' relative ability to bear delay will continue to
be reflected in the settlement range at each stage of the litigation
process and delay will continue to affect access to justice. CAA
programs that do not have strong disincentives to requesting a trial
do not reduce either the potential litigation costs or the amount of
delay that the parties can threaten to inflict on each other, and may
155
well increase such costs particularly when a trial is demanded.
Because it is the specter of these enormous potential costs (rather
than whether or not they are actually incurred) that has the effect
of limiting access to the justice system, innovations that leave
potential costs either unchanged and/or add additional levels of
costly procedure cannot increase access to justice-particularly for
those of limited means.
III. THE EFFECT OF CAA PROGRAMS ON PARTIES'
LITIGATION DECISIONS

This section uses simulations of a model of the litigation process
in a CAA jurisdiction with a post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting
provision to explore the programs' effects on parties' litigation decisions. The simulations demonstrate that it is precisely when the
arbitration award most accurately reflects the costs of invoking the
judicial process that the parties are most likely to accept the
arbitrators' decision.
The discussion following the simulations considers the programs' likely impact on discovery and total litigation costs, and
explores how each party's wealth, degree of risk aversion, and ability
to bear delay affect the programs' distributional consequences. It
concludes that as long as the arbitration award is non-binding,
inequality of bargaining power as well as the effects of the high cost
of litigation and long delays in trying cases will continue to be
reflected in the settlement value of a claim, and that as a consequence, CAA programs are unlikely to realize their stated goal of
155

See infra text accompanying notes 214-20.
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increasing access to justice 15 6 and may, in fact, decrease access to
justice for poorer and more risk-averse litigants.
A. The Sequence of Parties' LitigationDecisions
in a CAA Jurisdiction
The effects of CAA programs on the parties' incentives to sue,
settle, accept the arbitration award, or go to trial can be demonstrated by looking at several simulations of the parties' litigation
decisions using a model of the litigation process, 157 standard
assumptions about the ratio of costs to stakes, 158 and a stylized
fee and cost-shifting rule 159 which provides that: (1) if a plaintiff
requests a trial and fails to improve upon the arbitration award by
15% at trial, he must pay the defendant's post-arbitration costs; (2)
See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 11, at 2, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6804.
157 The formal model is presented in the Technical Appendix, infra. It is based
on the standard model of the litigation process. SeeJohn P. Gould, The Economics of
Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); Posner, supra note 101; Steven Shavell,
Sui4 Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the
Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 56-58 (1982).
158 The costs-to-stakes ratios used in these simulations are based on data collected
by the Civil Litigation Research Project at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. For
a discussion of the research methodology employed in the study, see David M. Trubek
et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 94-108 (1983). For a
discussion of possible biases in the data set and some interesting adjustments to the
data, see Avery Katz, Measuring the Demandfor Litigation, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 143,
166 (1987) (combining the Wisconsin data on the ratio of total expenditures to
average recovery with the Priest-Klein theory of the selection of disputes for litigation,
which suggests that the plaintiff is likely to prevail in half the cases that go to trial,
and concluding that "20-40 percent is a reasonable range of estimates for the ratio of
total expenditures to potential stakes"). For a discussion of the Priest-Klein theory,
see George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputesfor Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
159 Although federal CAA programs do not currently impose post-arbitration fee
and cost-shifting sanctions, experimental use of such sanctions in pilot jurisdictions
was recommended by the Federal Courts Study Committee. See FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMM., supra note 15, at 83-85. Many state CAA programs have fee and costshifting provisions similar to the one considered in the text, see supra note 58 and
accompanying text, as did some of the original pilots, see supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
At present, the only disincentive to requesting a trial is that the party requesting
a trial must post a bond with the court in the amount of the arbitrators' fees which,
depending on the district and the number of arbitrators, ranges from $125 to $800.
See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. If the party posting the bond improves
his position by a specified amount at trial, the bond is refunded; if not it remains in
the court treasury. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. In a jurisdiction
requiring a bond, it will be rational for a party to request a trial if the arbitration
award diverges from her expected post-trial position by more than the amount of the
bond.
156
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if a defendant requests a trial and fails to achieve more than a 15%
reduction in the arbitration award at trial, he must pay the plaintiffs post-arbitration costs; and (3) if both parties request a trial,
160
they each bear their own costs regardless of the trial outcome.

In addition, by illustrating the program's effect on the end-points of
the pre-arbitration settlement range, 16 1 the range of arbitrated

judgments the parties prefer to trial, and the post-arbitration
settlement range, the simulations can be used to explore the

program's distributional consequences-its effect on the parameters
that shape settlement amounts at various stages in the litigation
process. 162
The sequence of the parties' litigation decisions in a CAA
jurisdiction is pictured below.

PSettlement
Files Suit

Pre-Arbitration
costs

Both Accept
bitraion

Setlement
"'Plaintiff, Defendant,
or Both Request Trial

Post-Arbitration
Costs

Trial

A plaintiff files a claim which is either settled or arbitrated. If it is
arbitrated, costs are incurred by both parties, a hearing is held, and
160 The process for requesting a trial is not spelled out in most local rules. For
the purposes of this analysis it is assumed that a party desiring a trial notifies the
court but not his opponent; otherwise, when both parties want to request a trial a
game of "chicken" would likely ensue since each party is better off if his opponent
alone requests a trial.
161 At a given stage of the litigation process, the "settlement range" is the range
of settlement amounts that both parties prefer to continued participation in the
litigation process.
162 Although CAA programs are generally evaluated on the "settlement rate" they
are able to achieve, evaluating programs on this basis obscures the distributional
concerns that emerge when the programs' effects on the settlement amount are taken
into account. In addition, if either the programs' success or individual arbitrators are
evaluated on the basis of the settlement rate, the arbitrators' institutional interest may
lead them to render those awards that are least likely to lead to a trial request given
the parties' degrees of risk aversion and other relevant characteristics rather than the
outcomes most closely approximating the trial judgment. A similar argument has
been made with respect to judges' interests in increasing the number of case
dispositions in case management orientedjurisdictions. SeeJudith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 427 (1982) ("IJiudges with supervisory obligations may
gain stakes in the cases they manage. Their prestige may ride on 'efficient'
management, as calculated by the speed and number of dispositions. Competition
and peer pressure may temptjudges to rush litigants because of reasons unrelated to
the merits of disputes.").
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the arbitrator renders an award. Each party then independently
decides whether or not to request a trial, 163 taking into account
his view of the probability that the plaintiff will prevail, the expected
trial judgment, his own post-arbitration costs, 164 and the possibility that he will suffer a fee and cost-shifting penalty if he alone
requests a trial and fails to improve his position by 15% at trial.
The plaintiff will compare his post-arbitration position to his
expected post-trial position 165 if he alone were to request a trial,
and will only request a trial if, given the arbitration award, his
expected post-trial position is better than his post-arbitration
position. The arbitration award above which it is rational for the
plaintiff to accept the arbitration award and below which it is
rational for him to request a trial is a critical point for the plaintiff.166 Similarly, the defendant will request a trial if his expected
167
post-trial position is superior to his post-arbitration position,

163 For an explanation of why, under these assumptions, the parties' decisions
about whether or not to request a trial are not interactive, see infra Technical
Appendix.
164 The model used to generate the simulations uses a measure of "costs" that
includes both litigation costs, as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1988), and attorneys'
fees. However, the effects of fee-shifting provisions and cost-shifting provisions are
somewhat different. Under the American rule for the allocation of legal fees each
side pays its own attorneys' fees, while under the federal rules "costs shall be allowed
as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." FED. R. CIV.
P. 54(d). In a CAA jurisdiction where only costs are shifted, there will be some
instances where the plaintiff prevails at trial but nonetheless has to pay both his own
and the defendant's post-arbitration costs since he requested a trial but failed to
obtain ajudgment 15% greater than the arbitration award. In contrast, regardless of
who requested a trial, a defendant who prevails at trial will never have to pay the
plaintiff's post-arbitration costs, though he may have to pay his own costs if he alone
requested a trial. In addition, if the defendant requests a trial, he can then make a
Rule 68 offer of judgment to the plaintiff. See FED. R. Cv. P. 68. If the plaintiff
rejects the offer and fails to improve his position at trial, he will have to pay the
defendant's post-offer costs. See id. Under Rule 68, the plaintiff is not given the
option of making such an offer. Thus, as compared to a trial-onlyjurisdiction, a costshifting rule has a slightly greater negative impact on the plaintiff than it does on the
defendant.
165 The plaintiff's post-arbitration position is the arbitration award less his prearbitration costs. His expected post-trial position when he alone requests a trial is:
the probability that he will prevail at trial times his expected recovery if he prevailsnamely, the trial judgment less his post-arbitration costs, less the probability that he
will not improve upon the arbitration award by 15% at trial times the defendant's
post-arbitration costs-less the probability that he will lose at trial times the sum of his
and the defendant's post-arbitration costs, less his own pre-arbitration costs. See infra
Technical Appendix, equation IP.
166 See infra Technical Appendix, equation 2P.
167 The defendant's post-arbitration position is a loss of the arbitration award plus
his pre-arbitration costs. His expected post-trial position when he alone requests a
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and will also have a critical point 168 above which it is always
rational for him to request a trial and below which it is always
When the
rational for him to accept the arbitration award.
arbitrator rules in his favor, the defendant will never request a trial.
If the arbitration award is above the plaintiffs critical point and
below the defendant's critical point, each party comparing his postarbitration position to his expected post-trial position when he alone
requests a trial will opt to accept the arbitration award. The range
of arbitration awards that is rational for both parties to accept will
169
be referred to as the "dead zone."
Once a trial has been requested, the parties either settle or incur
post-arbitration costs and go to trial.
B. Simulations of Parties' LitigationDecisions
in a CAA Jurisdiction
The model used to generate the simulations presented below
makes several simplifying assumptions. The parties are assumed to
be risk-neutral, and both pre-arbitration and post-arbitration
litigation expenditures are assumed to be fixed and known in
advance by both parties. The amount of the arbitration award and
the trial judgment if the plaintiff prevails are assumed to be
normally distributed, 170 and both parties are assumed to be

trial is a loss equal to the probability that the plaintiff will prevail at trial times his
expected loss if the plaintiff prevails at trial-namely, the trial judgment plus his postarbitration costs, plus the probability that he will not improve upon the arbitration
award by 15% at trial, times the plaintiff's post-arbitration costs-plus the probability
that he will prevail at trial times his post-arbitration costs, plus his own pre-arbitration
costs. See infra Technical Appendix, equation ID.
168 See infra Technical Appendix, equation 2D.
169 If the plaintiff's critical point is greater than the defendant's critical point, as
might be the case when the parties hold widely different views about the probability
that the plaintiff will prevail or the amount of damages that will be awarded, a dead
zone will not exist. In such a case, regardless of the arbitration award, one or both
of the parties will request a trial, thereby making any money spent on the arbitration
hearing a dead-weight loss. See infra note 199.
170 To say the expected outcome of an adjudicative process is distributed means
that if the plaintiff prevails, the amount of the recovery he will be awarded is not
certain. Rather, a variety of awards might be rendered, each with a given probability.
The assumption that arbitration awards and trialjudgments are normally distributed
corresponds to the intuition that the adjudicator is most likely to make an award corresponding to actual damages but that the actual award may diverge from this
amount with small divergences being more likely than large divergences. A normal
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1 71
represented by hourly-fee lawyers.

1. Convergent Expectations
The effects of a CAA program with a post-arbitration fee and
cost-shifting rule can be seen most clearly by comparing the parties'
litigation decisions in a CAAjurisdiction to their decisions in a trialonly jurisdiction ("TOJ") in a case where the parties are risk-neutral
and have the same view of the distribution of arbitration outcomes
172
which is also their view of the distribution of trial outcomes.

distribution is pictured below.

Amount ($)
The standard deviation-the parameter that describes the amount of variability
(uncertainty) associated with the amount of the arbitration award-used in the
simulations is $40,000, which means that if the same claim were repeatedly submitted
to arbitrators of the same skill, their award would lie between $20,000 and $180,000
95% of the time-that is, within +/- 2 standard deviations of the distribution's mean
(the expected award). The same standard deviation was used for the amount of the
trial judgment.
171 The effects of fee and cost-shifting provisions on the parties' litigation
decisions may be different in a tort case if the plaintiff is represented by a
contingency-fee lawyer and will depend strongly on the structure of the indemnity in
the contingency-fee contract. Although the typical tort plaintiff is risk-averse, the
typical contingency-fee lawyer is closer to risk-neutral than his client (since he holds
a diversified portfolio of cases) and receives one-third of any settlement orjudgment
obtained by the plaintiff and nothing if the defendant prevails. If the contingency fee
lawyer were permitted to bear the cost of the fee-shifting penalty that was imposed
on the plaintiff, it is likely that the contingent fee percentage would increase and that
this would become the preferred arrangement since the main reasons for contingency
fee arrangements are the plaintiff's inability to finance the litigation and his inability
to borrow against the claim from conventional sources. Consequently, the effect of
a fee and cost-shifting penalty in this context will depend on whether the plaintiff or
his lawyer is made to bear the risk of the penalty. See also Miller, supra note 108, at
189-90 (discussing how contingent fee arrangements may create a conflict of interest
between the lawyer and the client with respect to accepting or rejecting a settlement
offer).
172 There are, however, reasons to believe that arbitration awards will tend to
diverge from trialjudgments. In programs where the arbitration hearing is held prior
to full discovery, the arbitrator and the judge (orjury) will face different information
sets. Even in jurisdictions where discovery is completed prior to the hearing, the
information sets are likely to differ since arbitrators may consider evidence that would
be inadmissible at trial. Similarly, in jurisdictions where live witness testimony is not
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Numerical Simulation. Consider a claim where the expected
damage award if the plaintiff prevails is $100,000, total litigation
expenditures are $25,000 for each party, all in post-arbitration
costs, and the parties both believe that there is a 90% chance that
the plaintiff will prevail at arbitration and a 90% (independent)
chance that he will prevail at trial. In this situation, the plaintiffs
critical point' 7 -the minimum arbitration award he will acceptis $58,069 and the defendant's critical point74-the maximum
arbitration award he will agree to pay-is $124,876.

permitted, the arbitrator will not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of
trial witnesses. In situations where one party perceives an adjudicated outcome to be
in its best interest from the outset, the attorney may find it desirable to keep certain
arguments secret until trial either to achieve an element of surprise or to manipulate
the arbitration award to minimize the chance of a post-arbitration fee and costshifting sanction being imposed after trial. Furthermore, even if the information set
presented to the arbitrator were identical to the information set presented at trial, the
arbitration award maybe more uncertain than the expected trial judgment due to the
arbitrator's relative inexperience in deciding cases.
Surveys of participants in CAA pilot programs have found that even in
jurisdictions where the arbitrator is considered the parties' preferred decision maker,
parties believe thatjudges and juries are better than arbitrators at applying the law.
For example, when parties in the Western District of Missouri were asked:
"Considering costs, time, and fairness would you prefer to have your case decided by
ajudge, jury, arbitrator, or makes no difference?," 41% of those responding to the
survey selected the arbitrator and 18% selected thejudge. BARBARA MEIERHOEFER &
CARROLL SERON, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI 42 (1989). But when asked who was most likely to

apply the law correctly, 50% chose the judge and only 7.9% chose the arbitrator. See
id. at 41. Studies of other pilot jurisdictions report similar responses. See
MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN THE E.D.N.Y., supra note 24, at 40; MEIERHOEFER & SERON,
CAA IN THE M.D. FLA., supranote 24, at 43-44; MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN THE M.D.N.C.,
supra note 26, at 59; MEIERHOEFER & SERON, CAA IN THE N.D. CAL., supra note 24,
at 39-40; MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN THE W.D. OKLA., supra note 24, at 43-44. Survey
samples in two jurisdictions were too small to draw meaningful conclusions. See
MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN THE D.NJ., supra note 30, at 48-49; MEIERHOEFER & SERON,
CAA IN THE W.D. TEX., supra note 63, at 35-36. In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, litigants were not asked these questions. See MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN THE E.D. PA.,
supra note 30, at 1.
173 See infra Technical Appendix, equation 2P.
174 See infra Technical Appendix, equation 2D.
In the example presented in the text, the fee and cost-shifting rule under
consideration creates a mild pro-defendant bias if the arbitration hearing takes place.
If the arbitrator erred $30,000 in favor of the plaintiff, itwould be worthwhile for the
defendant to request a trial since $130,000 is greater than the defendant's critical
point of $124,876. In contrast, if the arbitrator erred $30,000 in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiffwould accept the $70,000 award since this is greater than the
plaintiff's critical point of $58,069.
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$58,069 $100,000
$124,876
Defendant's
Plaintiff's
Critical Point
Critical Point
(not to scale)

If the arbitrator rules for the plaintiff and the award falls in zone
P, which it will with a probability of 14%,' 75 the plaintiff will
request a trial since his expected post-trial position is better than
his post-arbitration position. If the award falls in zone D, which it
will with a probability of 26%,176 the defendant will request a
trial since his expected post-trial position is better than his postarbitration position. If, however, the award falls in the "dead
zone," which it will with a probability of 59%,17 7 then neither

party will request a trial since each prefers his post-arbitration
position to his expected post-trial position when he alone requests
a trial. 178 If the arbitrator rules for the defendant, the plaintiff

will request a trial since his expected gain from going to trial is
positive.

179

Having identified the range of arbitration awards both parties
would be willing to accept if the arbitration occurs, it is interesting
to compare the settlement range at the outset of the litigation
process in a TOJ to the settlement range in a CAA jurisdiction. In
a TOJ, the plaintiff's expected gain from trial-the minimum
amount he would accept in settlement-is his probability of

prevailing times the amount of the expected trial judgment, less
his litigation costs, here $65,000.180 Similarly, the defendant's
175 See infra Technical Appendix, probl.
176

See infra Technical Appendix, prob2.

177 See infra Technical Appendix, prob3.
178 When the arbitration award is in the "dead zone," the defendant prefers paying
the award to requesting a trial regardless of whether the plaintiff chooses to do so
and the plaintiff prefers accepting the award to requesting a trial regardless of
whether or not the defendant chooses to do so. The decision of both parties not to
request a trial when the arbitration award falls in the dead zone is a Nash equilibrium.
See infra Technical Appendix.
179 At this stage the plaintiff's expected gain from trial is the probability he will
prevail times the expected judgment, less the probability that he will lose times the
defendant's post-arbitration costs, less his own post-arbitration costs since he will be
forced to bear them regardless of the outcome. See infra Technical Appendix,
equation P4.5.
180 See infra Technical Appendix, equation 5P.
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expected loss from trial, the maximum amount he would offer in
settlement, is the probability of the plaintiff prevailing times the
amount of the expected trial judgment, plus his own litigation
costs, here $115,000.181

In a CAA jurisdiction, the minimum the

plaintiff will accept at the outset of the litigation is $80,157112
and the maximum the defendant will offer is $103,519.18s

The settlement range at the outset of the litigation process is
narrower in a CAAjurisdiction than in a TOJ. This effect is due, in
large part, to the fact that each party's calculation of the expected
value of further participation in the litigation process takes into
account the possibility that the arbitration award will fall in the dead
zone, that both parties will accept it, and that no post-arbitration
costs will be incurred, as well as the possibility that his opponent
will request a trial which creates some probability that he will not
have to bear his own post-arbitration costs. 184 Whether a narrower settlement range increases or decreases the likelihood of
settlement is a matter of some dispute. Some argue that the
settlement range constitutes the "bribe" that is to be paid to the
parties to induce them to settle: the larger the bribe (that is, the
185
wider the settlement range), the more likely they are to settle.
Others argue that the narrower the settlement range, the less
benefit each party gets from holding out for a larger share of the
bargaining surplus and the more likely it is that a settlement will be
reached.18 6 Consequently, the effect of the programs on the
likelihood of settlement at the outset of litigation is difficult to
predict.
The assumptions used to generate these results represent a bestcase scenario for a CAA program: the arbitration is free, the parties
181 See infra Technical Appendix, equation 5D.
182 See infra Technical Appendix, equation PG.

See infra Technical Appendix, equation DL.
In the numerical simulation presented in the text, the defendant's expected
loss decreases by an amount less than the increase in the plaintiff's expected gain
since the defendant is somewhat more likely than the plaintiff to request a trial, even
when the possibility that the arbitrator will rule for the defendant is taken into
account. Whether this shift favors the plaintiff or the defendant depends on their
relative bargaining power. If the defendant has all of the bargaining power, the shift
favors the plaintiff since it increases the minimum he will accept in settlement. In
contrast, if the plaintiff has all of the bargaining power, the shift hurts him since it
decreases the maximum settlement offer that he can extract from the defendant.
185 See, e.g.,John C. Hause, Indemnity, Settlemen and Litigation,or I'llBe Suing You,
18J. LEG. STUD. 157, 158 (1989).
186 See Richard A. Posner, The SummatyJuiy Trialand OtherMethods of Alternative
DisputeResolution: Some CautionaryObservations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 371 (1986).
183
184
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are risk-neutral, the parties have the same view of the distribution
of arbitration outcomes which is also their view of the distribution
of trial outcomes, 187 all post-arbitration costs and fees are shifted,
and the parties do not engage in strategic behavior. However, if the
parties do not settle prior to arbitration and the arbitrator rules for
the plaintiff, the award will only be accepted 59% of the time. The
10% of the time that the arbitrator rules for the defendant, the
188
plaintiff will always opt to request a trial.
This simulation also demonstrates that it will sometimes be in
a party's best interest to accept an arbitration award, even if it
would have been rational for him to reject a settlement offer in the
same amount at the outset of the litigation process.1 89 Thus, the
parties' acceptance of an arbitration award that they rejected as a
settlement offer during pre-arbitration negotiation does not
necessarily mean that the arbitration has provided valuable
information which caused the parties to revise their estimates of the
plaintiff's probability of prevailing or the distribution of trial
outcomes. Consequently, anecdotal accounts which conclude that
ADR is a valuable settlement device based on the observation that
parties sometimes accept an arbitration award in an amount that
was rejected during bilateral settlement negotiations should be
viewed with caution.
2. Divergent Expectations
a. Mutual Optimism
It is also important to consider the programs' effects when both
parties are overly optimistic about their chances of prevailing at
trial. Mutual over-optimism is said to be the most common cause
90
of failure to settle.'
187 This means that the arbitration awards are assumed to be as accurate as trial
awards.
188 Note that under the more realistic assumption that the parties will incur half
of their costs pre-arbitration and half post-arbitration, in the simulation presented in
the text the likelihood that both parties will accept the arbitration award falls to 35%.
See infra Technical Appendix, prob3. This decrease in the likelihood that both parties
will accept the award is due, in large part, to the fact that post-arbitration costs, which
determine the magnitude of the fee and cost-shifting penalty, are now $12,500 rather
than $25,000, so the deterrent to requesting a trial is weaker.
189 In the example presented in the text, the settlement range at the outset of the
litigation is $80,157 to $103,519, while the range of arbitration awards the parties
prefer to requesting a trial is $58,069 to $124,876.
190 See Robert Cooter et al., Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model
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Numerical Simulation. Consider a $100,000 claim where total
litigation expenditures are $25,000 for each party half in pre- and
half in post-arbitration costs. The plaintiff believes his probability
of prevailing is 90% while the defendant believes that the plaintiff's probability of prevailing is only 30%.191 In a TOJ the
plaintiff's expected gain at the outset of the litigation,
$65,000,192 would be greater than the defendant's expected loss,
$55,000.193 A settlement range would not exist and the case
would go to trial. In a CAA jurisdiction, the plaintiff's expected
gain at the outset of the litigation process is even higher, in this
instance $69,512,194 and the defendant's expected loss is even
lower, in this instance $49,137;195 there is no settlement range
so the claim would definitely go to arbitration. However, if this
claim went to arbitration, the plaintiff's critical point would be
$72,507;196 he would request a trial whenever the arbitration
award is below this amount. The defendant's critical point would
be $46,010;197 he would request a trial whenever the arbitration
award is above this amount. Thus, regardless of the arbitration
award, a trial will be requested and any money spent on the

arbitration hearing is a dead-weight loss. In addition, no postarbitration settlement range would exist regardless of which party
198
requested a trial.
Thus, CAA programs will not create a pre-arbitration settlement
range and may not create a post-arbitration settlement range in
situations where a settlement range would not have existed in a TOJ

of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 225 (1982) ("The usual approach to
bargaining in the legal setting assumes that trial is caused by excessive optimism on
the part of plaintiff and defendant." (citing Gould, supra note 157; Posner, supra note
101, at 419 n.29)); see also Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A
Cognitive Perspective, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Arrow et al. eds.,
forthcoming) (discussing the psychological tendency for the parties engaged in a
dispute to overestimate their chances of success); George L. Priest, Private Litigants
and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L. REV. 527, 532-33 (1989).
191 In the simulations of divergent expectations, each party is assumed to calculate
his expected gain/loss at each stage of the litigation process as if the other party
shared his views. In practice, a party is likely to have some idea of his opponent's
expectations, but his ability to accurately assess them will be limited.
192 See infra Technical Appendix, equation 5P.
193 See infra Technical Appendix, equation 5D.
19' See infra Technical Appendix, equation PG.
195 See infra Technical Appendix, equation DL.
196 See infra Technical Appendix, equation 2P.
197 See infra Technical Appendix, equation 2D.
198 The post-arbitration minimum the plaintiff will be willing to accept and the
post-arbitration maximum the defendant will offer will depend on who requests the
trial because of the potential effects of the fee and cost-shifting provisions.
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due to mutual over-optimism. In addition, because the programs
raise the plaintiffs minimum demand and lower the defendant's
maximum offer, in some cases where a narrow settlement range
would have existed at the outset in a TOJ, no settlement range
(either pre- or post-arbitration) will exist in a CAA jurisdiction and
there may be no arbitration award that both parties would prefer to
trial. 199 If, however, the arbitration adds information that causes
the parties to revise their expectations, it may create a range of
arbitrated judgments that the parties would be willing to accept,
even where at the outset of the litigation process a settlement range
would not have existed in either a TOJ or a CAAjurisdiction due to
mutual over-optimism.
As they are currently structured and
administered, however, CAA programs are unlikely to bring about
a significant revision in expectations, particularly when the hearings
are held prior to full discovery and the parties' incentives to distort
20 0
information are taken into account.
199 Consider the claim described in the text but assume that the defendant thinks
that the plaintiff's probability of prevailing is 40%. In a TOJ, the plaintiff's expected
gain and the defendant's expected loss would be the same-$65,000-so a settlement
would be reached. In contrast, in a CAA jurisdiction the plaintiff's expected gain
would be $69,512 and the defendant's expected loss would be $60,807; consequently,
a settlement range would not exist and the claim would definitely be arbitrated. If
the claim were arbitrated, the plaintiff's critical point would be $72,507, and the
defendant's would be $57,006. Consequently, regardless of the arbitration award, one
or both of the parties would request a trial.
If both parties request a trial, the plaintiff's expected gain from further
participation in the litigation process is $77,500 and the defendant's expected loss is
$52,500, so no post-arbitration settlement range exists. (When both parties request
a trial, there are no fee and cost-shifting sanctions regardless of the outcome.
Consequently, the plaintiff's expected gain from future participation in the litigation
process is .9($100,00) - $12,500 = $77,500, and the defendant's expected loss is
.4($100,000) + $12,500 = $52,500). If the plaintiff alone requests a trial, his expected
gain depends on the arbitration award, but it is, at most, $77,500 (assuming that the
plaintiff does not suffer a fee and cost-shifting sanction). When the plaintiff requests
a trial, the most the defendant expects to lose is $52,500, since when the plaintiff
requests a trial the defendant's maximum expected loss is the expected trial award
plus his own litigation costs. Thus, when the plaintiff requests a trial, there is no
post-arbitration settlement range. The same is true when the defendant requests a
trial. In that case, the defendant's maximum expected loss from further participation
in the litigation process is (from his perspective) $65,000 (this is just the expected
trial judgment plus the plaintiff's and defendant's post-arbitration costs), but the
plaintiff's minimum expected gain from further participation in the litigation process
is $77,500 (the plaintiff's view of the expected trial judgment less his own postarbitration costs); no post-arbitration settlement range exists, and the parties will go
to trial.
200 There are a number of reasons why neither the information revealed at the
arbitration hearing nor the arbitration award are likely to greatly influence the
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b. Mutual Pessimism
It is also interesting to consider the program's effects on a claim
where both parties are pessimistic.
Numerical Simulation. Consider a claim for $100,000 where
each party incurs total litigation expenses of $25,000, half in preand half in post-arbitration costs. The plaintiff believes that his
probability of prevailing is 55%, and the defendant believes the
plaintiff's probability of prevailing is 95%. In a TOJ, the minimum
the plaintiff would accept at the outset is $30,000,201 and the
maximum the defendant would offer is $120,000,22 whereas in
a CAA jurisdiction, the minimum the plaintiff would accept is
$30,262,203 and the maximum the defendant would offer is
$116,043.204 Given the breadth of these settlement ranges, it is
likely that the case would settle regardless of whether it is filed in
a TOJ or CAA jurisdiction.
If the arbitration hearing does not cause the parties to revise
their expectations, the plaintiff will accept any award above
$36,415205 and the defendant will agree to pay any award below
$113,822.206 In contrast, if the arbitration hearing brings the
parties' expectations closer together, for example causing the
plaintiff to view his probability of prevailing as 70% and the defendant to view the plaintiff's probability of prevailing as 80%, the
plaintiff will now only accept an award above $55,402207 and the
defendant will only agree to pay up to $99,037.208
Thus, in the case of mutual pessimism, the effect of a GAA
program on the settlement range at the outset is small and is
therefore unlikely to have a significant impact on the parties'
litigation decisions. Furthermore, as information revealed at the
arbitration hearing causes the parties' views of the plaintiff's
probability of prevailing to converge, the dead zone-the range of
arbitrated judgments that the parties prefer to trial-will narrow
considerably: the more information revealed at the hearing, the

parties' expectations, see supra note 172, particularly when the parties' incentives to
distort the information they present at the arbitration hearing are taken into account.
See infra note 238 and accompanying text.
201 See infra Technical Appendix, equation 5P.
202 See infra Technical Appendix, equation 5D.
20
3 See infra Technical Appendix, equation PG.
204 See infra Technical Appendix, equation DL.
205 See infra Technical Appendix, equation 2P.
206 See infra Technical Appendix, equation 2D.
20 7
See infra Technical Appendix, equation 2P.
208 See infra Technical Appendix, equation 2D.
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narrower the range of arbitration awards that both parties are
willing to accept. The overall effect of the revelation of information
on the likelihood of trial as compared to a TOJ is, however, difficult
to predict since an increase in the amount of information revealed
may make the arbitration award more accurate and therefore more
likely to fall within the narrower dead zone; it will also result in a
narrower post-arbitration settlement range if a trial is requested.
C. FactorsNot Taken into Account in the Simulations
In practice, the parameters shaping the settlement amount at
various stages of the litigation process and the likelihood that the
parties will accept the arbitrator's decision will be affected by a
number of factors that were not taken into account in the simulations. 20 9 The most important of these factors are related to the
cost of the litigation process, the timing of discovery, the initial
distribution of information between the parties, the parties' relative
bargaining power, and the possibility of strategic behavior.
1. The Cost of the Litigation Process
a. Asymmetric Costs in Small Claims
The simulations assumed that the plaintiff and defendant each
incurred the same total costs. In many claims subject to the
programs'jurisdictional limits, however, defendants' total costs tend
to be far higher than plaintiffs' total costs. Consequently, the
magnitude of the fee and cost-shifting sanction facing a plaintiff
contemplating requesting a trial will tend to be greater than the
2 10
magnitude of the sanction facing a defendant.
209 These factors can, however, be included in the model presented in the
Technical Appendix without loss of generality.
Models of the litigation process can also be adapted to take into account the noneconomic factors that may influence the parties' litigation decisions. For example, if
a lawsuit is motivated by a desire for revenge, a term representing the benefit to the
plaintiff of revenge can be added to the model. This term may or may not be
multiplied by the plaintiff's probability of prevailing since forcing one's opponent to
appear at the arbitration hearing may be sufficient to produce the desired effect. In
the present context, if revenge is considered an important motivation for litigation,
CAA programs would most likely increase the plaintiff's incentive to sue since he
could drag his opponent into a public forum at a lower cost. In addition, because
program rules require the defendant (as opposed to just his attorney) to be present
at the arbitration hearing, see, e.g., W.D. MICH. Loc. CT. R. 43(h)(4), the amount of
reputational harm the plaintiff can inflict may be greater.
210 However, if costs are asymmetric primarily during discovery and the hearing
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In cases where less than $10,000 is at issue and both lawyers are
paid on a hourly-fee basis, the plaintiff usually spends 40.6% of the
judgment on costs while the defendant spends 85% of the judgment
on costs. 2 11 In a CAA district, this means that the magnitude of
the potential penalty facing a plaintiff who files a claim for less than
$10,000 and requests a trial may be as much as twice the magnitude
of the potential penalty facing the defendant who requests a trial.
This improves the defendant's bargaining power and, especially in
situations where the plaintiff is more risk-averse than the defendant,
makes it unlikely that the plaintiff will request a trial, even when the
arbitration award is quite low relative to his view of the expected
trial judgment.21 2 The difference between the plaintiffs and the
defendant's costs declines as the amount at issue increases. For
example, when between $10,000 and $50,000 is at issue, the plaintiff
typically spends 14.23% of his recovery on legal fees while the
defendant typically spends 16.67% of the plaintiffs recovery on
legal fees. 2 13 Thus, fee and cost-shifting provisions will systematically disadvantage plaintiffs in small cases, precisely the group of
litigants the programs were designed to help.
b. The Effect of the Programs on Parties' LitigationExpenditures

The simulations assumed that the parties' total litigation
expenditures in cases that went to trial were the same in TOJ and
CAA jurisdictions, were known by the parties at the time the claim
was filed, and were not affected by the amount of the arbitration
award. However, to the extent that higher litigation expenditures
are associated with either a greater probability of prevailing or a
more favorable judgment and tend to increase as the stakes
increase, the parties' post-arbitration costs and therefore their total
litigation expenditures 21 4 are likely to be higher in a CAAjurisdicis held after most discovery has been completed, the magnitude of the expected
sanction might be the same for the plaintiff and defendant since only post-arbitration
costs are shifted.
211 See Trubek et al., supra note 158, at 121 n.85.
212

See infratext accompanying notes 230-37 (discussing the effect of plaintiff's risk
aversion).
213 See DAVID M. TRUBEK ET AL., CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT, 2 CIVIL

LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT: FINAL REPORT at 11-194 tbl. 1-5-H (1983) (ratio of
lawyers' fees to recovery, hourly cases only).
214 The precise structure of the post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting rule selected
will also affect the parties' pre-arbitration expenditures, but exploring this effect is
beyond the scope of this Article.
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tion in cases where a trial takes place. How much higher will be
influenced by the size of the arbitration award (since this influences
the probability of a post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting penalty).
When a party requests a trial, the post-arbitration fee and costshifting provision increases the stakes relative to a TOJ since the
party knows that he will have to pay his opponent's post-arbitration
fees and costs if he fails to improve his position by 15% at trial.
This increase in the stakes may lead him to increase his litigation
expenditures, at least to the extent that increased expenditures are
associated with a greater probability of prevailing and/or a more
favorable trial award. In such a situation, his opponent is also likely
to increase his expenditures. When one party requests a trial, his
opponent knows that there is now some probability that he may not
have to bear his own costs; this subsidy gives him an incentive to
increase his expenditures. In addition, the party requesting the trial
may further increase his expenditures in anticipation of his
opponent's respons to the subsidy effect or in response to his
opponent's increased expenditures, either because he fears that a
failure to do so will decrease his probability of prevailing and/or
will result in a less favorable award, or because an action taken by
his opponent requires him to respond.2 1 5
When both parties request a trial, each bears his own costs.
Therefore, litigation expenditures should be approximately the same
as in a TOJ, apart from the cost of participating in the arbitration
2 16
hearing.

215 Some cost-increasing expenditures made by one party require increased
expenditures by his opponent. For example, if one party calls an additional witness
at trial, his opponent will have to spend money preparing and conducting crossexamination. When one party decides to conduct an additional deposition, opposing
counsel must be present. See Philip L. Hersch, Indemnity, Settlement and Litigation:
Comment and Extension, 19J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 237 (1990).
216 Despite the fact that the American rule for the allocation of legal costs applies
when both parties request a trial, there are a number of reasons why expenditures
may nevertheless be different in a CAAjurisdiction. First, the cost of the arbitration
hearing will have to be borne by both parties. See infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text. Second, at the time the suit is filed, the prospect of one-sided fee and costshifting may influence pre-arbitration expenditures. The effect of one dollar of
litigation expenditures on the arbitration and trial outcomes may be different and the
prospect of obtaining an arbitration award that would lead one's opponent to request
a trial (creating the possibility of indemnification) may lead a party to increase his
pre-arbitration expenditures. The skill of the lawyer may have an even greater impact
on the arbitration award than on the trial judgment even in districts that permit
witness testimony since most evidence is still introduced through the arguments of
counsel. Similarly, a dollar spent to conceal adverse information in pre-arbitration
discovery may have a higher expected return than a dollar spent to conceal
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In sum, CAA programs with post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting

rules are likely to either increase or eave unchanged 217 the
parties' litigation expenditures in cases where a trial is requested. 18 The programs may also increase total dispute resolution
expenditures relative to a TOJ in cases that never reach a hearing,
as well as in some cases where a hearing is held and the arbitration
award is accepted by both parties. The primary reasons for these
increases are the cost of participating in the arbitration hearing and
the incentives created by the programs' attempts to limit discovery.
2. The Cost of the Arbitration Hearing
Although a CAA hearing is likely to be less expensive than a
trial on the merits, the hearing may nonetheless impose substantial
costs on the parties. 2 19 Because these costs do not, for the most
information in a TOJ since if the information remains concealed, one's opponent may
have to take additional risk to obtain the desired information in post-arbitration
discovery. See infra notes 230-37 and accompanying text.
217 However, as Posner argues, "[a]n increase in [his] opponent's expenditures
may induce [a party] to increase his own [expenditures] to overcome their effect...
[but] it may [also] reduce the value of his own expenditures [so] as to induce him to
reduce them." Posner, supra note 101, at 431.
218 For a formal demonstration that the British Rule for the allocation of legal
costs (under which the winner bears his own and the loser's expenses) is likely to
increase litigation expenditures under plausible assumptions about the ratio of
litigation expenditures to recoveries, see Katz, supra note 158, at 166.
219 The requirement that a person with full settlement authority be present at the
hearing means that a representative of each party will lose at least one-half of a day's
work. For cases in the diversityjurisdiction, which comprise 39% to 86% of the pilot
jurisdictions' arbitration case load, see MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN TEN DIST. CrS., supra
note 4, at 43 tbl. 5, at least one party will have to come from out of state, which will
impose additional costs.
Most programs require the submission of pre-arbitration case summaries that
take time for lawyers to prepare. See, e.g., W.D. OKLA. Loc. CT. R. 43(h). These
documents, however, tend to be similar to some filings that are required by local
rules for filing a summaryjudgment motion. Consequently, if a summary judgment
motion would have been filed anyhow it may be improper to treat this as an increased
cost. In programs that permit the testimony of witnesses, the parties will have to pay
witness costs and expert witness fees. These expenses will be duplicated if the case
goes to trial. Arbitration testimony is inadmissible at trial except for impeachment
purposes, see supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text, and may only be used to
impeach if a transcript of the hearing is made by one of the parties and provided to
his opponent free of charge, see supra note 49. Hearings also increase attorneys' fees
since lawyers charge more for in-court than out-of-court time. In addition, if CAA
programs became widespread, a separate ADR bar might emerge, leading to a
situation where a lawyer's preparation for arbitration would, in large part, be

duplicated by another lawyer's preparation for trial. Although some argue that this
is improbable, the skills required of an ADR lawyer are more similar to the skills
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part, vary greatly with claim size, they impose a greater burden on
plaintiffs with small claims-the very litigants the programs are
designed to help. In addition, because few of the cases eligible for
CAA ever reach trial in a TOJ, a proper assessment of the impact of
CAA programs on dispute resolution costs would compare the costs
incurred prior to settlement in a TOJ to the costs incurred prior to
settlement in a CAA jurisdiction. Although there is no data
available on the costs of settlement in either TOJ or CAA jurisdictions, the CAA rules governing discovery suggest that they may
220
increase the cost of pre-settlement discovery.
3. The Cost of Civil Discovery
Reducing the cost of civil discovery is a central goal of all CAA
programs. However, CAA programs, particularly those with postarbitration fee and cost-shifting provisions, may increase the cost of
discovery while reducing the amount of material information
exchanged.
In a TOJ, discovery is typically a multi-stage process in which
information obtained in one stage is used to shape subsequent
requests. During discovery, parties often try to conceal adverse
information. Repeated requests are often necessary since "evasive
or incomplete responses to discovery probes impede[] discovery by
22 1
smaller case attorneys in about 40 percent of their cases."
Adverse information is usually revealed only in response to a
required of an appellate rather than a trial lawyer. As noted in Part I, some programs
do not even permit the presentation of live witness testimony, relying instead on
presentations of counsel. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. Thus, the
lawyer arguing at the arbitration hearing may not be the lawyer conducting the trial
(and this will become even more likely as the claim size increases) and there will be
much double preparation. Furthermore, even if the same lawyer participates in both
the arbitration hearing and the subsequent trial, the two events may be years apart,
and gven the typical lawyer's case load, much preparation will have to be repeated.
2 0
2 However, to the extent that a narrower settlement range decreases the cost of
reaching a settlement, the program might reduce settlement costs in cases that settle
soon after filing. Similarly, to the extent that a dispute that otherwise would have
gone to trial is resolved by acceptance of the arbitration award or settled in light of
information that was revealed at arbitration but would have remained hidden during
pre-trial discovery, the program may also reduce litigation costs.
221 See Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its
PrincipalProblems, and Abuses, 4 AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 787, 834 (1980). This study
also found that in one-fourth of the cases where less than $25,000 was at stake and
the parties settled, lawyers felt there was significant information that their opponent
had not yet discovered. See id. at 810-24.
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detailed discovery request where failure to respond would leave the
party or his lawyer vulnerable to sanctions.
Most CAA programs attempt to reduce the cost of discovery by
imposing strict time limits; 222 some districts allow only ninety
days for the completion of the discovery process. 223 Discovery
time limits create an incentive for lawyers to make broader initial
discovery requests than they would in a TOJ. Lawyers fear that if
they later need additional information, they may not be able to
obtain it since the discovery period will have elapsed. These
broader requests are likely to increase response costs and may not
reveal much material information. The shortened discovery period
may result in fewer rounds of discovery requests, which will limit
the opportunity for parties to use the information learned from
earlier requests to shape subsequent requests. The programs may
therefore increase the amount 224 and cost of discovery, decrease
the amount of material information revealed, and increase a party's
ability to hide adverse information. In addition, the programs may
increase the benefit of withholding information during prearbitration discovery since the information will never be revealed if
the arbitration award is accepted.
Although there are no studies comparing the amount and cost
of discovery in TOJ and CAA jurisdictions, a recent study of the
North Carolina GAA program, which gives the parties ninety days
to complete pre-arbitration discovery, rarely permits extensions, and
does not permit any post-arbitration discovery, 225 suggests that
time limits may increase both the private and social costs of
discovery. 226 The study, which compared cases randomly assigned
222 See supra note 31. The discovery time limits were adopted, in part, because of
judges' perceptions that "many lawyers are afraid 'not to discover a case to death' to
please their clients," and their hope that "the abbreviated period of discovery in
arbitration ... [will force] lawyers to do what their better judgment tells them."
MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN THE E.D. PA., supra note 30, at 16-17.
223 See supra note 31. One district allows only 60 days. See W.D. TEX. LOc. CT.
R. CV-87(fO(1).
224 A study of case management in five district courts conducted by the Federal
Judicial Center found that "[t]he district with the fastest discovery [that is the shortest
discovery time limit] also had the most discovery requests filed per case... [and that]
the districts with the longest time for discovery are the districts in which the fewest
requests were filed." STEVEN FLANDERS, FEDERALJUDICIAL CTR., CASE MANAGEMENT
AND2 25
COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 27 (1977).
See M.D.N.C. LOc. CT. R. 603(a), (d).
226 See MEIERHOEFER, CAA IN THE M.D.N.C., supra note 26, at 23, 41. The private
cost of discovery is the cost to the parties. The social cost is the cost to the court of
supervising discovery, deciding discovery motions, and, in some instances, imposing
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to either a CAA or a trial-only track, found that more discovery
227
motions were filed in cases assigned to the arbitration track.
Lawyers attributed the increase to the fact that the shortened
discovery process gave them less time to reach an accommodation
228
with opposing counsel.
4.

The Parties' Relative Bargaining Power

The model used to generate the simulations tends to overstate
the probability that the parties will accept the arbitration award,
particularly when the parties have unequal bargaining power and
the possibility of strategic behavior is taken into account. In practice, a party will compare the arbitration award not only to his
expected post-trial position, but also to the most favorable postarbitration settlement he can extract from his opponent. Thus, in
some instances where the arbitration award falls in the dead zone,
a party, particularly one with superior bargaining power, may find
it advantageous to request a trial. 229 Although there are many

sanctions. Two additional social costs of limiting discovery-the possibility that
wrongdoing will not be uncovered, and that a less accurate judgment will be
rendered-are important but will not be considered here.
227 See id. at 26.
228 See id. For similar reasons, the programs may also result in an increase in the
number of dispositive motions filed. Most local rules provide that any dispositive
motions filed after a case has been referred to arbitration are stayed pending the
arbitrator's decision. This creates an incentive for the defendant to immediately file
any dispositive motions that he can, subject only to the weak constraints imposed by
the threat of Rule 11 sanctions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
229 Modeling this comparison explicitly would entail constructing a mixed strategy
game and is beyond the scope of this Article. However, if we assume that after an
arbitration hearing is held one party has enough bargaining power to force the other
to accept a settlement at the least advantageous point in the post-arbitration
settlement range, then it is possible to get a feel for this effect. For example, in the
simulation of convergent expectations where the parties incurred all their costs postarbitration, if the arbitration award was just under the defendant's critical point of
$124,876 (where, under the model's assumptions, the defendant would not request
a trial), a defendant with vastly superior bargaining power might decide to request a
trial since the plaintiff would be willing to accept anything above his expected gain
from trial at that stage of the litigation process given that the defendant requested a
trial, in this example $74,876. Similarly, if the arbitration award was just above the
plaintiff's critical point (so that under the model's assumptions he would not request
a trial), the maximum post-arbitration settlement a plaintiff with vastly superior
bargaining power could extract from a defendant if he (the plaintiff) requested a trial
is $108,069. However, because the range ofarbitration awards that a party with vastly
superior bargaining power would find it desirable to reject in order to obtain a more
beneficial post-arbitration settlement is narrower than the dead zone, it remains
possible (though unlikely) that both parties will accept the arbitration award.
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sources of unequal bargaining power, the effects of CAA programs
on a party's ability to exploit his advantage can be explored by
considering a situation where the parties differ in their degree of
risk aversion and a situation where they have different abilities to
bear the costs of delay.
a. Risk Aversion

The simulations assumed that both parties were risk-neutral. In
practice, however, this is unlikely to be the case, especially in
litigation between individuals or between individuals and small
businesses. In general, plaintiffs are likely to be somewhat more
risk-averse than defendants, particularly in tort cases where an
individual who frequently needs the recovery to pay medical
bills 23 0 is litigating against a large, well-diversified insurance
23 1
CAA
company that is helped rather than harmed by delay.
programs, particularly those with post-arbitration fee and costshifting provisions, tend to systematically disadvantage the more
risk-averse litigant.
Post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting provisions increase the
maximum out-of-pocket loss a party may have to bear if he requests
a trial. 232 When a party is risk-averse, the prospect of paying the

opposing party's post-arbitration fees and costs has a stronger
impact on his litigation decisions than the prospect of being
reimbursed for his own post-arbitration fees and costs if a sanction
230 Note that in the tort context, a plaintiff who has actually been harmed by the
defendant's actions (and therefore has a relatively high probability of prevailing) is
likely to be far more risk-averse than a nuisance suit litigant.
231 Although courts do award prejudgment interest, it is usually at below-market
rates, which benefits defendants. Also, the passage of time between the commission
of a tort and a trial generally favors the defendant since the plaintiff usually has the
burden of proof and, over time, witnesses' memories tend to fade and evidence
disappears. See Posner, supra note 101, at 420-21.
2
For example, in a TOJ, the worst-case scenario for our convergent-expectations
plaintiff is that he will lose at trial and have to pay $25,000 in legal fees. In a CAA
jurisdiction, however, a plaintiff must take into account the possibility that if he wins
at arbitration and loses at trial, he will have to pay both his own and the defendant's
legal fees, here $50,000. If losing an additional $25,000 would cause the plaintiff to
default on his mortgage and lose the credit line for his small business because he
could no longer post his house as collateral, he is quite likely to accept a rather low
arbitration award no matter how strong his legal entitlement.
Even though CAA programs tend to increase the risk-neutral plaintiff's expected
gain at the outset of litigation, the more risk-averse the plaintiff is, the smaller the
expected gain will be. In the case of a very risk-averse plaintiff, it is possible that the
program will leave him worse off than he would have been in a trial-onlyjurisdiction.
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is imposed on his opponent. 233 In addition, because uncertainty
itself imposes costs on a risk-averse party, the impact of the
programs on a risk-averse party's litigation decisions will depend not
only on the magnitude of the potential fee and cost-shifting
sanction, but also on his ability to estimate the likelihood that it will
be imposed. A party's ability to estimate the likelihood that a
sanction will be imposed will depend strongly on his view of the
accuracy of arbitration awards and trial judgments, as well as the
initial distribution of information between the parties 23 4 and the
23 5
amount of pre-arbitration discovery permitted.
If the jurisdiction has a post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting
provision and the arbitration hearing is held prior to full discovery,
a party in need of additional information must take a larger
financial risk to get it than he would in either a CAA jurisdiction
without a post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting provision or a TOJ.
In calculating the cost of requesting a trial and conducting further
discovery, a party must take into account the possibility that the

arbitration award was, in fact, relatively advantageous to him so that
the expected trial judgment may be less favorable and may also
result in a fee and cost-shifting sanction. This possibility increases

the expected cost of post-arbitration discovery and makes it more
likely that the arbitrator's decision will be accepted.2 3 6

Thus,

233 Thus, a risk-averse plaintiff will accept a much lower arbitration award than a
risk-neutral plaintiff and a risk-averse defendant will agree to pay a much higher
arbitration award than a risk-neutral defendant. The effect of risk aversion on the
parties' expected gains and losses at the outset of the litigation relative to a TOJ will
depend on the degree of the risk-averse party's risk aversion as well as the risk-averse
party's view of the amount of uncertainty associated with the arbitration award and
the trial judgment.
234 The initial distribution of information between the parties is even more
important in a CAAjurisdiction than in a jurisdiction with the British Rule for the
allocation of legal costs. Under the British Rule a party attempting to calculate the
expected cost of sanctions need only estimate the magnitude of the sanction and his
probability of winning or losing at trial. In a CAA jurisdiction, a party deciding
whether or not to request a trial must estimate not only his probability of prevailing
but also how much the plaintiff is likely to recover in the event that he prevails.

235 In the case of a risk-averse plaintiff, the initial distribution of information
between the parties and the amount of pre-arbitration discovery permitted will be
even more important in ajurisdiction with both a post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting
provision and a plaintiff-drops rule. In the absence of a plaintiff-drops rule, a plaintiff
who requests a trial, conducts discovery, finds out that his case is weak, and drops his
claim, need only bear his own post-arbitration costs, whereas in ajurisdiction with a
plaintiff-drops rule, he will also have to bear the defendant's post-arbitration costs.
236 In addition, post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting provisions, may also increase
the expected benefit of concealing information during pre-arbitration discovery
relative to either a CAAjurisdiction without a post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting
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although post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting provisions are
generally viewed as disincentives to requesting a trial, they are also
disincentives to obtaining information through post-arbitration
discovery. 23 7 This effect is particularly strong when a risk-averse
party in need of information is litigating against a risk-neutral party
with superior information.
The only way to reduce the effect of post-arbitration fee and
cost-shifting provisions on a risk-averse party's incentive to obtain
information through post-arbitration discovery and to lessen the
importance of the initial distribution of information between the
parties, is to increase the amount of pre-arbitration discovery
permitted. However, increasing the amount of pre-arbitration
discovery permitted would severely limit the programs' ability to
reduce litigation costs, even in those cases where the parties opt to
In addition, as the amount of
accept the arbitration award.
discovery conducted prior to the arbitration hearing increases, postarbitration costs tend to decrease since a large proportion of the
parties' total litigation costs have already been incurred. Since postarbitration costs determine the magnitude of the fee and costshifting penalty, as these costs decrease, the disincentive to
requesting a trial becomes weaker. As a consequence, the dead
zone-the range of arbitration awards that both parties prefer to
trial-narrows, and the parameters influencing the parties' litigation
decisions become increasingly similar to those in a TOJ. In the
absence of meaningful disincentive to requesting a trial, the arbitration hearing is simply an additional pre-trial procedure that
increases costs and makes justice even less accessible to poorer
litigants.

provision, or aTOJ. Because the expected cost of post-arbitration discovery in a CAA
jurisdiction with fee and cost-shifting sanctions is greater than both the expected cost
of post-arbitration discovery in a CAAjurisdiction without such sanctions and the cost
of an additional round of pre-trial discovery in a TOJ, such sanctions decrease the
likelihood that a trial will be requested and post-arbitration discovery will take place.
This, in turn, increases the expected benefit of concealing information during prearbitration discovery since if a trial is not requested, the information will never be
revealed.
237 Disincentives to conducting civil discovery may have unintended social costs.
Adjudicative accuracy or settlement on the basis of full information may be
compromised, and, in the tort context, it is possible that fewer instances of
wrongdoing will be discovered (constituting both a private and a social cost).
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b. Delay
The asymmetric benefits of delay are one of the main reasons
that parties might not enter into an agreement to resolve their
dispute through private ADR even when doing so would create
private benefits. However, this does not provide a strong justification for mandatory non-binding CAA programs. As long as the
arbitration award is non-binding, the party better able to bear the
costs of delay can still exploit his advantage by requesting a trial.
Post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting provisions do not strongly
constrain a party's ability to inflict delay on his opponent relative to
a TOJ. Although such provisions may, in fact, slightly improve the
disadvantaged party's bargaining position, the party better able to
bear the cost of delay can adjust his presentation at the arbitration
hearing to minimize the probability that he will suffer a postarbitration fee and cost-shifting sanction.2 3 8 A party's ability to
manipulate the amount of the arbitration award in this manner is
subject only to the weak constraints of the programs' "meaningful
participation" requirement and the applicable state code of legal
ethics. Thus, the programs will not only fail to prevent a party
from taking advantage of his opponent's inability to bear the costs
of delay, but will also create incentives for parties to present
different information at the arbitration hearing than they would at
trial.
The incentives for strategic behavior created by the programs
suggest that, given the many reasons for the parties to manipulate
the evidence presented at the arbitration hearing, the hearings are
unlikely to give the parties reliable information that they would not
have obtained through pre-trial discovery. Furthermore, the signal
generated by the arbitration award, even assuming that it was a
perfect reflection of the information presented at the hearing, may
be a poor predictor of the trial outcome. Thus, CAA programs will
238 When the plaintiff is better able to bear the cost of delay-for example, where
the mere existence of the claim creates a cloud on title to an asset of the
defendant's-he can threaten to present a very weak case at arbitration or fail to
introduce evidence of some of the damage he suffered (so that he is likely to improve
his position at trial and is unlikely to suffer a fee and cost-shifting sanction) unless the
defendant agrees to a settlement that reflects his inability to bear the costs of delay.
Similarly, when the defendant is better able to bear the cost of delay, he too can
threaten to go to arbitration, present a weak case, and request a trial (knowing that
the probability of a penalty may be low since the arbitration award is likely to be
high), unless the plaintiff agrees to accept a settlement at the outset that reflects his
relative inability to bear the costs of delay.
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not meaningfully prevent parties who enjoy strategic advantages in
a TOJ from exploiting them in a CAA jurisdiction. As long as the
arbitration award is non-binding, even programs with disincentives
to requesting a trial will do little to remedy the problems created by
parties' unequal bargaining power and the high litigation costs and
long delays in the federal courts.
IV.

THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ADR

The simulations of parties' litigation decisions in a CAA
jurisdiction have illustrated the effects of various program features
on the parties' litigation decisions and identified many undesirable
distributional consequences of instituting CAA programs. However,
the limited promise of the court-connected ADR movement for
creating private benefits, improving case management, and
furthering other social objectives cannot be fully understood
without exploring the differences between private and public ADR
and the implications of these differences for assessing the potential
of court-connected ADR programs to create private and social
benefits.
Private ADR tribunals have a number of features that parties
consider important, but which cannot be fully replicated in
mandatory non-binding CAA programs. These features include
secrecy, informality, speed, finality, the right to select a trier of fact
with specialized knowledge or expertise, and, in some trade industry
arbitration, the ability to specify the rule of decision that will be
used to resolve the dispute as well as the avoidance of litigation
costs. In addition, in commercial transactions, ADR provisions have
important functions other than merely specifying the forum and
means of resolving disputes; 239 in many transactions they can be
used to create value by reducing transaction and negotiation costs,
reducing risk, and broadening the range of credible substantive
commitments available to the parties. They may also enable the
parties to secure the benefits of both legal and extralegal sanctions.

239 The idea that different types of disputes are best suited to different types of
dispute resolution tribunals is a central premise of Multidoor Courthouse programs,
a popular type of court-connected ADR. Interview with Frank E.A. Sander, Professor
of Law, Harvard Law School, in Cambridge, MA (Mar. 30, 1993).
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A. Features of Private ADR Tribunals
1.

Secrecy

One of the most important features of private ADR is the
secrecy of both the proceedings and the outcome. Advertisements
240
for private ADR providers tend to emphasize secrecy.
Secrecy can affect both the likelihood of settlement and the
settlement value of a claim. In situations where a party is frequently
involved in litigation and has an interest in having a reputation as
a hard bargainer, secrecy may remove the benefit of being perceived
as a hard bargainer in a particular case and make him more likely
to settle. Conversely, a party who would have settled to avoid
revelation of proprietary information in the absence of an ADR
agreement may refuse to settle when such an agreement exists,
secure in the knowledge that the proceedings will remain se24 1
cret.
An additional benefit of secrecy is that it enables the litigants to
minimize the damage to their reputation. Although this might not
be important in the context of smaller claims to the extent that the
existence of a dispute may affect a party's access to capital during
the pendency of the dispute, it is an important advantage of private
ADR.24 2
Federal court-connected ADR programs cannot offer parties the
same degree of secrecy as private ADR programs. Even in courtconnected ADR proceedings where the hearing is closed to the
public so that the information revealed in the proceeding is kept
private, the existence of the dispute and the allegations in the
pleadings are a matter of public record.2 43 In addition, although

240 See Gail D. Cox, The BestJudges Money Can Buy, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 21, 1987, at
1, 24 (reporting that according to the president ofJudicate, Alan Epstein, "[c]onfidentiality is part of what his firm sells").
241 The secrecy of the proceedings also eliminates the need for protective orders,
which are difficult and costly to obtain. It is important to note, however, that
depending on the type of claim at issue, the secrecy of private ADR proceedings may
create social costs. For example, it may delay information about a defective product
from reaching consumers.
242 The effect of the mere existence of a dispute on a party's access to capital
during the pendency of a dispute is one of the main reasons that the diamond
industry continues to prefer to resolve its disputes through its private ADR system.
See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal ContractualRelations in
the Diamond Industy, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
243 In addition, in some programs, such as mandatory non-binding CAA, if the
parties accept the arbitration award it is entered as ajudgment of the court and is
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the Sixth Circuit has held that summary jury trials may be closed to
the public, 244 the constitutionality of closing other types of federal court-connected ADR proceedings to the public has not yet been
245
considered by any federal court.
2. Informality
According to ADR professionals, informality is an important
reason that parties opt for private ADR.246 Informal processes
are said to be better than formal adversary proceedings at preserving ongoing business relationships. However, it is precisely in the
relational contract setting, where the parties have dealt with each
other on a repeat basis over a long period of time and know the
types of disputes that are most likely to arise, that the barriers to
contracting for private ADR are the lowest, the benefits from doing
so are largest, and the parties can most easily select a trier of fact
who they feel will justly and amicably resolve any dispute that may
arise. In such a situation, failure to include an ADR provision in a
contract is likely to reflect a deliberate choice made by the parties
and to signal their preference for traditional adjudication should a
dispute arise that cannot be amicably resolved.
The ability of court-connected ADR proceedings to fully capture
the benefits of informality that are available when the parties opt to
use relatively informal private ADR processes is limited. First, the
success of most informal dispute resolution processes is due, in
large part, to the fact that parties consent to their use. An informal
therefore a matter of public record.
244 See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir.
1988), where the court held that "the first amendment right of access does not attach
to summary jury trial proceedings," since
there is no tradition of access to summaryjury trials or to other recognized
settlement devices, .. . [and] public access does not have a significantly
positive role in the functioning of the summary jury trial because the
proceeding is non-binding and has no effect on the merits of the case other
than settlement.
Id. at 902.
245 For a general discussion of the importance of secrecy and the issue of public
access to court-connected ADR proceedings, see CPR Legal ProgramAnnual Meeting,
9 ALTERNATIVEs 147, 150-51 (1991).
246 Interview with Frank E.A. Sander, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, in
Cambridge, MA (Mar. 30, 1993); Interview with Eric Green, Professor of Law, Boston
University School of Law, in Boston, MA (April 1993).
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process is unlikely to lead to a consensual settlement when one
party does not wish to participate. Second, the history of agency
adjudication suggests that court-connected ADR programs and
proceedings are likely to become increasingly formal and complex. 247 CAA programs, for example, are designed to be far less
formal than traditional adjudication; yet CAA hearings have an
adversary structure and local arbitration rules are far more
complex 2 48 than the procedural rules of many private ADR
249
providers.

247 The history of agency adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988), suggests that public programs are unlikely to remain
informal. Agency adjudication was originally intended to be less formal and
adversarial than traditional adjudication. Over time, however, numerous due process
challenges have been brought and the hearings have become increasingly similar to
traditional adjudication. In an attempt to recapture the benefits of relatively informal
proceedings, the recently passed Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 571 (West Supp. 1993), directs each agency to designate an ADR official to explore
the possibility of substituting agency ADR for agency adjudication whenever possible.
For a discussion of the considerations leading to the passage of the Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act, see Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 101552, § 2, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 2736,2736 (1990) (noting that "administrative
procedure ... is intended to offer a prompt, expert, and inexpensive means of
resolving disputes as an alternative to litigation in the Federal courts.... [However,]
administrative proceedings have become increasingly formal, costly, and lengthy
resulting in unnecessary expenditures of time and in a decreased likelihood of
achieving consensual resolution of disputes") (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. § 571 note (West
Supp. 1993) (Congressional Findings)).
e48 Many legal issues regarding the implementation of CAA programs continue
to arise and have yet to be definitely resolved. See, e.g., McHale v. Alcon Surgical,
Inc., No. 9 1-7445, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6544, at *I (E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 1992) (holding
that whether parties have participated in a CAA hearing in a "meaningful manner"
is for the court to decide). But see Gilling v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 169,
171 (D.N.J. 1988) (concluding that the local arbitration rule "appears to place the
determination of meaningfulness entirely in the hands and discretion of the
arbitrator, without being subject to district court review"). See also Ewell v. Allstate
Ins. Co., No. 91-5858, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2565 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 1992)
(considering whether arbitrators in a CAA program have the authority to award
punitive damages); Action Orthopedics, Inc. v. Techmedica, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 390,
390-91 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (considering whether or not a party is entitled to demand a
trial de novo as to a portion of an arbitration award, and concluding that he may
not); RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 110 F.R.D. 95 (M.D.N.C. 1986)
(discussing defendant's motion for leave to amend his answer under F.R.C.P. 15(a)
when the case had already been set for arbitration).
249 Compare M.D.N.C. LOC. CT. R. 601-608 withJUDICATE R.P., supra note 71.
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3. Finality and Reduction of Delay
Although many private ADR processes are non-binding and
some disputes take as long to resolve through arbitration as
litigation, 250 parties who value finality and prompt resolution of
disputes can contract for binding arbitration, strict discovery time
limits, and a fixed time for conduct of the hearing and the announcement of the judgment. 25 1 By providing for finality and
certainty as to the duration of the dispute, private ADR agreements
can affect the potential costs that the parties can threaten to inflict
on one another in the event of a dispute. Perhaps the most
significant effect of an agreement to use binding private ADR is that
it breaks the shadow of the law-it ensures that the parameters
shaping the settlement range are determined by a set of variables
that the parties prefer to those provided by the legal system.
4. Consent
Another important difference between private ADR tribunals
and mandatory CAA programs is that private ADR tribunals hear
cases with the consent of the parties. Although "consent" influences
the dispute resolution process in a myriad of ways, 252 at a minimum it is a signal that both parties perceive a nonlitigated solution
to be in their best interest and are willing to consider compromise.
Contrary to the arguments of ADR proponents, it may not be that
ADR processes induce the parties to settle, but rather that parties
who are inclined to settle are more apt to choose ADR as a method
of dealing with their dispute. It is therefore unlikely that mandatory
non-binding court-annexed ADR programs will resolve disputes as
successfully and amicably as private ADR programs selected by the
parties. Although participation in CAA programs and other types
250 Private ADR is not necessarily cheaper or faster than litigation. See, e.g.,
Herbert M. Kritzer & Jill K. Anderson, The Arbitration Alternative: A Comparative
Analysis of Case ProcessingTime, DispositionMode, and Cost in the American Arbitration
Association and in the Courts, 8JusT. SYs.J. 1, 18 (1983) (concluding that "[o]ne does
not save money by going to the AAA" rather than state or federal court for claims
above $5,000).
251 For examples of ADR provisions that are designed to reduce cost and delay,
see AMERICAN ARBITRATION Assoc., supra note 99, at 22-27.
252 For example, when the parties choose a neutral decisionmaker with expertise
in the area of the dispute, they may be more willing to defer to his opinion,
particularly if he has an established reputation in the relevant business community so
that rejection of his award would be viewed by market transactors as opportunistic
behavior.
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of court-connected ADR could be made voluntary, studies of
voluntary state court-connected ADR programs show low participation rates, 253 as do studies of the federal programs which permit
any claim to be submitted to CAA with the consent of the par254
ties.
5. Summary
Thus, many aspects of private ADR tribunals that make them
attractive to disputants such as secrecy, informality, finality, and
reduction of delay are not fully replicated in mandatory non-binding
CAA programs, and may not be possible to fully replicate in other
types of court-connected ADR programs. In addition, many of the
private benefits created by ADR agreements and provisions cannot
be created by mandating participation in a non-binding courtconnected ADR programs since ADR provisions have many
functions apart from specifying the forum for resolving a particular
dispute.
B. Functions of ADR Provisions
The private benefits available from private ADR go beyond the
savings in litigation costs and the reduction of delay that are said to
be the primary private benefits of publicly mandated CAA programs. As the name ADR suggests, arbitration, mediation, and
other processes conducted by third-party neutrals are viewed
primarily as dispute resolution techniques, and are implicitly
conceived of as alternatives to trial. Viewing ADR processes as
dispute resolution techniques yields insights into why parties enter
into ADR agreements after a dispute has arisen (ex post ADR), but
255
obscures many of the reasons that ADR clauses or provisions
are included in commercial contracts (ex ante ADR). In many
transactional settings, ex ante ADR provisions can be used as
253 See Pearson, supra note 16, at 426.
254 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
255 The term "ADR clause" is used to refer to an agreement to submit all disputes
that arise under the contract to a particular ADR tribunal. The term "ADR provision"
is used to refer to a more narrowly drafted ADR clause, such as a provision which
requires certain factual issues related to performance of a particular clause of a
contract to be submitted to a third-party neutral or an ADR tribunal. See, e.g.,
AMERICAN INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A107 (8th ed. 1978), discussed in E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS,

657-58 (4th ed. 1988).
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effective substitutes for detailed contractual language or as ways of
enabling parties to contract with respect to an alternative default
regime (that is, a set of default rules) that they prefer to the rules
provided by the state. Such provisions can also be used to prevent
or constrain strategic behavior during the course of contractual
performance and to obtain the benefits of both legal and extra-legal
256
sanctions.
1. ADR Clauses and the Creation of Value
When parties can agree on an acceptable neutral, the inclusion
of a narrowly tailored ADR provision can defer, and therefore
reduce, the cost of negotiating and drafting clauses dealing with
remote contingencies. 257 Such ADR provisions can also reduce
the likelihood of both negotiation breakdown 258 and the possibili256 In some types of transactions, ADR provisions designating a "wise man" to
resolve certain types of disputes can also be used to enable parties conducting
discrete arms-length transactions to capture many of the benefits of long-term
relational transactions. For example, in transactions between strangers, "good faith,"
"best efforts," and other clauses designed to give the parties flexibility, often have
little effect on parties' actions due to the uncertainty and expense of enforcing them,
yet their effectiveness can be enhanced by designating a "wise man" whose opinion
both parties respect to decide issues arising under these clauses.
2 7 When the determination of the parties' rights and duties under the contract
in the event of a remote contingency is left to a third-party neutral whose determination the parties think will replicate the bargain they would have reached had they
spent the time and money to negotiate and draft a specific contractual provision
(their "hypothetical bargain"), the parties will not have to incur the transaction costs
of actually reaching an agreement. In addition, if the contingency occurs, they still
have the opportunity to renegotiate their agreement, and the transaction costs of
doing so may be smaller since neither side will be able to threaten litigation. In such
a situation, if a negotiated outcome is reached, the outcome is less likely to simply
reflect the parties' relative ability to bear the cost and delay of a court proceeding
than it would have been in the absence of the clause. For a more complete discussion
of how ADR provisions can be used to fill contractual gaps, see Lisa Bernstein, Social
Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. (forthcoming November
1993) (working title).
258 Such clauses can also be used to reduce the potential value left "on the table"
in the negotiation of complex contracts by solving a central problem identified in the
negotiation analysis literature, the so-called "negotiator's dilemma." The negotiator's
dilemma arises when a strategy of mutual cooperation would produce the largest
gains for the parties but would not be undertaken since it requires each party to
reveal information that could be used to his disadvantage by his opponent if his
opponent "defects" and acts uncooperatively. In such situations, the parties can work
out the rest of the transaction and include a provision in their contract which
designates a "wise man" (a third-party neutral they both respect) to write the clause
at issue based on the confidential submissions of each party. For a description of the
negotiator's dilemma and an overview of the emerging literature on negotiation
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ty that the transaction will not be consummated by the relevant
deadline. 259
In addition, in some contexts, ADR provisions
designed to ensure that disputes are resolved quickly can reduce the
actual damage suffered by the promisee in the event of breach,
since a quick resolution of the dispute may prevent some consequential damages (both compensable and noncompensable) from
260
arising.
In a more limited range of circumstances, ADR clauses can
create value by reducing certain types of risk. For example, in a
situation where the risk of inadvertent breach is large and performance cannot be specified with sufficient precision at a reasonable
price, the inclusion of an ADR provision-one that provides for
either arbitration and cure or enables the promisor to get an
advance determination as to whether a particular action would
constitute breach-can reduce the amount of risk borne by the
promisor. A clause enabling the promisor to determine in advance
what constitutes breach removes the uncertainty of how a court,
necessarily viewing his actions ex post, would classify his behavior.
An arbitrate-and-cure provision enables the promisor to make a
deliberate breach or perform decision. 261 These types of provisions also benefit the promisee since as the amount of risk borne by
the promisor decreases, so does the contract price.2 62 In addi-

analysis, see generallyJames K. Sebenius, NegotiationAnalysis: A Characterizationand
Review, 38 MGMT. Sci. 18, 30 (1992).
259 In attempting to value the "benefit" of reducing the likelihood of negotiation
breakdown or the possibility that the transaction will not be consummated by the
relevant deadline, it is important to take into account that the value of this "benefit"
to the transactors maybe different from the value of this "benefit" to the transaction
when transactors' nonpecuniary risk aversion is taken into account. For example,
when a high-level corporate manager negotiates a contract, he may be more
concerned about failure to close a deal that will bring him intra-organizational
prestige than he is about the expected cost to the corporation of a remote
contingency that will happen, if at all, in the distant future.
260 In many contexts, the further removed in time the breach is from the alleged
harm, the more likely it is that a court would find the harm to be noncompensable
on the grounds that it was either unforeseeable or too speculative to be proved. In
addition, even if prejudgment interest is eventually awarded, in a situation where a
non-breaching promisee does not have access to credit on reasonable terms during
the pendency of the dispute, he may suffer large noncompensable harms as a result
of the delay between breach and judgment.
261 However, this type of clause is only useful if the harm caused by the breach
can be avoided or remedied through the cure provision.
262 In addition, in situations where it would be prohibitively expensive or simply
impossible to draft a clause specific enough to reduce the risk and the amount the
promisee would have to pay the promisor to assume the risk would make the
transaction as a whole undesirable, these clauses can facilitate the conclusion of value-
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tion, by making it more likely that only efficient breach of contract
26 3
will take place, these clauses can also increase social welfare.
2. Advantages of Specialized Providers
When the dispute resolution provider is a trade association with
its own transactional rules tailored to reflect industry custom, the
inclusion of an arbitration clause in a contract enables the parties
to contract with reference to a set of background rules and/or gapfilling provisions that are tailored to their business. This reduces
the transaction costs of entering into a contract since fewer terms
need to be specified. The ability to enter into contracts that will be
interpreted and enforced in accordance with industry-specific norms
will ordinarily be desirable from the perspective of the parties
because small industries or closely-knit communities "will tend to
develop for the ordinary run of problems norms that are wealth"
maximizing. 264

Even in instances where a court would look to trade custom to
decide a dispute, it is advantageous for the parties to contract for
industry-specific arbitration. Unlikejudges, many trade association
arbitrators are drawn from the association's membership (or, most
commonly, retired membership), and have extensive personal
knowledge of industry custom. 265 This gives them an advantage
over judges, who must determine the content of customary norms
from the conflicting testimony of expert witnesses. Arbitrators'
industry-specific expertise and their authority to consider evidence
that would be inadmissible at trial may make their verdicts more
accurate and predictable than those of a court. As an arbitral
tribunal acquires a reputation for consistency and as its judgments
become increasingly predictable, the parties' view of the expected
outcome of the proceeding will tend to converge, and more and
maximizing transactions that might not otherwise have been concluded.
263 These clauses also help mitigate the welfare loss from the socially excessive
incentive to perform contracts that results when the damage caused by breach is likely
to be high and what constitutes performance is unclear.
264 Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesisof Wealth-MaximizingNorms: Evidencefrom the
Whaling Industiy, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 84 (1989).
265 In the New York Diamond Dealers Club, for example, all arbitrators must be
members of the club and are elected to the position for two-year terms. See DIAMOND
DEALERS CLUB, INC., ARBITRATION BY-LAWS, art. XII, § 5a (1987). Some local CAA

rules attempt to capture the benefits of arbitrator expertise by giving the parties a
period of time to agree on the arbitrator of their choice. See supra note 28.
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more disputes will be settled without the assistance of a third-party
neutral.
In general, when a dispute is likely to turn on technical
questions of fact or specialized knowledge, ADR provisions
requiring certain issues to be submitted to a technically skilled
expert can create value by reducing both the likelihood of adjudicative error and the need for expensive provisions setting out the
266
parties' obligations in highly specific contractual language.
3. Broadening the Range of Credible
Substantive Commitments
Private ADR agreements can also broaden the range of credible
substantive commitments available to the parties. In situations
where a contract would be legally enforceable in theory but an
action for breach would be prohibitively expensive, an agreement to
use ADR can function as an "earnest of performance" in a manner
similar to a liquidated damages provision. By giving the promisee
the right to institute an action and obtain a recovery at a reasonable
price, the promisor signals his intention to perform or pay damages.
This is particularly important to new market entrants who lack an
established reputation. Thus, in some situations, the availability of
private ADR can facilitate entry into markets and improve competition.
4. Enforcement Advantages
The ability of courts and private ADR tribunals to enforce their
judgments may differ substantially. Private (extralegal) dispute
resolution tribunals are often preferred because they have the ability
to impose both legal sanctions, such as money damages and specific
performance,2 67 as well as extralegal sanctions. 268 These extra266 ADR provisions that designate an expert arbitrator to resolve certain types of
disputes can be used as an effective substitute for contractual language where detailed
provisions would have been needed to make the parties' obligations under the
contract clear to a third-party neutral in the absence of the clause. In addition, in
some contexts, ADR provisions can be used as partial substitutes for contractual
language that is designed to clearly specify the parties' obligations so that the parties
know what is required of them under the contract. See supra notes 257-63 and
accompanying text (discussing the use of an arbitrate and cure provision).
267 Unlike judges who are reluctant to order specific performance because they
are unable to accurately assess compliance with their order, specialized arbitrators
may have the expertise to monitor compliance with an order granting specific
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legal sanctions put additional pressures on the parties to comply
with the arbitrated judgments, pressures that are unavailable to
courts. For instance, in a well-organized industry, a trade association tribunal may be able to quickly translate an unpaid judgment
into damage to reputation. 2 69 Some trade associations and
commodities exchanges require members to sign an agreement to
submit disputes to the organization's dispute resolution tribunal and
to promptly comply with their judgments.2 70 By threatening to
expel a member or to publicize his failure to comply with a
judgment rendered against him, these associations can make a
credible threat to put a noncomplying disputant out of business. In
the diamond industry, where all disputes among members of the
world's diamond exchanges are decided by exchange-run mediation
and arbitration tribunals, the existence and outcome of disputes are
kept secret as long as the decisions of the dispute resolution
tribunal are complied with, but a party who fails to promptly pay a
judgment rendered against him will have his picture hung in every
diamond exchange in the world along with a prominent notice
performance.
268 For a general discussion of extralegal sanctions, see Charny, supra note 101.
269 Although an adverse court judgment can also harm a party's reputation, the
harm may be greater when an intra-industry tribunal renders a decision because

industry participants recognize its expertise and have greater confidence that the
losing party actually violated industry-specific rules. The greater reputational effect
of intra-industry arbitration was recognized by Judge Weinstein in AMF Inc. v.
Brunswick Co., 621 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), in which the court upheld an
agreement to submit all disputes regarding truth-in-advertising claims to the National
Advertising Division of the Council of Better Business Bureaus for a non-binding
advisory opinion. The court noted that "[violuntary compliance with NAD's decisions
has been universal ... [and] no advertiser who has participated... has declined to
abide by the decision .... A court decision and a NAD decision would have
different effects upon the parties' reputations within the bowling products industry."
Id. at 458, 463.
270 See, e.g., DIAMOND DEALERS CLUB, INC., BY-LAws, art. III, § 2b (1980) ("It shall
be a condition of membership... [to] be bound by and be subject to the mandatory
arbitration provisions contained in these by-laws."). Similarly, the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange rules provide:
[I]t is contrary to the objectives and policy of the Exchange for members to
litigate disputes relating to or arising out of any transaction upon the
Exchange or membership in the Exchange.... [A] person or entity elected
to membership agrees to have any disputes which.., relate to or arise out
of any transaction upon the Exchange or membership in the Exchange
resolved in accordance with the [arbitration] rules contained herein.
CONSOLIDATED RULES OF THE CHICAGO MERCANTILE EXCHANGE AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY MARKET DIVISION AND THE INDEX AND OPTION MARKET DIVISION
R. 600(A), (B) [hereinafter CHICAGO MERC. RULES].
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describing his wrongdoing and the fact that he failed to pay a
judgment. 27 1 At the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, where the
mere existence of a dispute can threaten the public's perception of
the integrity of the market, both the existence of a dispute and the
judgment of the Exchange's dispute resolution tribunal are posted
outside the trading floor even when the guilty party promptly pays
the judgment rendered against him.2 72 Although exchange rules
limit the maximum fine that can be imposed,2 73 the reputational
effect of making the dispute and judgment public greatly increases
the significance of the sanction.
A court-appointed arbitrator, in contrast, cannot take advantage
of these types of extralegal enforcement mechanisms; he cannot
bring any unique pressures to bear on the parties to induce them to
accept his decision, and the fact that he has rendered a decision
may have no more effect on the parties' reputations than the mere
filing of a claim.
In sum, the private benefits available from the inclusion of
private ADR provisions go far beyond the ex post reduction in delay
and dispute resolution costs. When the parties are able to agree on
an acceptable neutral, narrowly tailored ADR provisions may reduce
the costs of entering into a contract and can be used to reduce the
actual damage suffered by the promisee in the event of breach and
thereby increase the value of a contractual promise. In addition,
such clauses can broaden the range of credible contractual commitments available to the parties and, in certain contexts, can be used
to secure enforcement advantages and the full benefit of reputation
bonds. While some of these gains can be captured through the use
271 See Bernstein, supra note 242, at 128. In general, the use of secrecy as a
"carrot" and publicity as a "stick" is a common feature of trade association dispute
processing procedures. For example, the National Advertising Division of the Council
of Better Business Bureaus ("NAD") requires the dispute to be kept secret until it is
resolved and, under its procedural rules, the organization may "refuse to handle a
case where the challenger [plaintiff] publicizes, or otherwise announces, to third
parties not directly related to the case the fact that specific advertising is being
referred to NAD for resolution." NATIONAL ADVERTISING DIV., COUNCIL OF BETrER
BUSINESS BUREAUS, INC., NATIONAL ADVERTISING REVIEW BOARD PROCEDURES
§ 2.2(B)(v) (1991); see also SelfRegulation: Neutral Forum for Advertisers, 9 ALTERNATIVES 69, 73 (1992) (discussing NAD procedures). This provision can also be
viewed as an attempt to prevent parties from using the NAD process to place a de
facto cloud on title on a competitor's advertising claim.
272 See 17 C.F.R. § 9.13 (1992) (requiring the posting of disciplinary findings in
a "conspicuous" place for five consecutive business days).
273 See CHICAGO MERC. RULES, supra note 270, § 430 (describing maximum
penalties for major and minor violations of exchange rules).
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of private ex post ADR agreements, they cannot, for the most part,
be captured by requiring parties to participate in a non-binding
GAA hearing conducted by a volunteer member of the local bar.
Thus, evidence of the popularity and success of private, consensual,
binding ADR should not be used to justify mandatory non-binding
court-annexed arbitration programs, and should be used with
caution in analyzing the desirability of other types of court-connected ADR programs.
5. The Potential Uses of Private ADR to Increase
the Value of Traditional Adjudication
Although the analysis presented here suggests that the government should not become a provider of mandatory non-binding CAA
programs, and that many of the benefits of private ADR cannot be
fully replicated in court-connected ADR programs, this does not
necessarily mean that ADR cannot be used to increase access to
justice by helping to solve some of the problems created by the high
cost and long delays in civil litigation. 274 Another possible approach to using ADR to help solve the problems facing the federal
courts, would be to amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
explicitly permit parties to use private ADR in place of or in
conjunction with certain pre-trial procedures, 275 and to ensure the
The suggestions made in this section are designed to increase access tojustice
(defined as increasing the likelihood that a plaintiff who suffers $X in damages will
recover an amount as close as possible to $X, net of litigation costs) by reducing the
private cost (that is, the cost to the parties) of obtaining ajudicial resolution of their
dispute. The effect of such proposals on the social cost of litigation and the number
of trials held is more difficult to predict. As the cost of traditional adjudication
decreases, the number of cases filed may increase. More claims will have a positive
expected value, and some disputes that would otherwise have been resolved through
private ADR may now be resolved in court. Alternatively, increasing the pace and
decreasing the cost of discovery might lead to earlier settlements. For a formal
analysis of the likely effects of the availability of bifurcated trials or sequential
decisions on separate issues on parties' litigation decisions and the number of suits
274

filed, see William A. Landes, Sequential Versus Unitary Trials: An Economic Analysis,
22J. LEGAL STUD. 99 (1993).
275 For example, the parties might enter into an agreement to submit all discovery
disputes to a binding determination by a third-party neutral. Alternatively, they might
designate a discovery "wise man" who, in the event of a dispute, will determine, either
with or without a hearing, the information each party will have to produce. The use
of such a "wise man" will greatly limit a party's ability to impose large costs on his
opponent by making unnecessary discovery requests.
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legal enforceability of ADR provisions 276 and other types of
agreements 277 designed to reduce the cost of trial. Such an
approach would create private benefits by reducing the cost of
traditional adjudication, and might also create social benefits by
enabling judges to spend more time deciding questions of law. If
private ADR agreements could be used in this manner, they would
have the potential to create value not only by enabling parties to opt
out of the law, but also by enabling them to leverage the law, that
is, to contract for the mix of private and public dispute resolution
and dispute avoidance techniques 2 78 best suited to their transac279
tion.

276 For example, if, in the event of a dispute, a court would have to permit the
introduction of extensive, and in most cases conflicting, expert testimony to resolve
a highly technical question of fact, the parties could include a provision in their
contract requiring that the issue be submitted to a technically skilled arbitrator whose
determination would be considered binding in any subsequent litigation. This would
have the additional benefit of increasing the accuracy and predictability of the trial
outcome, which would, in turn, narrow the settlement range and may make
settlement more likely. In addition, in some types of disputes this type of provision
may make it possible to resolve the dispute on summary judgment, which is much
quicker and cheaper than a trial, but still enables the parties to get a judicial
determination on questions of law.
277 For example, in cases where the dispute would likely turn on questions of
industry custom, but industry-specific arbitration is not readily available, the parties
might enter into an agreement specifying that in the event of litigation, a particular
expert will be the only person allowed to testify about the content of industry norms.
278 There are some types of ADR processes and provisions that are more
accurately described as alternative dispute avoidance techniques. See, e.g, supra note
275 (describing the use of a discovery "wise man" who determines which documents
each side must produce in the event of a dispute); supra notes 261-63 and accompanying text (describing the use of arbitrators to obtain a declaratory judgment-for
example, in a contract setting, a determination that a particular action will or will not
constitute breach of contract-that would be binding in any subsequent litigation).
279 The recognition that many of both the private and social benefits of ADR can
only be fully realized when ADR agreements are entered into ex ante, that is, before
a dispute arises, suggests that injurisdictions that operate Multidoor Courthouses or
in jurisdictions that use a differentiated case management system where, after an
initial intake conference, a case is routed to one of several "tracks"-each associated
with a distinct set ofpre-trial procedures-the programs' ability to create value for the
parties would be enhanced if parties could elect via a choice of procedure provision
in their contract to submit all disputes that might arise to the track of their choice.
For a more formalized discussion of the differences between ex ante and ex post
ADR, see Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis (July
1993) (Harvard Law School Program in Law & Economics, Discussion Paper No. 131)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has focused primarily on the desirability of one
form of federal court-connected ADR-mandatory non-binding
court-annexed arbitration-but it has also provided a framework that
can be extended to analyze the promise of other types of courtconnected ADR such as mini-trials, mandatory mediation, summary
jury trials, and early neutral evaluation. 280 The numerical simulations of parties' litigation decisions in a CAA jurisdiction with a
post-arbitration fee and cost-shifting provision and the discussion of
the real world factors not captured in the simulations have suggested that CAA programs have distributional effects that are often
overlooked by legislators who draft CAA enabling legislation, judges
who draft local rules implementing the programs, and academics
who evaluate the programs' desirability on both theoretical and
empirical levels. Finally, the exploration of the differences between
private and public ADR has demonstrated that public ADR
programs cannot capture most of the benefits available from private
ADR that lead parties to either include ADR provisions in their
contracts or enter into agreements to use ADR after a dispute has
arisen.
Although the cost and delay involved in civil litigation continue
to increase and impede access to justice, CAA programs will not
increase access to justice and may in fact decrease access to justice
for poorer and more risk-averse litigants by either adding an
additional layer of costly procedure or, in programs with postarbitration fee and cost-shifting provisions, by forcing them to take
more risk. The analysis presented here suggests that further experimentation with federal court-annexed arbitration is unwarranted
since the programs will produce neither private nor social benefits.
280 The analysis presented here has also suggested that in considering the

desirability of public ADR programs in the federal courts, such programs should be
viewed as a bundle of procedural reforms and analyzed as innovations in pre-trial
procedure rather than as substitutes for trial or alternative forms of dispute
resolution.
Supporters of CAA fail to realize that despite the name "court-annexed
arbitration," the dominant feature of most federal CAA programs is not the so-called
arbitration hearing itself. Rather, the programs are more accurately viewed as a
bundle of procedural reforms relating to discovery limits, fee and cost-shifting, and
other aspects of case management. Viewing the arbitration hearing as the most
important program feature has led CAA proponents to contend that any shortcomings in CAA programs can be overcome by improving the quality of arbitrators and
the amount of information revealed at the arbitration hearing. However, the
discussion presented here suggests that this is not the case.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX

NOTATION
Va is the probability of an arbitration award in favor of the
plaintiff and Vt is the probability of a trial verdict in favor of the
plaintiff.
A* and T" are the expected arbitration award and the expected
trial judgment, respectively, if the plaintiff prevails. Let f(A) and
g(T) be the distributions of arbitrated and trial outcomes if the
plaintiff prevails. The outcomes are assumed to be normally
distributed.
Cp and Cd are the plaintiff's and defendant's pre-arbitration
costs. Cp' and Cd' are the plaintiffs and defendant's post-arbitration costs. Costs include attorneys' fees as well as the expenses that
can be recovered under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1988); they are assumed
to be determined exogenously.
Sp is the probability that if the plaintiff alone requests a trial, he
will fail to improve his position by 15% at trial (A + .15A > 7) and
will therefore suffer a cost-shifting sanction and have to pay the
defendant's post-arbitration costs, Cd'.
Sd is the probability that if the defendant alone requests a trial,
he will fail to improve his position by 15% at trial (A - .15A < 7) and
will therefore suffer a cost-shifting sanction and have to pay the
plaintiff's post-arbitration costs, Cp'.
represents an actual arbitration award that has been rendered.
THE MODEL
Suppose that an arbitration has taken place and that an award

A has been rendered in the plaintiff's favor. In deciding whether or
not to request a trial, the plaintiff will compare his expected posttrial position when he alone requests a trial to his post-arbitration
position, and will request a trial only when the former is more
favorable. The plaintiffs post-arbitration position is A - Cp. His
expected post-trial position is:
Eq. 1P

Vt[T* - SpCd' -

Cp'] - (1 - Vt)(Cd' + Cp') - Cp

Consequently, a risk-neutral plaintiff will request a trial when:

Vt[T* - SpCd' - Cp'] - (1 - Vt)(Cd' + cp') > A
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Thus, the award A such that:
Eq. 2P

Vt[T - SpCd' - Cp'] - (1 - Vt)(Cd' + Cp') = A

is the critical point for the plaintiff, denoted Acp, above which it will
always be rational for him to accept the arbitration award and below
which it will always be rational for him to request a trial.
When the plaintiff alone requests a trial, the plaintiffs expected
gain from going to trial is:
Eq. 3P

Vt[T* - SpCd' - Cp'] - (1 - Vt)(Cd' + Cp')

The defendant's expected loss is:
Eq. 4P

Vt[T* + (1 - Sp)Cd'] + (1 - Vt)(O)
Vt[T* + (1 - Sp)Cd']

=

Similarly, once an arbitration award has been rendered in favor
of the plaintiff, the defendant too must decide whether to request
a trial. To do so he will compare his post-arbitration position, A +
Cd, to his expected post-trial position when he alone requests a trial.
His expected post-trial position is:
Eq. ID

Vt[T* + SdCp' + Cd'] + (1 - Vt)Cd' + Cd

Consequently, a risk-neutral defendant will request a trial when:
Vt[T* + SdCp' + Cd'] + (1 - Vt)Cd' < A
Thus, the award A such that:
Eq. 2D

Vt[T* + SdCp' + Cd'] + (1 - Vt)Cd' = A

is the critical point for the defendant, denoted Acd, above which it
is always rational for the defendant to request a trial and below
which it is always rational for him to accept the arbitration award.
When the defendant alone requests a trial, the defendant's
expected loss from going to trial is:
Eq. 3D

Vt[T* + SdCp' + Cd'] + (1 - Vt)Cd'
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The plaintiffs expected gain is:
Eq. 4D

Vt[T* - (1 - Sd)Cp'] - (1 - Vt)Cp'

When the arbitration award falls above Acp and below Acd, a range
referred to in the text as the "dead zone," in the absence of
strategic behavior,28 1 each party, comparing his post-arbitration
position to his expected post-trial position, prefers to accept the
arbitration award regardless of what his opponent decides to do.
The plaintiff will reason that if the defendant decides not to request
a trial, he too is better off not requesting one since the award lies
to the right of Acp, which is, by definition, the award above which
the plaintiffs expected post-trial position, if he alone requests a
trial, is less advantageous than his post-arbitration position. And,
if the defendant does request a trial, the plaintiff is still best off not
requesting a trial since when the defendant alone requests a trial
there is some chance that the plaintiff will not have to bear his own
costs, whereas if both parties request a trial each bears his own costs
regardless of the outcome. Similarly, the defendant will reason that
if the plaintiff decides not to request a trial, he too is better off not
requesting one since the award is to the left of Acd, which is, by
definition, the award below which the defendant's expected posttrial loss, if he alone requests a trial, is greater than his post-arbitration loss if he pays the arbitration award. And, if the plaintiff does
request a trial, the defendant is still best off not requesting a trial
since, if the plaintiff alone requests a trial, there is some chance that
he (the defendant) will not have to pay his litigation costs, whereas
if they both request a trial each will bear his own costs regardless of
the outcome. Thus, in the world of the model, the decision of both
parties to accept the arbitration award when it falls in the dead zone
282
is a Nash equilibrium.

281 In reality, however, parties routinely reject settlement offers that are more
advantageous than their expected post-trial positions in the hope that they will be able
to capture a larger share of the bargaining surplus. Consequently, a party may also
compare A to the most favorable post-trial de novo request settlement amount that
he expects his opponent to accept. Thus, particularly when one side has superior
bargaining power, a trial may be requested even when the arbitration award falls in
the dead zone. The model therefore tends to overstate the probability that the
arbitration award will be accepted by both parties as a final resolution of their case.
See supra note 229.
282 However, as the simulations of divergent expectations and mutual pessimism
suggest, when the parties have different views about their probability of prevailing or
the amount the plaintiff will recover if he prevails, it is possible that a dead zone will
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It is now necessary to consider what happens if the arbitrator
rules in favor of the defendant. In such a case it is clear that the
defendant will never request a trial. The plaintiff, however, will
request a trial as long as his expected gain from doing so is greater
than zero, that is, if:
Eq. 4.5P

Vt[T - Cp'] - (1 - Vt)(Cp' + Cd') > 0

In such a situation the plaintiff's expected gain from requesting a
trial is:
Eq. DPI

Vt[T - Cp'] - (1 - Vt)(Cp' + Cd')

And, the defendant's expected loss is:
Eq. DP2

Vt[T* + Cd'] + (1 - Vt)(0) = Vt[T- + Cd']

Having established the conditions under which each party would
request a trial after an arbitration award has been rendered, it is
possible to compute the plaintiffs expected gain, and the defendant's expected loss, at the outset of the litigation process in a CAA
jurisdiction, and to compare it to the parties' expected gains and
losses at the outset of the litigation process in a trial-only jurisdiction.
In a trial-only jurisdiction with the American Rule, 283 the
plaintiffs expected gain is:
Eq. 5P

Vt[T] - Cp - Cp'

The defendant's expected loss is:
Eq. 5D

Vt[T*] + Cd + Cd'

In a GAAjurisdiction, in order to compute their expected gains
and losses at the outset of the litigation process, the parties will
have to calculate their expected positions in four situations which
occur with the following probabilities:

not exist.
283 Under the American Rule, each side bears its own costs regardless of the
outcome.
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(1) The arbitrator rules for the defendant, which occurs with the
probability 1 - Va, and the plaintiff requests a trial;
(2) The arbitrator rules for the plaintiff and renders an award
A< Acp so 284
that the plaintiff requests a trial, which occurs with
probability:
Acp

probl

Va f(A)dA

(3) The arbitrator rules for the plaintiff and renders an award

A > Acd so that the defendant requests a trial, which occurs with
285
probability:
prob2

Vafj(A)dA
Acd

(4) The arbitrator rules for the plaintiff and renders an award
that is Acp < A < Acd, which occurs with probability:

A

Acd

Va f(A)dA

prob3

Acp

in which case neither party requests a trial and the arbitration award
is entered as the judgment of the court.
For each of these scenarios, the parties must compute their
expected position if the plaintiff wins at trial, which occurs with
probability Vt, and if the plaintiff loses at trial, which occurs with
probability 1 - Vt.
Thus, in a CAA jurisdiction, at the outset of the litigation
process, the plaintiff's expected gain from trial is:
(1 - Va)[Vt(T*- Cp') - (1 - Vt)(Cp' + Cd')] +
Acp

Va[( Jf(A)dA)[Vt(T* - SpCd' - Cp') - (1 - Vt)(Cp' + Cd')]] +

Eq. PG

Ad

VaJ Af(A)dA +
Acp

Va[(ff(A)dA)[Vt(T* - (1 - Sd)Cp') - (1 - Vt)(Cp')]] - Cp
Acd

284 For computational reasons, the simulations use the integral from zero to Acp.
285 For computational reasons, the integral from Acd to two million is used. The
integrand two million was chosen since this is the largest arbitration award ever
rendered in a CAA jurisdiction.
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Similarly, in a GAA jurisdiction, the defendant's expected loss
at the outset of the litigation process is:
(1 - Va)[Vt(T* + Cd') - (1 - Vt)(O)] +
AP
Va[(fJf(A)dA)[Vt(TI + (1 - Sp)Cd') + (1 - Vt)(O)]] +
Eq. DL

-oo

Vaf AJ(A)dA +
Acp

Va[(jf(A)dA)[Vt(T* + SdCp' + Cd') + (1 - Vt)(Cd')]] + Cd
Acd

